


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Study Published on Big Powers Mideast Involvement

44230097D Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 28 Jan 90 p 7

[Article by Yoram Levi]

[Text] To the extent that the situation in the Middle East worsens, the involvement of the USSR in the region will increase, and cooperation between the big powers will tighten—that is the estimate of a team of experts from the Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The members of the institute have begun to publish a series of strategic assessments on various current issues under the name of LOOKOUT.

The first subject discussed within this framework is the possibility for Soviet-U.S. cooperation to speed up a solution to the conflict in the Middle East. The experts believe that nonintervention by the Soviet Union in what is occurring in Eastern Europe stems not only from the desire to protect glasnost and perestroika at home, but also to protect its improved image in the West. However, this precedent, in their opinion, does not guarantee that if events arrive at some red line, which is difficult to define, the Russians will not intervene in what is happening.

As for the United States, the experts from the Davis Institute state that its image as a superpower is harmed by the invasion of Panama (despite the success of the operation) more than the USSR was harmed by the developments in Eastern Europe. But the case of Noriega is also unique, and basic conclusions should not be drawn on that basis regarding future patterns of American behavior.

Against this background, the members of the Davis Institute wondered whether the Americans and the Soviets would cooperate in the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and under what conditions. The experts believe that the intifadah—which, despite Israel's efforts, has not yet subsided—will have a central role in a decision by the big powers whether or not to intervene in the conflict. The responses of the United States and the USSR to the intifadah are defined by the team as lukewarm. While a considerable deterioration in Israel's status in American public opinion was caused by the methods that it uses to suppress the intifadah, the special relations between the two countries were not impaired. Moreover, paradoxically, relations between Israel and the USSR improved precisely in the two years of the intifadah, although there are as yet no diplomatic relations between the them.

In the absence of diplomatic relations, it is hard for the USSR to increase its involvement in what transpires in our region, but that would not keep it from assisting the United States, if the latter were to decide to act more decisively to resolve the conflict. The aid that the USSR could provide is mainly influence and pressure on Syria and the PLO, and several steps have been taken in this

sphere. In the opinion of the experts of the Davis Institute, the Americans now recognize the role of the Soviets in the relative moderation of the PLO, as well as the restraining influence of the USSR on Syria. Syria has even expressed its desire to participate in the peace process. Although the USSR continues to send weapons to Syria, these weapons are intended only to achieve strategic parity with Israel. The experts do not rule out the possibility of another war between Israel and Syria, but they do not believe that it would be with Soviet backing.

As for the United States, the team of experts believes that it will continue to be the leading force in finding solutions to the conflict. Even though the Americans are not interested in acting with great force against their ally, there has been a considerable erosion in their willingness to consider the tactical requirements of the Israeli leadership. "The limit to the approach that calls for active and integrated nonintervention will be...the collapse of the psychological walls that protect Israel in American public opinion and mainly in Congress," the team's report states. "If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is understood as an intercommunal conflict, becomes a civil rebellion or a war with firearms, then it will be seen as spilling over onto the regional level, and if Israeli repression increases and provides difficult scenes for the television screens, U.S. intervention will be possible, and cooperation between the big powers will not only be possible, but almost certain."

The two big powers are interested that negotiations begin in the Middle East, in order to arrive through them at control over the arms race in the region. The Davis Institute team believes that the two big powers have in fact already begun to cooperate in directing the peace process: The USSR is aiding the United States in restraining the process in the United Nations for the recognition of a Palestinian state, and the Americans would apparently agree to the presence of a Soviet observer at the Cairo talks on elections in the territories.

The USSR will obtain influence over Israel with the aid of the card of diplomatic relations, in which Israel is so interested. The experts believe that the refusal of the USSR to renew relations is rooted not only in Israel's opposition to an international conference and to contacts with the PLO, but also to their fear of losing their premier status in the Arab states before the regional picture becomes clear. U.S. pressure on Israel could be felt on the diplomatic level, but also in the sphere of economic and military assistance.

In its conclusion, the team of experts expressed its opinion that the possibility of cooperation between the big powers in the solution of the conflict in the region has increased, and it will come about if the region is on the verge or in the midst of a conflagration, but also if the dimensions of the intifadah and the repression worsen. However, the extent and the level of cooperation will be influenced also by the interpower agenda, and the internal and international situations of the United States

and the USSR. The researchers do not believe that the big powers will let the sides sharpen the conflict, but rather the contrary—to the extent that the conflict worsens, the groundwork will be laid for interpower cooperation. "It appears that only a serious process of

negotiations, beyond the meeting of the three foreign ministers, could prevent the realization of such a forecast. But even in the stages of such negotiations, the interpower cooperation will be greater than was possible up to now," the team sums up.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Strategic Accords Needed With Iraq

44230089A Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 19 Jan 90 p 17

[Article by Avner Cohen]

[Text] The biting and pointed declaration by the president of Iraq early last week that any Israeli attack on Iraqi technological research and development facilities will elicit a strong military response from Iraq is tantamount to a *casus belli* from Iraq in relation to Israel. It was the strongest kind of signal that any Israeli attempt like the attack on the Iraqi reactor in Osirak in 1981 to damage Iraq's aspiration to develop advanced technologies will cause an automatic military show of force. Iraq worries especially about its development in the ballistics and nuclear arenas which has drawn international attention in recent months. The declaration noted that Israel's sensitive technological installations are not immune to attacks.

Many foreign sources indicate that Israel and Iraq are in the midst of a heated technological race of far-reaching significance in the realm of unconventional weapons. It appears that its technological aspirations in the face of Israel's adherence to "Begin's doctrine" (its obligation to work to prevent nuclear capacity in hostile nations) are likely to set the two countries on a path of technological/military confrontation. Such a conflict could set off a Middle East explosion. Only by creating and building strategic understandings on the subject of advanced technological development, through mutual clarifications and the establishment of red lines, for example, will open conflict be avoided.

Underlying Iraq's goal of becoming the leading technological force in the Arab world are obligations which have been given public expression. Israel must keep in mind that technological advances, especially in the realm of nuclear power and space technology, are always tied to the creation of technological possibilities geared to civilian and military uses. Practically, it is very difficult to place limits on the sale of technology with "dual uses," and whoever believes that it will be possible in the long run to prevent the transfer of sensitive technologies is very wrong. When a country with a decent technological base is determined to develop such a technological capacity, no limits will keep it from doing so in the long run. Such limits, however effective, can only bring about delays and difficulties in carrying out technological projects, but they will not prevent them. The nuclear development in Pakistan only proves this point.

Furthermore, an Israeli attempt to prevent such technological progress for Iraq is beyond our capacity (and cannot be accomplished by any other country either), and it cannot be justified. Iraq's goal of becoming a leading technological force in the Arab world is, on the face of it, a legitimate goal. Furthermore, in contrast to Israel, Iraq has signed a nuclear nonproliferation document, a fact which legitimizes its nuclear technological

goals. In any case, even to very sensitive Israeli eyes, it is impossible to view Iraq's technological aspirations as motivated entirely by the desire to create a strategic threat to Israel or to balance the strategic Israeli threat, as seen through Arab eyes.

It is clear that any attempt to repeat an operation like the bombing of the Osirak reactor is a much more complex matter than it was in 1981. First of all, Iraq, according to public knowledge, has dispersed its sensitive technological plants to various places. Second, such an operation, even were it carried out under conditions of national duress, would cause more political harm than any value it might represent.

Do these understandings mean, practically, that we have to abandon "Begin's doctrine?" Not necessarily. We have to guard the objective that "Begin's doctrine" addressed—preventing nuclear capability—but we have to change our way of thinking about how to realize this objective.

This objective will not be achieved through military means but through a set of strategic accords with Iraq. In other words, we have to try to create a system of arms control with Iraq, and especially with regard to its unconventional weapons.

Israeli strategic thinking displays considerable skepticism regarding the feasibility of arrangements for arms control. At a conference on this subject, which took place a few weeks ago at the Institute of Strategic Studies at the University of Tel Aviv, almost all the Israeli participants, both political and academic types, expressed distrust about the possibility of setting up frameworks for arms control in our region. It seems that the source of this pessimism lies in special deep geopolitical conditions which characterize the Arab-Israeli conflict. In other words, before the conflict itself can be resolved by means of the two sides getting to know each other, it is hard to talk about arms control agreements.

This skeptical position is even more intense when the discussion concerns arrangements for control and limitations on unconventional weapons—nuclear, chemical and biological. Such weapons, which currently no one in the Middle East admits to having, are seen as deterrent weapons intended as a last resort. Such weapons, several conference participants argued, would be the last subject to be brought up within the framework of arms control agreements.

It should be remembered, however, that arms control agreements are not only connected to a system of public contracts and signed agreements. A system of understandings, red lines, and informal agreements can build a foundation for a primary system of arms control.

It is possible to argue that even in the current system, without any cooperative arrangements or signed agreements between the two sides, meaning the nuclear status quo in our region, there actually exists, *de facto*, a primary system of arms control based on unspoken

understandings on both sides. Despite the fact that Israel has committed itself not to be the first country to bring nuclear weapons to the region, there is no reason to belittle its nuclear potential.

The position which Israel has been adopting is characteristic of almost the entire Arab world except for Iraq. No hostile Arab nation has tried to develop a nuclear program with threatening potential. It appears that the majority of the countries in the region, in a kind of rare spirit of blind cooperation and without any coordination, have come to agree on the rules of the game as far as the nuclear option in the region is concerned (this may be the reason that Israel recognized Syria's chemical weapons potential as an existing fact). With the exception of Iraq and Libya, none of the Arab nations—certainly not Egypt and Syria—have disputed the system of rules of the game that have been developed in the area of unconventional weapons control. It should be emphasized, however, that this system, based as it is on covert understandings, is likely, in certain circumstances, to turn sour. The recent declaration by Iraq's president is an example of this.

Israel's concern is justified. Just as Iraq amazed the Western world with its prediction regarding control of ballistic technology, it may do the same with regard to nuclear capacity. When it attains such a capacity, it will find an excuse to allow it to exploit its legal right to get around the nuclear nonproliferation agreement or to make its participation dependent on a demand for mutuality on the Israeli side. Under such conditions, arms control will really become more complex and difficult.

It is necessary, therefore, to come to some clear strategic understandings with Iraq—quietly and perhaps through a third party. There must be agreements related to ballistic and nuclear restraints. There are signs that this is possible. The development of such a strategic dialogue, even if its results are incomplete, is important in preventing a violent confrontation between the two sides.

Egyptian POW's Demand Money Owed From Iraq

45000116 Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 18 Mar 90 p 1

[Report by Zakariya Fikri]

[Text] Alexandria—The Egyptian prisoners that have recently returned from Iran have demanded that the government quickly contact the Iraqi authorities to demand the money owed to them for the time they spent working for Iraq before their capture. The returning prisoners have also demanded payment of an allowance for living expenses.

SLA Reportedly Enlisting Beirut Refugees

90OL0304A Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE
in Hebrew 7 Mar 90 p 10

[Article by 'Amit Gurevich]

[Text] The SLA [South Lebanon Army] company deployed in 'Ayysha is the bottle neck of the South Lebanon security zone. The company in fact serves as a one-kilometer barrier between the battle fronts of Amal and Hizballah. In other words, while it is very broad in the al-Biq'a area, it narrows down in the SLA area, then widens again in the Jazzin area. The company's deployment in 'Ayysha ensures control of Lebanon's water line, which is located in the area. In point of fact, the SLA is fighting there for "the whole pot," in order to prevent terrorists from passing through.

Mulazim Awwal (lieutenant) As'ad Nasir is the SLA company commander in the area. He has under his command about 150 troops whose average age is 30. "The main problem of the company," Nasir explained, "is the low recruitment percentage in the area."

Every soldier who comes to the company signs up for one year. At the end of the first year he has to decide whether he wants to continue and to develop a military career, which draws a big salary, or get out. Four soldiers recently went to officers' school from the 'Ayysha company, which is made up of Christians, one Shi'ite, four Druze, and four Sunnis.

Lieutenant Colonel H., deputy instructor with the SLA, said: "Because not many men join the company, in view of the difficult situation in the area (the domestic war in South Lebanon), we are forced to include refugees in the company, namely people who come expressly from Beirut to serve here."

[BAMAHAANE] Are you not afraid that such a company of "mercenaries" may one day turn its back on you?

Mulazim George Gharghurah, SLA deputy company commander: "It is not right to describe our soldiers as 'mercenaries,' although some of them came here for the money. It does not affect the way they carry out their missions, because they understand the military power and the responsibility resting with them. We try to foster corps pride in them, so as to ensure unity." Throughout the base Lebanese flags and portraits of General Antoine Lahd and the late Major Sa'd Haddad, the first commanding officer, are displayed.

[BAMAHAANE] It was alleged that problems existed between the soldiers and the local population on religious grounds.

"That's not true, although recently there have been disputes about occupying houses."

Apparently, many inhabitants abandoned their homes because of threats by terrorist organizations, and the houses were occupied by homeless or wandering people. SLA troops, who fear that terrorists may settle in the area, keep driving the homeless away.

In the past six months, the company carried out three independent campaigns, which were all a complete success. The soldiers apprehended five terrorists who were moving along the main road of 'Ayysha. Tracks were

discovered in each of those campaigns, and SLA troops, who were rushed to the place, wrapped up the job in short order.

[BAMAHANE] Company commander (two gold stars on his epaulets), don't the local inhabitants resent the link between the SLA and the IDF [Israel Defense Force]? Don't they view it as part and parcel of the Zionist enemy?

[Nasir] "No. The local population treats us as a body with which it is worthwhile cooperating, especially for the sake of their personal safety. On the other hand, it is clear to me that without the IDF's support and presence we would have a very tough time holding up. Terrorists sometimes tell us on the radio that we are helping the Israelis. We don't care that they say it. But if Israelis were to tell us that, it would make us very angry, because it's not true."

[BAMAHANE] How do you relate to the Israeli instructor that trains you?

[Nasir] "Not as to a commander, but as a colleague. That's the difference from my viewpoint."

[BAMAHANE] When do you think you will be able to hold the area by yourselves?

[Nasir] "Not yet, especially because of the manpower problem and the pay, which is apparently not yet attractive enough to the locals. You have to remember that this is a dangerous area, so IDF assistance is important."

Lt. Col. H.: "Currently the SLA is holding the local stronghold and is responsible for advanced observation posts and for keeping the roads open. Unfortunately, the day when they will be able to hold the area by themselves is still distant."

Article Explores "Japanese Alternative" Vice EEC

90OA0351A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI
in Arabic 29 Jan 90 pp 24-26

[Article by Shahirah al-Rafi'i: "Egypt and the Dangers of the Opening Up of the East"]

[Text] Last year we presented the case of the shrinkage of our political and strategic importance on the international level, after the first signs of Soviet-American rapprochement and the beginnings of international relaxation, and the effect of that on the volume of aid and loans offered to us. We dealt specifically with the case of American aid, and we said that, for a period of 15 years or more, we had relied upon American aid, among other foreign aid, and still rely on it in plugging the deficit in many sectors. But indications are that this situation cannot continue year after year because Egyptian-Israeli relations have not gone in the direction expected of them when the Camp David Accord was signed, and on the basis of which aid increased during the years 1978-1980 after undergoing deterioration as of

1977. From a second standpoint, the large role which Egypt played in the Middle East case and in the Arab area in general was a factor taken into consideration by the countries granting the aid. But despite the role which Egypt is still playing in the Palestinian case, the recent developments in it have led to the diminution of this role. Or at least, since there is an intimate connection between the "weight" and "heft" of the state from one standpoint and between the size of the aid offered it from another standpoint, we raised the possibility of reduced aid and loans either in the long or short term.

Egypt and Europe After 1992

In the same framework, we presented another case no less important than the first, and that is the future of Egyptian-European relations after the unified common market comes into being at the end of 1992. Although the basic aim of the unified market is to produce internal changes, its effects will spread externally in its relations with other countries outside the European Community.

Our relationship with the European Community will be affected in three main fields: First, the loans and grants (and we mean here especially the bilateral loans and the collective grants which are given in the name of the European Community) will not suddenly change. According to some officials in the European Community, the establishment of the unified market may prevent any of its member states from making loans to another country. But there is no doubt that the organization and unification of political, economic, and monetary policies will lead to unifying collective action, perhaps at the expense of individual policies.

From another aspect, it is well known that European investments have not reached the levels which it was hoped they would reach, and they are now being reduced. With the establishment of the unified market, the trend will be to concentrate investments inside the European Community to take advantage of the benefits of the big market.

The third field which will certainly be affected by the establishment of the unified market is exportation. Despite our diminished presence in the European market, the changes which are expected to occur after 1992 will increase the degrees of competition within the European Community to the point where it may threaten our exports to it.

Today, after the recent developments in Eastern Europe, questions are renewed: Where is our place in this new world? And where is our position, given the recent international changes?

If the fear of the establishment of the unified market is that all of the attention will be directed to inside the market, today another factor of appeal is added, no less important than the measures to finalize the unified market, and that is aiding the countries of Eastern Europe. These two causes have become in fact among the most important priorities of the European Community.

As Ireland's Foreign Minister Collins of the European Community for the current six months said, the most important missions of the Community are its policy toward Eastern Europe, finishing preparations for the unified market, and protecting the environment.

The indicators are clear as to the seriousness in dealing with one of the cases, for monetary and material aid have been raining down on Eastern Europe since the end of last year and even now in an amount which cannot be tracked. In the beginning, the attention was fixed on Poland and Hungary, since they were the first eastern countries which began changing. But today the distribution of gifts equally among the countries of Eastern Europe has begun, whether through bilateral aid or collective aid in the name of the European Community.

The latest development in this accord is the establishment of a European bank for aiding the countries of Eastern Europe, and despite the fact that talks are still going on about its nature and bases, nevertheless, agreement has become final now on its establishment and semifinal on its capital, which will amount to about 10 billion units of European currency. The shareholders will be from among the 24 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Soviet Union and East Germany, but the biggest percentage of the capital will be from the countries of the European Community, the European Investment Bank, and the European Committee in Brussels.

The question now is: What is left for us and the other countries of the Third World?

The Japanese Alternative

Some present the thought of turning to Japan and strengthening relations with her more than they are today, on the basis that she does not have big interests in Eastern Europe or South America. This view may have been correct in time past, but today, as Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu said when he visited West Germany the first part of this year, Japan does not intend to be content with the role she has been playing in a post cold war world of rotating capital and goods. The message which the Japanese Prime Minister sent, as political observers interpreted it, is that given the developing relations with the United States and given the relaxation between the East and the West, Japan will pay greater economic and political attention to Europe. Actually he announced, on this visit of his, loans and grants to the countries of Eastern Europe will amount to billions of dollars.

So the Japanese alternative will not be sufficient to rely on alone, for the developments in Western Europe in establishing the unified market, the developments in Eastern Europe with the fall of the communist regimes, and the role which Japan intends to undertake in that area, have made Japan the other one aiming its clout at the center of attention, at Europe.

On the other side, some are calling for increased Arab cooperation and uniting the Arab groupings to confront the international groupings, and this idea is well-founded, but the likelihood of its happening is remote. What has not happened in thirty years is not going to happen in a year or two, and these recent international developments demand swift action. But nevertheless, this alternative is the most appropriate, if it were carried out.

Perhaps it would be best to proceed in all of these directions—diversifying sources of financing, opening up to new countries, and increasing Arab cooperation—as well as taking an interest in the Eastern countries in the pattern of international interest, especially given the recent developments there, for opportunities abound to increase the volume of trade with them.

The world around us is changing very swiftly and unexpectedly.

Centers of gravity vary and international interests vary.

Priorities retreat and priorities advance.

If we do not move with the same speed and in the same measure, we will find no place for ourselves in this new world.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

New Armed Group Reported in Nabulus

44230088B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 16 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Yizhar Be'er]

[Text] In the casbah in Nabulus, an armed group called the "General Security Service" has begun operating recently.

The group functions in the name of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising against violent elements in the city who engage in murder, abductions, and interrogations of Palestinian residents.

Yesterday, around 4:00 p.m., a group of eight people wearing masks and armed with three pistols and a submachine gun marched in the streets of the old city in Nabulus.

The incident, it should be noted, took place in broad daylight in view of a large crowd and with no interference on the part of the Army.

The masked group made an announcement to residents over a mobile loudspeaker in the name of the General Security Service in which they called for a halt to the violence in the town and warned those involved in abductions, interrogations, and murders of Palestinian residents suspected of collaborating with the enemy.

After the declarations, they fired four shots in the air.

Recently in the town, there have been many abductions of residents interrogated by violent groups who are continuing the work of the "Black Panther" and the "Red Eagle" which were destroyed by the IDF [Israel Defense Force] in recent months.

In several of the cases, it became clear that those abducted were innocent, even according to the strict criteria of these violent groups.

Palestinian sources reported yesterday that the event highlights the substantial effort which the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising is putting into enforcing its authority over the independent organizations operating in Nablus.

In the past, denunciations and proclamations on the part of the command and even of Yasir 'Arafat himself have not succeeded in stopping the actions of such groups who have argued that the territories must lead the uprising and not leadership from abroad.

Now the leadership has decided to impose its authority on these groups with armed power, and it is not totally unlikely that, in the near future, there may be confrontations with live ammunition between the various armed groups over control of the town.

Hamas Circulates Its Credo

44230088A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 12 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Eytan Rabin]

[Text] Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] recently distributed a 79-page pamphlet describing its credo. A small number of copies of the pamphlet were circulated. "We believe that our struggle with the Jews over the land of Palestine does not distinguish between Left and Right. From our perspective, all of them bear arms and are murderers. It is enough that they migrated from other countries to settle in Palestine against the wishes of our people," they wrote in the pamphlet in which the organization's relationship to the Palestinian question is explained.

The pamphlet is bound in violet and pink and has a drawing of a map of Israel against a setting sun. The name of the pamphlet is: "The Relationship of Hamas to the Palestinian Problem." The author of the pamphlet is Mahmud Ben-Yusuf, apparently a pseudonym. One of the articles in the pamphlet appears under the headline, "The failure to gain control of the holy lands is the fault of those who have distanced Islam from the battle with the Jews in opposition to the spirit of Islam." Another headline says: "Our struggle with the Jews is a struggle between truth and falsehood, between Islam and Judaism."

One of the most important chapters in the pamphlet deals with the differences of opinion between Hamas and the United National Command and with the question of why the two groups do not unite. The answer to

this question is complex and reasoned. Hamas believes that the organizations connected with the United Command are capable of infiltration by "enemy intelligence who have been able to recruit dozens of weak-willed souls within the organizations. We had a bitter experience when Hamas tried to cooperate with Fatah which led to the majority of the Hamas leadership in the territories being arrested."

The structure of the United National Command is also not acceptable to Hamas members. "The structure of the United National Command is composed of a number of elements, and this demonstrates that it is not united from a political perspective or from its vision of the future. For example, they publish manifestoes with a number of different versions, and they even did something serious when, in manifesto No. 25, they attacked the Hamas organization in one version but not in another."

In chapter one of this pamphlet, the basic principles of the organization for solving the Palestinian problem are presented:

- Release of prisoners.
- Opposition to settlements.
- Opposition to deportation policy.
- Resistance to occupation and SHABAK [General Security Service] entrapment.
- Opposition to tax collection policy.

The last chapter of the pamphlet deals with the goals of the organization:

- Resistance to the solution of surrendering, opposition to Camp David, autonomy and an international conference.
- Constant activity to chase out the conquerors and liberate the homeland and the holy places from the contamination of the occupation.

Accomplishment of the goals will take place in stages:

- Maintaining the momentum of the Palestinians in occupied Palestine.
- Emphasizing the Islamic nature of the Palestinian problem.
- Emphasizing the opposition of the Palestinian people to the U.S. plan.
- Emphasizing that under discussion is the entire system and not a specific part.
- There is no leadership for the Palestinian people other than religious Islamic leadership.
- Self-sufficiency of the Palestinian people with little in their daily lives in order to engage in a total boycott of the enemy's institutions.
- Sabotaging attempts on the part of Israel to stop the intifadah.

EGYPT

Ministry Plans To Store Water Each Winter

45000115 Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 14 Mar 90 p 2

[Text] Muhammad Mazin, first deputy at the Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources and head of the Irrigation Authority, has announced that it has been decided to store 1.5 billion cubic meters of water annually in Buhayrat [Lake] al-Burullus in the northern delta region during the winter damming period, as the water had previously been lost to the sea without being used. He affirmed that the government of Holland has decided to contribute 5 million guilders (roughly \$3 million) to take part in project studies to be carried out during the coming year's [work] plan. This water could be used in horizontal [as published] agricultural expansion projects.

Al-Banna on MB Party, Jama'at, Political Methods

90DA0346A Kuwait AL-SIYASAH
in Arabic 21 Jan 90 p 11

[Interview with Ahmad Sayf-al-Islam al-Banna, son of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood; place and date not specified]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

[AL-SIYASAH] Does the Muslim Brothers' entrance into legislative assemblies, and their resolve to do so, achieve one of the group's goals, or has the price of a presence become great, as some are affirming?

[Al-Banna] We rely on the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood [MB] in the Peoples's Assembly as a means to convey our call, not only the call directed at the people, but also the call directed at the government and at confronting the very persons who hold power.

The general rule is that we can convey that call to the ruler and to ministers only through legal channels, which are represented by the People's Assembly. Another thing: If idols were worshipped in the People's Assembly to the exclusion of God, we would be obliged to arise, as did God's prophet, God bless him and grant him salvation, to fulfill the commandment to oppose them and to convey God's call to those persons [who worship idols]. Generally, the People's Assembly will not in any case be worse than pre-Islamic Mecca. If there are idols in the People's Assembly, we would be obliged to storm it and to convey this call to the leaders of unbelief and idolatry. If we appeal to powerless people and do not confront the rulers with the call, this would be characterized—and I say this frankly—by cowardice. "A man who has stood forward is lawful, because He entrusted and proscribed him."

[AL-SIYASAH] However, some are saying that you are concluding a truce with the government?

[Al-Banna] Those accusing us of concluding a truce with the government are fleeing from confronting the rulers. We will confront those responsible for corruption and torture. I can affirm that what the Muslim Brothers have said in the Peoples's Assembly has never been said by anyone in this assembly at any time. We have spoken with complete frankness of the lack of restraint, terrorism, and oppression being encountered by the people. Our presence in the People's Assembly is by the grace and favor of God.

Another thing is that Imam Hasan al-Banna ran for parliament to convey to officials the command of the call. He discussed that from a juristic standpoint, asking whether or not his participation in parliament should be considered participation in the ruling authority. He concluded that it should not be considered as such. We reject power from the dais of power. How can it be said that we are participating in the government? Can we be judged by the government's hypocrisy when we declare ideas contrary to it regarding every matter? The logic here is reversed. [passage omitted]

[AL-SIYASAH] You have been in the assembly for six years. Nonetheless, have the people felt the influence of the MB inside the assembly?

[Al-Banna] Our presence in the assembly is established under the minority clause. We cannot make decisions. Our only prerogative in this case is to report. Nonetheless, we have disclosed or spoken about all aspects of corruption, thereby gaining great popularity. We may have suffered losses inside the assembly, but they should be weighed against the gains that we have made outside the assembly. The Muslim Brothers have defended the application of the *shari'ah* [Islamic law], maintained that the policy of torture and the use of force and violence are unacceptable, attacked bribery, and insisted on democracy. All of that continues. We asked the information minister to broadcast the sessions of the People's Assembly on television in full so that the facts become clear. However, he denied the request, because the full broadcast of the sessions would raise the people's consciousness, benefit the opposition, and be conducive to sounding the alarm inside the assembly, thereby preventing [the enactment of] many oppressive laws. Here, I affirm that if the Muslim Brothers were not currently in the assembly, more damaging laws might have been issued. We are winning some battles, and our presence in the assembly is reducing the sharpness and severity of laws. You can read the minutes to find out whether we have been flattering or dissembling toward anyone. We have raised issues in the assembly that no one else has raised.

The Story of the Alliance

[AL-SIYASAH] It is also frequently heard that you are not operating independently inside the People's Assembly, but within the framework of an alliance with an existing political party. [passage omitted]

What is your conception of the future of the alliance?

[Al-Banna] The alliance will continue. It must continue to achieve the goals for which we formed it. All of the parties participating in it see no reason to dissolve it conclusively. The Wafd Party and the NPUG [National Progressive Unionist Grouping] Party may join us again at a subsequent time.

[AL-SIYASAH] Some affirm that the alliance is currently unnecessary. What is your comment?

[Al-Banna] I ask them: Why is the alliance unnecessary? We are pursuing a defined goal, and an alliance is better than disunity.

[AL-SIYASAH] Some believe that this alliance might not continue owing to the schism that occurred in the [Socialist] Labor Party. The MB had been supporting and cultivating it to the extent that some affirmed that the MB wishes to gain control of the party. Is this so?

[Al-Banna] What happened in the Labor Party is purely an internal matter in which the MB has no involvement. Also, the socialist wing, which grew out of the Labor Party, supported the alliance, and they were nominated based on the alliance's principles. They agreed to all of the points contained in our alliance with the Labor Party. However, their subsequent dispute over administrative positions inside the party is no business of ours. Therefore, we did not attempt to reconcile them lest we be accused of wanting to aid one faction to the exclusion of another. However, behind this split are certain parties with an interest in fragmenting the opposition parties. They helped to split the Labor Party and are now attempting to give them legitimacy. The same parties are also currently attempting to cause a split inside the Wafd Party in order to weaken the opposition.

A Political Party for the MB

[AL-SIYASAH] Although we know that the constitution prohibits the formation of a party on a religious basis, we nonetheless pose this question to you: Are you working toward establishing a party? What is your attitude toward this entire issue?

[Al-Banna] There are attempts to form a political party, but they are expected to fail, because the state does not want the MB to have a party. The Parties Law is formulated in such a way as to ultimately prevent the MB from having a party.

We are attempting to form a political party, but it is expected that this party will not be permitted to appear at all. So what do you do?

We exist whether or not there is an alliance, and we existed before the alliance. The state knows that. We are growing day by day. This is incontestable. The state must know that regardless of what it did to the Islamic current, it will never be able to do what 'Abd-al-Nasir did to it. It is better for it to coexist with the Islamic current, and to

recognize its existence instead of attempting to annihilate it, because the annihilation of this current is impossible. Let them learn a lesson from what happened in the past. Finally, I say that there is no reason to attempt to uproot the Islamic current because, if they uproot them now, another group, which might be more extremist than the current group, would arise.

If the state recognized Israel, why does it not recognize the Islamic current?

It gave legitimacy to a state that usurps land. Why does it not grant legitimacy to the Islamic current. It gave legitimacy to the NPUG Party. Why does it not give legitimacy to the Islamic current?

[AL-SIYASAH] However, is it possible to disregard the existing legal stipulation without changing it?

[Al-Banna] The present law permits the formation of a party based on religious and spiritual principles. There is no reason to fear the establishment of an Islamic party and a Christian party, which would call to Islam and Christianity with sincerity. Both would advocate religious and spiritual values. [passage omitted]

[AL-SIYASAH] Then how did extremist ideas grow or appear. Do not some ascribe such ideas to the writings of the MB?

[Al-Banna] The issue is more complex than that. The MB's absence in the arena for a time, and the employment of a policy of torture inside the prisons, created extremist ideas, all of which grew as a reaction to the torture that occurred in 'Abd-al-Nasir's time. In those circumstances, formal legal opinions appeared which leveled the charge of unbelief against the ruler, who had resorted to means of torture worse than any described in the course of time. It is natural that someone would appear in order to charge the ruler with unbelief and to call for permitting his assassination. However, all of this must be placed in its proper context.

With the appearance of unbelief, new ideas also appear, which are based on the idea of unbelief. The policy of torture practiced against the Islamic current left the current no choice but to become intellectually extremist and to sentence unbelief with these means, or to become extremist in terms of practice and behavior, and to find itself wishing to practice killing. I can almost say that if the policy of torture toward the Islamic current ceases, these formal legal opinions would be lifted, because the government is the cause of the growth of this extremism, either by its pursuit of a policy of torture or by its encouragement of this policy. I said that in the People's Assembly.

[AL-SIYASAH] However, what is the MB's position on extremist ideas and behavior?

[Al-Banna] The MB is against internal extremism and assassinations. We have acted against British and Zionist colonialism, and we have called the people to a jihad for the liberation of their fatherlands. We are against any

attempts to settle accounts domestically. We incite and mobilize the people against the Jews who occupy the land of Palestine. This action is legal from the standpoint of international law. The aid given by the MB to the Palestinians is a legal act, not a terrorist act.

Violence in the Egyptian Arena

[AL-SIYASAH] What then are the MB's methods for achieving its goals?

[Al-Banna] The MB's true method is education. If all of us focused on calling the people to the sound path, we would solve many problems. The only solution is to adhere to Islam. If each person applies the method of education to himself and his family, and tries to convince others to do so, the result would be that the majority of the people would someday change. No government would be able to resist all of the people.

A clear example of this is the change in the definition of the Islamic *shari'ah* from being "a main source of legislation" to being "the main source of legislation" in al-Sadat's era. When he sent committees to survey public opinion, the masses demanded that the *shari'ah* be the law, and he was compelled to establish this stipulation in the constitution. Therefore, if the people have agreed unanimously about something, the government must change it.

The MB has actually begun to change society's customs. Currently, Islamic marriage is practiced, the veil has become widespread, and celebrations are held in the mosques. Our impact on Egyptian society has become prominent, regardless of the increase in attempts to spread corruption. A clear indication of this is the more widespread distribution of religious books. If we continue in this way, in an atmosphere of freedom, the entire Egyptian people will become convinced of our idea, which precedes all ideas. After all that, do you ask why we resort to violence? We do not need such a method. We need only stability and freedom. We want no more than the freedom to act. This is what God's prophet, God bless him and grant him salvation, demanded when he said "give me and the people a free hand," because freedom provides a field of action for all; it enables the movement of ideas, so that they become embedded. I repeat, we do not need violence.

[AL-SIYASAH] However, how can the violence in the arena be stopped?

[Al-Banna] The response is that the state must first stop the torture. In the People's Assembly, I said that we do not wish to spin around in a vicious circle of killing and being killed. We want to end this pattern. It is most fitting that the state first undertake to end it. It must combat torture and implement the law so that it is applied to those at fault alone. The confiscation of people's honor, even if such people were subsequently released, is a different matter. Can we expect someone who has been tortured to be quiet after that?

My response is that such a person will not be quiet. Thus, the matter has gone beyond the presence or absence of religion or Islam to become a purely personal struggle. Every action has a reaction.

[AL-SIYASAH] How do you perceive the role of leading religious personalities regarding this problem.

[Al-Banna] In the People's Assembly, I stated that if formal legal opinions are to serve the people, we have only to begin with reform. [passage omitted]

Disagreement With the Islamic Societies

[AL-SIYASAH] There are issues in the arena that are being broached by the Islamic societies. It is well-known that there are clashes between you and them. What is the extent of this discord?

[Al-Banna] We precede the societies historically, and we are clearer than them ideologically. Regarding the issue of forcefully changing what is reprehensible, we differ from them regarding several secondary matters. We always say that no matter how much we differ with the Islamic societies, it is a slight difference, not exceeding five percent. We agree with them on all other matters. Do the adherents of Islam plot against each other because of a trivial, marginal disagreement? We must work together, abandon disagreements, cooperate on what we agree on, and forgive each other our differences. It is difficult and unacceptable to disregard anarchy, apostasy, religious ideas, piety, and those who destroy religious and spiritual principles, so that we might occupy ourselves exclusively with our disagreements. We must refrain from discord, until God decides a matter which was done. We call on the Islamic societies to cooperate, maintain solidarity, and aim all weapons against Islam's enemies, not against Muslims. We implore God for divine guidance for them.

One last word: A difference of opinions must not cause a person to go beyond reasonable limits, such as saying that entering the People's Assembly is blasphemy, and that opposition to the ruler supports the sovereign power. All of this is baseless talk. [passage omitted]

The Islamic Economic Projects

[AL-SIYASAH] Numerous parties state that the MB is undertaking extensive economic activities, and the government has recently charged that the MB supported the investment companies. What is your comment?

[Al-Banna] The MB were not behind any of the companies of which you speak. However, what happened is that an Islamic current appeared on the surface by virtue of the spread of the MB's ideas and Islamic consciousness in general. Thus, there came to be an enormous sector of people who no longer accept transactions with interest. The government has disregarded the existence of this current. However, the owners of the investment companies, with their economic sense, perceived the existence

of these forces, and they were quicker than the government in mobilizing these funds. In other words, they knew the right time, and their companies provided an outlet for these sentiments. Bank Faysal began to operate when it sensed that there was an Islamic current to which deference must be given by accumulating its funds and investing them in what is permitted. [passage omitted]

[AL-SIYASAH] Could you comment on what subsequently happened to these companies?

[Al-Banna] Everything that happened to these companies is altogether the government's responsibility. It is also the government's responsibility to return to every depositor his money, because these companies were operating within the sight and hearing of the government, which did nothing, even regarding the advertising campaigns published in the newspapers and broadcast on television. Officials also participated in establishing these companies' projects. Then, the government turned against them. The state is responsible for the delay in intervening. It then intervened in an erroneous fashion by issuing an unexpected law to deal with the matter all at once.

"To be continued."

Former Minister Links Debt, Starvation, Threat to West

900A0333A Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF
in Arabic 22 Jan 90 pp 30-32

[Interview with Dr. Isma'il Sabri 'Abdallah by Usamah Salamah: "Beware of Revolt of Two Billion Starving People; IMF Conditions Will Bring About World Disaster"; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

[Sabri] Whereas the crisis became aggravated toward the end of the eighties, the early years of the nineties will witness a solution to this very difficult problem. The creditor countries will make every effort to hit upon a settlement, primarily for their own benefit. For if they insist on maintaining the status quo and collecting the debts by the due date, they will withdraw all the money and resources of the debtor countries, whereupon these countries will be forced to halve their development and their situations will become doubly worse. They will be unable to buy the products of the industrialized world—40 percent of the advanced exports go to developing countries. Lower exports lead to lower production, higher unemployment rates and a drop in world trade volume, thus threatening the world economy with a new disaster. That is why advanced countries find themselves obligated to find a solution to the debt problem.

These countries have actually begun to put forth a number of proposals and initiatives that center around forgiving part of the less-developed countries' debts. This includes the proposal submitted by French President Mitterrand offering a fair solution to the debt

problem, centered around the concept of Third World countries using these debts to import goods and advisors from creditor countries, thus returning the money in a different form and, consequently, forgiving part of these debts as an international duty. This proposal, however, has been turned down by Western countries.

As for the Brady Plan proposed by the American treasury secretary, it calls on the creditor banks to forgive 20 percent of the due debts, but this solution was also made contingent upon IMF approval, thus rendering very small the number of countries that undertook this solution. Mexico was one of these countries.

There is also Soviet President Gorbachev's initiative that proposed rescheduling the debts over a period of 100 years, which means the debts will reach one-fourth of their value only, or, in some cases, cancelling the debts, something the Western countries have rejected as well. Even the Soviet parliament has turned down this proposal, blaming Gorbachev for undertaking this initiative without authorization, because Russia is a creditor country and has an interest in collecting its debts in full.

Generally speaking, Dr. Isma'il said, the debt crisis has reached a point where it is scientifically impossible for Third World countries to pay their debts in full, no matter what sacrifices their governments are willing to make and no matter how much starvation and deprivation their people will face, and for creditor countries to collect their debts in full. Consequently, to resolve the crisis, it is incumbent to discuss measures within the bound of the following three principles: reducing the overall debt, forgiving part of the less developed countries' debts and setting a reasonable ceiling for interest and, finally, rescheduling the debts for longer periods of time and with easier terms. Naturally, these solutions will be applied to each country separately according to the constitution of its debts.

Where does Egypt stand on these initiatives and proposed solutions?

Egypt is in an odd and difficult position. The initiatives propose forgiving part of the debts owed by poorer countries. Egypt is not one of those countries and, therefore, will not benefit from this measure as it will not benefit from reducing debts owed to banks, because 80 percent of our debts are owed to governments rather than banks. The problem is that negotiations for settlement must be followed by political concessions. Banks look at the matter from a purely financial perspective in terms of gains and losses and whether it is in their interest to keep a client afloat or to bankrupt him. Governments, however, look at the matter first and foremost from a political perspective and, therefore, financial concession must be matched by political concessions. Add to that the fact that such financial concessions are not made by the chief of state, as is the case with all Third World countries, but rather by the parliament whose policies are often swayed by lobbies. Take

America, for example, which is the source of 40 percent of our overall debts. Its policy is controlled by Congress whose policy is guided to a large extent by Jewish lobbies, hence the following question: Will Congress agree to forgive part of our debts as it did for Israel? Furthermore, American aid to Egypt is expected to be cut in the coming years. For example, I do not think that the additional aid Egypt and Israel receive as a grant to establish peace in the Middle East will last through the nineties, especially since the Camp David Accords were concluded ten years ago. Naturally, America will not give us this grant forever, particularly since Egypt and Israel alone received 40 percent of aid to Third World countries. Will this situation continue in the nineties or not?

Naturally, the matter is tied to satisfaction with the country's policy.

[Salamah] This means that countries indebted to banks are in a better position than those indebted to governments?

[Sabri] Yes, because banks usually do not have an interest in bankrupting a client. This is the last thing they want to do because it is in their interest to keep a client borrowing.

[Salamah] Some Arab economists are advocating a proposal to solve the Arab debt problem by establishing an Arab emergency fund to grapple with these debts. Is it possible to establish such a fund and how?

[Sabri] The problem now is that there is no Arab country not suffering from a balance of payments deficit. [passage omitted]

Therefore, it is virtually impossible to finance such a fund.

[Salamah] The Committee of the South, of which your excellency is a member, has called for the establishment of a debtor club opposite the "Paris Club" in an effort to stand up to IMF hegemony. [passage omitted]

How have the debtor countries responded to this call?

[Sabri] Most countries do not favor this call. When we in the committee drafted a communique and sent it to all Third World countries, only a limited number expressed their approval. The majority sent a message to us saying: We are with you in heart but cannot be part of this. The main reason is pressure from creditor countries. Even the United States has threatened not to hold negotiations with or to grant loans to any country that takes part in such a conference, hence, these countries' refrain from participating in such a club.

[Salamah] This means that because of the creditor countries' intransigence and the debtor countries' fear, any North-South dialogue is doomed to failure. What role can the Committee of the South play in this dialogue?

[Sabri] The world has changed and the dialogue is no longer bilateral between the North and the South. Now

that the East has joined as a party, it has turned into a trilateral dialogue. The existence of an international dialogue notwithstanding, Third World countries have not taken part in it because we are still dealing with a backward agenda drawn up in the seventies on the basis that the socialist countries that support us politically are not deeply involved in economics and, therefore, have remained neutral and do not take part in formulating international economic policies. This picture, however, is changing, for the East is calling for world unity and interdependence among the nations. We in the south committee are aware of these developments.

It is true that initially we were operating on a traditional basis, namely dialogue between the North and South. But we quickly realized this mistake and prepared a report addressed to all countries of the South, pointing out to them the mistake they were making in talking about the problems of the nineties as though they were the problems of the seventies. The report included the problems that could be facing these countries in the nineties. [passage omitted]

[Salamah] If the world is headed for international cooperation, can the countries of the South play a role in this cooperation, at least in easing the pressures they are under?

[Sabri] Actually, the countries of the South have to cooperate to force their issues on the world. Intentions to step up cooperation are not enough. Reality says that Third World countries need manufactured materials produced by the industrialized countries. As for raw materials, there is no demand for them in developing countries, and industrialized countries do not need them now that alternatives have been discovered. Consequently, they will only buy manufactured materials and, therefore, the world is headed for cooperation only among the rich. All the advanced world wants from the developing world is its money. Third World investments abroad, according to IMF calculations, amounted to \$600 billion in 1985, or equal to the entire developing world's debts. Indeed, if the profits from these investments alone were to be diverted to these countries, the problem of satisfying the debts and interests on the debts would be solved.

The Third World has now become the financial backer of the industrialized world. Interest paid on loans and profits of direct investments transferred out of these countries amount to \$50 billion. If we add the flow of capital from the Third World to the industrialized world for investment, the amount of money going from the South to the North goes up to \$100 billion. Accordingly, the poor countries are financing the rich countries and not the other way around. That is why development policy in the Third World countries ought to be reconsidered and ways to keep capital in the country must be explored.

[Salamah] Third World countries, including Egypt, are now facing the problem of negotiating with the IMF that

is insisting on certain policies that have surely failed in countries that have tried to implement them. Why is the IMF insisting on these policies?

[Sabri] The IMF is dominated by a capitalist colonialist ideology which is like a religion and a doctrine to IMF responsible officials who do not wish to go into a scientific discussion with anyone. They are not at all interested in the human factor and are not concerned with the disastrous effects their policy might have. They only deal in figures and calculations and are only interested in balancing their sheets, even if it leads to the death of thousands of starving children. In one meeting, I told them, "You are like the ignorant and the clergy of a decadent religion." Like the religious extremists, they are fanatics who are well aware that countries who borrow from them will be ruined if they were to adopt their policy, but they do not care. Therefore, we must force them to discuss our problems, be it by logical or illogical means for Third World peoples will overtake their governments.

These peoples may resort to such tactics as international terrorism and crime and will find allies in these countries, for killers sometimes kill because of hunger. That is why I am warning the industrialized countries not to spread despair in the hearts of two billion people, because this manpower will go to these countries despite immigration restrictions and can ruin many things. The computer virus was spread by a group of juveniles, so what would prevent a group of Third World youth from doing the same thing in order to ruin and indeed destroy life in these countries whose existence depends on the computer. Therefore, one must not count on hundreds of millions of starving people for help, because no one can control or restrain them if they are desperate enough and hungry enough to die.

Communists Defend Marxism, Explain European Events

90OA0341A Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 22 Jan 90 p 8

[Article by Salim Ghurur and 'Isam Kamil]

[Text] 1989 was the year of the downfall of communism. The beginning was in the Soviet Union, then the peoples of the East European countries, taking their cue from it, staged demonstrations that brought down communism in these countries.

In Poland, the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] was brought down and the opposing Solidarity labor union came into power. In Hungary Janos Kadar fell and the communist party was disbanded. In East Germany Erich Honecker and his successor Egon Krenz departed. In Bulgaria Todor Zhivkov departed and in Czechoslovakia he was followed by Gustav Husak.

Thus communism in the world fell in succession, and the day will come when communism will become something of the past.

With the downfall of communism, Egyptian communists have been in a state of disarray. Some of them say that the fault was in the practical application and not in the theory. Some others affirm that what happened was one stage in the development of communism, for communism is a theory and not a creed! Yet a third group believes that Marxism has not been implemented in the 20th century.

Now what do the Egyptian communists have to say after what has happened?

Mahmud Amin al-'Alim said: In my estimate what happened was the fourth stage of the development of socialism, both in concept and in application. The first stage was that of the creation of the Marxist theory by Marx and Engels in the 19th century. The second stage was that of practical application during Lenin's era, whether in order to resist the intervention war or the civil wars, or the stage of consolidating the pillars of the Soviet authority and the new Soviet society. The third stage, in my estimate, was the Stalinist era, and the fourth stage is the one we are witnessing now.

We can say, he continued, that this stage is a reaction to the stage of ideological stagnation, decline of democracy, and the consecration of the Stalinist model as the only and the ideal socialist model.

Therefore, he added, the new stage is not a break away from the Marxist theory stage or from socialism. Rather, it is a democratic consolidation of it within the framework of rectifying negative applications.

Consequently, he added, what happened was an absolute resumption of the fundamentals of Marxism and not a break away from them. It is not a repetition or blind application, but rather it is a renewed resumption that takes into consideration the realities and the new world conditions, as well as the domestic socioeconomic conditions which the stage of negative application and the stage of stagnation have brought into light.

Dr. Isma'il Sabri 'Abdallah said: I would like very briefly to say that what happened in the Soviet Union was a misapplication resulting from the Soviet Union's economic, scientific, and social growth; it did not result from the Soviet Union being backward. This is a fundamental point. If it was backward it would have remained so, but it was society that dictated this change because the forces of production have changed. For example, those who finished 10 years of schooling total 45 million people. With regard to planning during severe drought conditions, they resorted to distribution with coupons, as in the case of food supplies.

But, he continued, when the society begins producing goods and the purchasing power increases, the consumer has the freedom of choice. There was no study of the consumer's behavior; it is as if he were a sensible human that would be satisfied only with the necessary!

What happened in the Soviet Union, he added, was bound to happen; its magnitude grew in relation to the delay in change. Some 20 years ago I wrote an article criticizing the situation in the Soviet Union from a democratic standpoint. I said that the question of democracy in the socialist states is a current question. The forms [of government] that were devised in the twenties, when the Soviet Union was under siege and the fascism facing it in the West was growing, cannot remain practicable from now on after all the progress it has achieved.

He continued: During my first trip to the Soviet Union in 1967 I told our Soviet friends that it is inconceivable that involvement in politics in the Soviet Union should be restricted to 13 million citizens, members of the Communist Party.

"I would say," he added, "that the traditional formula of the communist party proved its impracticality in the third world countries, with an exception in the cases of national liberation wars as in China and Vietnam. Many people are dedicated to socialism without being associated with Marxism. The Marxists no longer have the right to claim monopoly of the highest form of socialism."

Dr. Isma'il Sabri 'Abdallah added: Obviously the deficiency was in the application and not in the theory, for the simple reason that there is no theory for the socialist society and there is no special theory for the socialist economy. All that we have is books describing the Soviet experiment. Also the concept that says that a model has historically been established and therefore others must copy it is a concept hostile to Marxism, because the essence of Marxism is that everything changes and that you should not swim in the same river twice. Marx often wrote that history does not repeat itself.

"In order for me to say that the theory is wrong," he continued, "I must assume that it consists of components or a description of how the socialist economy should be. But such a theory is nonexistent. What we have is a certain method that analyzes contradictions within the society and classifies them into hostile and nonhostile contradictions, and seeks to advance the society and change it through alliance, though not in an absolute manner, with forces with which it has no major contradiction, against the forces of exploitation and tyranny within a specific society. Even in the historical analysis that Marx offered to all humanity, much of what he offered was not a universal analysis. Marx basically analyzed Europe's history, the primitive society, the slavery society, and then feudalism. These social forms occurred in European history, some of which you will not find the likes of in ancient civilizations. For example, ancient Egyptian civilization did not know slavery and the farmer was always free. Different situations occurred in China."

Writer and journalist Salah 'Isa said: It is wrong to look at what is happening in the East European countries as

being the result of the same reasons or heading in the same direction, although there is a common factor, namely the inclination toward multiplicity of views and imposing a democratic and popular control on the executive authority's performance. But some of these countries faced economic difficulties relating to a drop in productivity and an increase in foreign debts, such as Hungary, while other countries, like Poland, had no foreign debts.

"I think," he continued, "what is happening there will develop with every East European country having a different future. I am not one of those who see the straw in other people's eyes and fail to see it in their own. Whether socialism succeeds or fails is unimportant, because countries like ours do not adopt any of the virtues of socialism. We are a nation living under an omnipotent authority. We now must pay attention to our own problems. The Egyptian socialists never ruled or applied their policy in any Arab country."

Lutfi al-Khuli said: What is happening now is a rectification process under new conditions, which is the existence of a powerful socialist world headed by the Soviet Union with all its powers, and which is one of the two superpowers that has realized the facts of the age better than is being realized by leaders of the capitalist world as a leadership. The rectification is now being carried out in a revolutionary manner because it is the masses that are rectifying power from the top. We were wrong in regarding socialism as achievable with one single revolution. In the socialist world today we have two experiments: In one, some people are carrying out the rectification from the top with a new awareness of their age, in another rectification is being imposed on others from the bottom by the masses that are aware of the needs and dictates of the age.

Salah 'Isa continued: There are several phenomena that we should take into consideration. What has been happening in the Soviet Union since 1985, in the light of Gorbachev's own statements, the perestroika documents released so far, and the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Central Committee meetings, confirm that there is a deep crisis involving the ideological structure of the Soviet experiment in socialism relating to application. What I would like to focus on is the ideological and practical dilemma in the socialist experiments. Lenin's experiment was theoretical. In application, Stalin, as an individual, came and changed both this experiment and its course, despite the existence of a strong revolutionary party that has led the revolution. Consequently, the question is: How was this individual able to assume all these powers and become a dictator—that is not to say an autocratic ruler—despite the existence of the working class and the party? Which means that there was something wrong in the application and in the ruling ideology.

"What is happening in the Soviet Union," Lutfi al-Khuli added, "has distinguished characteristics, reasons, and themes. What is happening in what we call Eastern

European is quite different. It is true that there is a Soviet influence on this, but all the socialist experiments in Europe did not happen as a result of revolutions led by a communist party to establish a socialist regime. On the contrary, this was the result of the intervention of the Soviet Red Army in these countries in order to establish socialism."

'Abd-al-Sattar al-Tawilah said: Originators of Marxist theory have determined that the socialist system they aimed at establishing should be founded on two fundamental basis. The first is that the party that carries out the revolution and rules the country, that is the Communist Party, should be internally organized on a democratic basis, meaning that its leadership on all levels should be elected by direct secret ballot, that decisions should be taken by majority in a free debate, and that the party should hold a congress every two or three years. The congress is also an elected body; it is preceded by a period of no less than two months, during which the party will be the subject of debate and criticism in a totally free atmosphere. The congress then elects the party leadership.

"The second basis," he continued, "is that socialism, on the grounds that it represents the interests of the majority of the people—workers, farmers, soldiers, the middle class, and the intelligentsia—it ensures for them the widest possible democracy. In other words, the people have the freedom of political expression and staging demonstrations and strikes. But those who applied socialism since the beginning of the socialist revolution in 1917 in Russia did not abide by these two bases for many reasons. This culminated into the ruling party becoming led by handful of persons headed by one individual who is the absolute ruler."

Al-'Alim continued: Also, important international changes are taking place in the world situation and in the relations between the various classes inside every society calling for changes in certain principles on which the Marxist theory was based.

Furthermore, Marxism decided that change from capitalism to socialism must be achieved by force and weakness, because capitalism will violently resist the change. This has not proved to be an absolute rule, but rather, through democratic progress, could cause a peaceful transformation. Consequently, the idea of the communist party monopolizing power and defeating its adversaries is negated. Rather, reliance should be on party multiplicity.

Al-Tawilah continued: It has also been established that the ideal application of socialism is not public property of the means of production, including the small and the medium means. Rather it has been established that it is necessary to allow the freedom of individual incentive through private ownership of some of the means of production, especially in the field of services.

It has also been established that the idea of collective or cooperative ownership of farm land does not satisfy the

farmers' desire for ownership and, consequently, agricultural output drops. Although Marxism has warned against the danger of the growth of a bureaucratic class in the communist party that would plunder the country's wealth, yet the theory did not discuss this problem or studied it well in depth in view of the fact that before the communists in any world country took over power this problem had not clearly emerged. This is in addition to the fact that new world situations have changed the Marxist concept that the basic conflict is between the socialist and the capitalist systems and that this conflict must be resolved through clash. The principal conflict now is between the whole world with its different systems and the danger of extinction. At no time did any of the communist leaderships in the socialist countries and most of the world communist parties realize these reasons. There was a small ray of hope that they would understand and realize these changes, as has happened in the case of the Italian Communist Party [PCI], Khrushchev's attempt at the CPSU Congress in 1956, and the ideas of Andropov who was in office in the Soviet Union only for one year, until Gorbachev came and voiced all these changes in the world. So he and the political current that supported him took steps to reform the situation. He realized that if the situation continues as it is, an explosion is bound to occur because the communist parties had for a long time suppressed freedom. These parties also failed to achieve a real increase in production in order to raise the standard of living.

"In summary," he concluded, "the world communists have begun rectifying their mistakes by establishing a human socialist system. If they can establish a democracy such as that in the United States, then they will certainly win with peaceful contests."

Muhammad Sayyid Ahmad said: I would imagine that Marxism, as Marx perceived it, was not implemented in the 20th century. What Marx meant was not only that socialism is the antithesis of capitalism, but also the outcome of capitalism. What happened in the 20th century was that socialism proceeded from a point which Lenin called imperialism's weakest point and not its strongest point. Capitalism has developed to the extent of producing its antithesis. This resulted in the world becoming divided into two camps, which proved to be a weakening of communism and a strengthening of capitalism. I believe that when cohesion is once again resumed, socialism will have better opportunities. If today we are witnessing an explosion in Eastern Europe, then tomorrow we will witness an explosion in Western Europe.

He added: For this reason I say that the Marxist theory has been revised. What used to be called Marxism in many respects was not Marxism. Moreover, new things have happened, hence the importance of theory as a method of following up the new thing that is being imposed on all of us. In the past century, nature was expansive, the world was even more so, and capitalism was in a small part of it and gradually expanding. But today we have reached the limit of boundaries and we

hold the planet in our hands. We can destroy it and so bring human existence to an end. How can we protect humanity from extinction and what are the new rules to achieve this objective?

Dr. Rif'at al-Sa'id said: Egyptian Marxists are different from other Marxists and on several occasions they disagreed with the Soviet Union.

I believe that the success of Marxism now depends on detecting the mistakes of practical application and implementation. This is one of the healthy signs, for Marxism regards renovation as a fundamental issue, otherwise it would become a rigid doctrine. Engels said: Marxism is partial towards any new scientific discovery.

Despite the great amount of sciences accumulated during the past 50 years, Marxism rejected renovation, so it was bound to explode from within. In fact it did explode from within and has been looking for what is new in order to try to rectify the course.

ISRAEL

Likud Situation After Conference Examined

44230109C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 16 Feb 90 p 2B

[Article by Bo'az Shapira']

[Text] In another few months, conflicts within the Likud will once again sharpen and the Central Committee will be required to decide among leaders. After a few months there will be another round, and so it will continue until the Knesset elections, which will be held at the latest in exactly 1,000 days, at the beginning of November 1992. The prime minister will regret to see how ministers from his own party treat him. His friend Yitzhaq Rabin will tell him that that's how it is in politics and that he received the same treatment when he was prime minister. Confrontations will increase before the elections.

It seems that the prime minister is interested in leading his party to the next elections. On the eve of elections there will be a feeling that this is a real confrontation, because at that time it will be permissible to compete against the prime minister for the party leadership. The constraints ministers will direct most of their personal statements against the prime minister. They will claim that he is getting too old—77—and that no one that age ever served as prime minister of Israel. Ari'el Sharon will run against Shamir and will be content with 45 percent of the Central Committee votes. Some will once again read the funeral oration for Sharon for the umpteenth time, but he won't lose strength and won't even be disappointed. He will even put all his energies in helping the prime minister conduct his campaign against the Alignment.

Except for Menahem Begin in 1977, no political leader in Israel ever began to serve as prime minister as a result

of winning elections. MAPAI [Israeli Workers Party]-Alignment always appointed an heir at the height of one's term between elections, and that is how Shamir won his position. Only in the changeover of 1977 did Menahem Begin win the top job in elections, but that was the ninth time that he had competed for it. That was also the only time that the Alignment ran a candidate who had not previously served as prime minister, Shim'on Peres. Sharon doesn't want to win only the contest for the party nomination, he really wants to be prime minister. And he knows that every politician, and he more than others, would be better off getting the job without national elections. Because of the difficulty of winning the position within the coming one or two years, he will wait until after the elections. Just like Moshe Arens. In the meantime, one has to remain in top condition. On the eve of the elections he will compete in the party Central Committee in order to give himself a running start and position himself advantageously in expectation of Shamir's retirement. Now he would have to unseat Shamir in order to inherit his position, and that is a difficult and unprecedented move in our politics. A Sharon victory against Shamir today would lead to early elections. After the elections, Sharon can legitimately win the battle for the succession.

Sharon, 62, can afford to wait another three to four years. Moshe Arens, 65, is also patient. The confrontation within the Likud will thus continue for a few more years, until Shamir's retirement, and will probably intensify come that day. Sharon, Levy, and Moda'i belong to the category of politicians who years ago declared themselves suitable to fill the position of prime minister. The race for this job ends only when someone wins. Until then, the battle will continue to rage.

There is a feeling in the Likud that the party is now at an ideological and personal crossroads. Consequently, the fight is reaching high decibels and sinking to low levels. If not now, when? However, compared to the possible battle at Sharon may in the future wage against Arens, his present confrontation with Shamir is moderate. Especially because the more that politicians feel that time is running out on them, the more intense their battle. As far as Sharon is concerned, the enigma will then reach its peak: "To be or not to be." The present race against Shamir is still a rehearsal for the confrontation with Arens. On the surface, everything will be decided when Shamir calls for electing "Misha" Arens as his successor and the party will choose him over Sharon. However, from that day on, Sharon will do to Arens everything he's doing to Shamir and more.

Elected prime minister Moshe Arens will come to a ready-made coalition that already functioned under Shamir. It may even be a national unity government. He will ensure the status-quo and his partners will grant him 100 days of grace. His first difficult decision will be to define the status of those of the constraints ministers who ran against him for the top job. If Sharon is leading them, he will certainly claim and receive an important seat on the government. Above and beyond the cabinet a

forum of four senior ministers has for a long time now been established, made up of Shamir, Arens, Peres, and Rabin, and with Shamir's retirement and Arens' election, Sharon will be viewed as No. 2. At the side of the Peres-Rabin team, if it continues to lead the Labor Party, a new team of partners-rivals may come to be, namely Arens-Sharon, who will be expected to lead the party and the state in forced harmony. In a narrow government led by the Likud, there is no doubt that Sharon will demand the defense portfolio.

The confrontation will continue within the Likud. After a few months, senior minister Sharon will try to dictate to the prime minister what to do through the party Central Committee. The confrontation will once again be shifted to that arena where, in accordance with party regulations, political questions, and particularly personal issues, are debated. In the meantime, this arena would have acquired new shape. Sharon will be confronted by the (Shamir)-Arens camp, while he continues, as is his custom, to support whoever is prime minister. However, cracks may appear within the camp: Some of the princes will begin to position themselves next to each other or facing each other in preparation for Arens' succession. Several of them will declare themselves fit to lead come the day, and the more diligent among them will begin to form subcamps of their own from among Arens' supporters. Dan Meridor, Roni Milo, and Ehud Olmert do not have a camp of their own at the moment, content to rest in the shadow of the prime minister's power. Only their contemporary Moshe Qatzav can claim his own supporters as a base for future confrontation, while Binyamin Ze'ev Begin can rely on his name as an even wider base of support. Those cracks will not be any easier to manage than the ones currently affecting the party.

The princes who will find that they are not close enough to Arens will feel that they have nothing to lose and will bet on Sharon in the hope that he will make radical changes in the party leadership.

Still, when the day comes for Shamir to retire and for Arens to present his candidacy, he may yet be surprised by the outcome. Shamir was already surprised twice, when he had Begin's blessing upon his retirement in 1983. In the confrontation against David Levy at the time, Shamir won only 436 votes (59 percent) as opposed to 302. When Sharon tried again for the party chairmanship for the 1984 elections, after about seven months on the job, as prime minister he won only 407 votes (57 percent) compared to Sharon's 306 (42.9 percent), who just one year before had had to resign as defense minister. It is possible that when Shamir retires, Sharon will win more than half the Central Committee vote and will become prime minister. In keeping with the best American traditions, his rival Arens will announce defeat and will welcome the winner. At that moment, the Shamir-Arens camp will collapse and many of its members will cross over to the winner's camp. Prime Minister Ari'el Sharon will invite Moshe Arens to continue as foreign minister; the other Likud ministers will also keep their portfolios, but the whole government may well fall. A unity government with Labor, will not be able to rise again. Sharon will not give up and will try to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor-rival Shamir and to form a wide government. He will propose a status-quo and may even tempt the Labor leaders with the promise of a dramatic political step. The Alignment will agonize whether to give him a chance for a few months. Only Arens will then try to rescue the state from the prime minister's concessions, and he will present a list of constraints to the Central Committee.

After Shamir	If Arens Wins	If Sharon Wins
How rival reacts	Arens forced to appoint Sharon as senior minister. Sharon continues the confrontation from inside the government.	Arens continues as foreign minister. Debates on how and whether to place constraints on Sharon.
Camps	In addition to winner Arens' camp (former Shamir camp) there will be a constraints camp. The princes begin to build camps of their own.	Shamir supporters will join Sharon's camp. Arens and some of the princes will be identified as members of the weakening main camp.
Constraints	Continue the confrontation from inside the government.	Sharon distributes the camp government loot among his associates. Levy, still deputy prime minister, looks into ways of cooperating with the rival camp.
The princes	First signs of rivalry among younger members in expectation of Arens' retirement.	Several accept the party ruling and follow Sharon. Others join the constraints against him.
The government	Sharon is a senior minister (defense or finance).	Wide-spread public battle against the Sharon-led government. Arens described as a "brake" on Sharon.
Ideology	Status quo continues. Constraints criticism rises.	Sharp Likud criticism of any dramatic Sharon initiatives (against intifadah or towards PLO).
Labor reaction	Arens is a direct continuation of Shamir and therefore unity government can continue.	Great distancing from Sharon. Sharon's invitation to join the government splits the Labor party.

Israeli Politics Viewed as Regressive

44230108A Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 14 Feb 90 p 7

[Article by Daniel Ben-Simon]

[Text] Even those who don't belong to Likud have no reason to rejoice at that party's troubles. The blow that was dealt the Likud Central Committee the day before yesterday was a blow to the entire political culture of Israel, and it was Israel's declaration of intent on entering the 1990's decade.

Throughout the world politics are beginning to take the back seat to wider democracy, more personal freedom, greater creative freedom, and more individual initiative. Governments are content with a minimal supervisory role and are allowing their societies maximum room to maneuver in managing themselves. This is the beat to which the world is marching at this beginning of the last decade of the 20th century.

In our country, on the other hand, time has stopped. We seem to be inexplicably attracted to the past and its archaic values. Politics is the lifeblood of this society, which is the most politicized in the world. We continue to support politicians who were active in the 1940's and we allow them to continue to lead us. We continue to nurse the conflict in the area and behave as if we couldn't live without it.

Our politicians don't miss an opportunity to paint the enemy as black as possible. There are almost no cuts in the defense budget, which is out of proportion to the war threat from the Syrian side. There is almost no move by the PLO that is not immediately interpreted here as a manipulation against Israel's existence. This paranoia is injected into Israelis from an early age by politicians; small wonder that Israelis have such trouble parting with them, it's like addicts trying to separate from their pushers. All this has created a stifling, cruel, and almost inhuman system of Israeli politics.

And this is what occurred at the Likud Central Committee conference. People who live with politics came to hear people who deal in politics. And as we said, our political life is ruthless. Pity the state whose history is written by authors such as these. The entire world watched the brutal drama in which the Likud leader and the challenger were involved. One had to be in the audience to feel the fear that seized thousands of people from the moment that Shamir and his friends left the stage. People felt like a herd without a shepherd and looked around for salvation. The shouting and yelling reminded one of party meetings in central Europe in the 1930's, before the fall of the world.

Today's world, which is marching forward, watched Israel sink toward dangerous depths: the type of spectacle that the world is accustomed to seeing in Sri Lanka or perhaps Bangladesh. We insist that we are the only democratic country on our continent. We have turned democracy into a digging spade and have been exploiting people's stupidity to advance our cause. There was not one day that Bibi

Netanyahu didn't voice his slogans about Israeli democracy on American television, not to mention Arens and Israeli ambassadors throughout the world. That was our moral superiority over the Arab world, because it was the basis on which the Israeli society was built.

But things are beginning to go wrong, and not only in the Likud, and that's the reason that we cannot rejoice in its discomfiture. An antidemocratic atmosphere has been spreading throughout Israeli society in the past few years. The Likud and its policies intensified the intolerance, xenophobia, racism, and ethnocentrism—all elements with a fatal effect on the delicate fabric of democracy. No wonder, then, that sociologists are promoting their academic advance with most frequent studies showing that the dwellers of Zion are getting fed up with Israeli democracy. High school students clearly say that they want a strong personality to end the disorder reigning in the country. Students turn to the ideological right wing which is endeavoring to provide clear-cut answers to complex problems.

What we have to remember is that we cannot wage six wars, live with a perpetual conflict, killings and nationalist executions, sink one-third of the gross national product into defense, serve frequent tours of reserve duty, and live in endless insecurity, and at the same time preserve our sanity and develop tolerance and democratic values. This disorder creates an emotional disquiet that could drive any nation out of its mind. And this is what is happening to this society that has been afflicted more than any other modern society in the new era. The political madness is thus a direct consequence of the general madness that is affecting Israeli society. Therefore, in the absence of appropriate life culture, there can be no appropriate political culture. This is both the symptom and the diagnosis.

Defense Policymaking Criticized

44230108C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 15 Feb 90 p 1B

[Article by Re'uven Padhatzor]

[Text] The national defense policy of the Israeli Government is to a large extent the policy of one man: the defense minister. He actually shapes the policy of the entire government in its most critical areas.

The other ministers, including the prime minister, leave the defense minister almost unlimited room to maneuver. None of them interferes with his considerations and none of them tries to monitor what is happening in the defense apparatus; thus, in the absence of other control and supervision mechanisms, the defense minister enjoys unrestricted autonomy to map out his policy.

The combination of the hierarchical structure of the defense system and the constitutional provisions concerning the Army afford the defense minister the right to veto any military decisions, and he can impose his views on the chief of staff even in the most clearly professional military issues.

In practice, the defense minister is the connecting link between the IDF [Israel Defense Force] and the other government ministers. However, communication between the Army and the government is not the only function of this link; according to the constitution, the defense minister is "the minister appointed by the government over the Army," which means that really important issues are decided between the minister and the chief of staff before being put, if at all, before the government ministers.

When there is disagreement between the defense minister and the chief of staff, the minister's opinion prevails. The IDF is completely dependent on the decisions of the minister in charge. The defense minister decides the operational framework of the Army and its procurement measures, as they appear in the IDF's multiyear plans. The minister has the power to approve or cancel the procurement, development, or purchase of major weapons systems, thus deciding the nature and capability of the Army for the next decade.

In addition, the defense minister is directly responsible for policy in the territories; strategic cooperation with the United States; a considerable part of the defense industry; establishing the principles of the IDF's military doctrine, and to a large extent he is responsible for settlements in the territories. That means that the person who fills this position in the government has the greatest influence (greater even than the prime minister) on shaping Israel's political path.

Hence also the great importance incumbent on the decisionmaking process within the defense ministry. Consequently, we should examine how policy is made by the forum responsible for such important decisions. The quality of the decisionmaking process at the defense minister's office has become one of the decisive components of the quality of the government's decisions.

An examination of the work of Yitzhaq Rabin's office shows that the decisionmaking process there is mostly based on the minister's intuition. There is no orderly and systematic decisionmaking process at the defense ministry, and vital issues, including some that have long-term strategic implications, are handled on an ad-hoc basis and without proper preparation and analysis.

The defense minister does not have even the basic means of examining and planning policy. He has not appointed a professional team that can help him devise alternative policies and analyze their possible implications. The outcome is that Rabin's policy is often the result of improvisation that bears no resemblance to long-term planning and considerations.

The defense minister does not have professional advisers well-versed in the area of national defense who can counsel him, present alternatives to existing policies, and examine his professional decisions. Rabin is working in unsplendid isolation. He makes decisions based on his own advice. However talented the defense minister may

be, he cannot possibly handle by himself the entire burden of decisions required of a minister in charge of the defense system.

It is impossible for one man to absorb and analyze in depth the multitude of areas that require the minister's decision. In the absence of professional assistance and advice, the quality of the decisions coming out of Yitzhaq Rabin's office is bound to suffer.

Rabin has a genuine revulsion to listening to professionals, especially if they belong to the academic community. He rejects out of hand the views of such people and tends to patently ignore their suggestions. In his office there is not one distinguished professional adviser, it being instead staffed by a few assistants mostly occupied with political and party maneuvers and with building up the minister's image in the media. The only adviser brought in from the outside, who is the minister's assistant for military industries, is de facto neutralized and lacks executive powers.

Rabin has a talent for staffing his office with assistants and advisers who at best don't help him and usually hurt him. Already as a prime minister he appointed assistants and advisers of this kind, beginning with Eli Mizrahi, who served as influential secretary while no one understood the source of his power, and ending with two personal advisers whose appointment he would undoubtedly prefer to forget, Rehav'am Ze'evi and Ari'el Sharon.

Thus, the decisionmaking pattern at Rabin's office appears amateurish and based on improvisation; its key principle is to postpone as much as possible difficult decisions that involve confrontation with factors outside the ministry. The defense minister is "playing for time." There is always a chance that something will happen on the way and he won't need to make a decision.

The result is, of course, heavy damage to the defense system, the IDF, and government policy. That is what happened in the Lavi affair, the Navy submarines decision, and the approach to the intifadah and its implications. And if to all that we add the fact that the busiest minister in the government surprisingly finds time every week to appear at least three times before high school students or party activists and to discuss political issues with them, it becomes clear that something is very wrong in the decisionmaking process at the defense minister's office.

Druze Nationalistic Organization Uncovered

44230108B Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 14 Feb 90 p 5

[Text] The defense forces, in cooperation with the Galilee Regional Police, recently uncovered Druze nationalistic organizations in the Golan Heights. Seven persons were arrested. One team, made up of four young men, was intending to kidnap an IDF [Israel Defense Force] soldier serving in the Golan Heights as a basis for

negotiations on releasing Druze men imprisoned in Israel for nationalistic and defense offences.

Thus, the defense forces uncovered one organization made up of two young men from the first team and three high school students. This team planned to display PLO flags and toss Molotov cocktails during the events marking the first anniversary of the enforcement of Israeli law in Druze villages in the Golan Heights.

Border policemen were mobilized yesterday afternoon in the Mis'ada area in anticipation of a demonstration planned for today for the anniversary of the enactment of Israeli law in the Druze villages in the Golan Heights, which led to a strike. There is great tension in the area. Fliers distributed yesterday called on people to go on strike and to demonstrate against the Israeli occupation of the Golan.

Today the police force in the Golan Heights will be reinforced by 500 men. Police Minister Hayim Bar-Lev and Police Commander General Commissioner David Kraus will inspect the area to determine the situation.

A stage was erected on the Syrian side of Screams Hill, equipped with powerful loudspeakers, to broadcast speeches and music to the Golan Heights residents making their yearly pilgrimage to the border.

The police commander general yesterday said that the police leadership is holding talks with leaders of local authorities and notables in the Golan Heights in the hope that they will influence the residents to refrain from causing disruptions.

Situation in Gaza Strip Updated

44230106C Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 12 Feb 90 p 7

[Article by Dani Tzidkoni]

[Text] The almond trees blossomed last week in the southern part of the Gaza Strip. In the north, citrus-picking was in full swing. One must not be deceived by the pastoral view from the main road. The storm continues to rage in the area. Last week, the divided city of Rafiyah was at the center of the storm. The fire was fueled by rumors about the handing down of a verdict on the local khomeyni, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, and the terrorist attack in Ismailia.

The Commander of the Southern Command, Matan Vilna'i, a soldier who keeps his distance from media exposure, has for the past six months been changing the methods of action in the Strip. The aim is—hitting specific targets, taking effective measures to prevent a deterioration, closing breaches in security while keeping the number of victims to a minimum, and, as much as possible, not coming down too hard on the population in general. I do not know the major general's political views, but in the field he acts solely according to military considerations, without getting entangled in political interests and emotions.

Last January, those responsible for the area—Major General Vilna'i; Brigadier General Tzvi Polag, the commander of the troops in the field, who will soon complete his assignment; Brig. Gen. Aryeh Ramot-Schiffman, the chief of the Civil Administration; the commanders of the two divisions, the northern and the southern, and the battalion commanders, upon whom depends the conduct of the soldiers and their operational success—could claim zero fatalities. To their sorrow, the picture changed in the first week of February. In Rafiyah—a city where no one was killed by IDF [Israel Defense Force] bullets in the last four months—one of the leaders of the uprising and a youth of the Beney Suheyla were killed. (This article does not deal with the victims of the internal terror, whose number in Gaza is much larger than the number of those killed due to IDF actions—from September to last week, 25 Arabs in the Strip died at the hands of Israelis; 47 persons died at the hands of Arabs. This terror will not go down as one of the glories of the intifadah. The leadership and the PLO factors on the outside who are seeking to halt it have until now failed to achieve their goal. Apparently, they have to a great extent lost control over the many factors that are operating in the field.)

The orders that were given to the forces were clear, and they require the fighters to demonstrate a large measure of restraint in the face of provocations. During the massing of crowds, the outbursts, and the clashes between the Army and youths, they are now trying to act with more thought, a characteristic that in the past marked the special strength of the IDF. The methods, despite their restraint, are quite stern. Today, the IDF prefers, for example, to impose security and order in the cities and camps without insuring itself by imposing a curfew. The routine of a curfew did not always prove itself, because the outbursts resumed at the conclusion of the curfew, with renewed force. Another example of the caution taken by the IDF with regard to human life is the introduction of telescopes, to allow the wounding of persons disturbing the order without causing their death.

Factors in the field note that, under the influence of the events in Eastern Europe and South Africa, there are signs of an attempt to return to the mass demonstrations that characterized the early days of the intifadah. Today in Gaza, there is very evident frustration over the fact that the popular uprising, which has lasted more than two years, has not borne the same fruits as the demonstrations in Eastern Europe.

School pupils are, as is known, in the forefront of the uprising, and they cause many problems for the IDF. Aside from an insignificant minority of sadists in its ranks, the IDF does not like confrontations with children. A colonel in the field says, "The death of a child is a terrifying thing." On this subject, there is a commonality of interest between the IDF command and the leadership of the intifadah. Both of them are interested that peace prevail in the educational system. But it seems that the leadership of the intifadah does not have control over the pupils, who have recently also established

pupils's committees. The committees decide on their own when to study and when to go on strike. The critical times are the entry into and the departure from the schools, which operate in two shifts in the Strip. Thousands of pupils are involved, who flood the streets at those times. On Palestine Street in Gaza there is, for example, a complex of five adjacent schools. In the afternoon hours, 4,000 to 5,000 pupils are concentrated on that section of street. There was an incident in which a jeep, without the soldiers being aware of it, went into this uproar on the way to the canteen.

It should be remembered that there was hostile terrorist activity in the Strip before the intifadah. Today, this activity is based mainly on factors of Islamic extremism, whose aim is to kill Jews. Last November, two soldiers were murdered in an ambush in Shaykh Aglin. Last week, an explosive device was thrown at the Medina police station in Gaza. "This is background music that is always playing in the Strip," says a senior officer.

The impression is that the two sides that are in confrontation in the Strip, the IDF and the Palestinians, have learned to understand what is possible and what is impossible in this situation, in which they are prepared—as they had not foreseen—for a prolonged war. The leaflets of the religious [groups] already refer to the intifadah as a way of life. The IDF also has adapted over time to the intifadah, drawing on patience and equipping itself with appropriate logistics and even a certain spiritual armor. It maintains maneuverability and operational flexibility. It can be said that the IDF is walking on very thin ice, and that it stumbles, occasionally. The commanders and fighters in the Strip, who were given the burden of the intifadah—not necessarily with their freely given assent—are angered that these stumbles receive broad coverage, unlike the other aspect of this cursed war. But then that belongs to the IDF's information policy.

Impact of East European Changes Viewed

44230091B Tel Aviv DAVAR (Supplement)
in Hebrew 12 Jan 90 pp 10, 11

[Article by Yisra'el Landers]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] In the balance of relations between Israel and the Arabs, who gains from the changes in the Eastern Bloc and in the international sphere?

The balance is viewed more positively in Jerusalem than in Damascus, Cairo, Tripoli, or Tunisia. Professor Itamar Rabinovitch, the dean of the humanities faculty [at Tel Aviv University] and an expert in Middle Eastern affairs, states that it is difficult to generalize about the entire Arab world. However, the general impression is that the Arab states are not satisfied with the changes, which help, according to their appraisal, Israel. The following are some of the main factors that figure in the satisfaction in Israel and the concern in the Arab capitals:

- The improvement in Israel's relations with the communist bloc: Hostile states, which supported the Arabs unhesitatingly and almost never missed a chance to denounce Israel or vote against it in the United Nations, are currently interested in forming trade relations and renewing diplomatic relations with Israel. This change is occurring as the intifadah continues, when the media is not treating Israel with kid gloves, and when the Israeli Government is headed by a representative of the hawkish Likud. Therefore, it is clear that relations with the Eastern Bloc are improving due to changes there, and not under the influence of Israel's policy, inasmuch as Shamir has not changed recently.
- A reduction in the bargaining power of the Arab states: Egypt, Syria, and other Arab states did well in the past by maneuvering between the two superpowers. Israel did not have this capability, because it had no real possibility to jump back and forth between the Western camp and the Eastern Bloc. It could only envy the Arab states, which exploited their maneuverability to obtain political gains and economic aid. These days of twisting are over.

The weakening of the Arab's bargaining position has also eased the U.S. administration's fears of too much U.S. support for Israel. Dr Dori Gold points out that, since the start of the cold war until 1980, the United States was deterred from pursuing courses that could be interpreted as excessive identification with Israel, lest it push the Arabs into the arms of the Soviet Union. These fears are now unfounded, and, in the existing circumstances, nothing should deter the administration from tightening its strategic relations with Israel.

Chain reaction: Prof Itamar Rabinovitch states that authoritarian leaders in the Middle East and elsewhere fear that events in the Eastern Bloc will serve as an example for their citizens. The buckling of communist regimes, considered all-powerful until recently, and the ability of popular groups to rebel against, and overthrow, authoritarian rulers, are liable to be, in the opinion of authoritarian rulers, a source of inspiration in their states as well. It is possible to discern, for example, similarities between the Ceausescu regime in Romania and the Ba'th regime in Syria: rule by a kinship group, and the power and modus operandi of the security services. The possibility that opposition groups in the Middle East will attempt to imitate the example of Eastern Europe is not absent from the thoughts of Arab leaders. This possibility could strengthen their resolve to immediately suppress any manifestation of a rebellion.

The weakening of Soviet support for Syria: Soviet support of Syria is an important element in the Israeli-Arab balance. The change in Soviet policy has distanced it from the radical Arab states and brought it closer to the moderate states. Several experts believe that this change has affected Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and South Yemen. The veteran, radical clients of the Soviet Union are already unable to rely on the Soviet Union to the same extent as they did in the past. The limiting of

Soviet support certainly tipped the balance in favor of Syria's decision to renew diplomatic relations with Egypt. Other factors also contributed to this development: A difficult economic situation, isolation in the Arab world, Iraqi pressure, and Syria's continued entanglement in Lebanon. However, all of these factors weighed on Syria in the past, and the new element imposed on the scales was the change in Soviet policy.

As early as Hafiz al-Asad's visit to Moscow in 1987, Kremlin leaders made clear to him that they did not support his undermining of the strategic balance with Israel, and last year, the Soviets began to give public expression to their reservations. Remarks in this spirit were also recently stated by the Soviet ambassador in Damascus, Aleksandr Zotov. Instead of a doctrine of a strategic balance, the Russians are recommending to al-Asad that he adopt the concept of a reasonable, sufficient defense level. The Soviet crisis in Damascus enables the Soviet Union to refrain from wasting abundant capital on the supply of weapons in the absence of sufficient economic proceeds. Zotov stated, in an interview with THE WASHINGTON POST, that his country would now sell weapons based on economic considerations. Syria is already about \$15 billion in debt to the Soviet Union for combat means that it acquired in the past, and it is unlikely that it will ever be able to repay this debt in full. The question is: To what extent will Moscow be strict about implementing its new policy? It is clear that the Kremlin does not intend to abandon Syria, its most important ally in the Middle East.

Dr Ze'ev Eytan, a senior researcher at the Jaffe Institute, and an expert in the regional arms balance, states that there is no substantive change at present in the supply of Soviet weapons to Syria, whose value, he estimates, is in the billions of dollars per year (about half of this sum is offset by Syria's granting of permission to the Soviet fleet to use the Tartus and Latakia port facilities). The Russians supply Syria with modern MiG-29 interception aircraft, and will soon send, or have already sent, Syria the first Sukhoi-24 attack aircraft, which can carry 8 tons of ordnance and which have an excellent low-altitude penetration capability. The Soviet Union's restraint regarding the supply of weapons to Syria is expressed in its refusal to supply Syria with SS-23 ground-to-ground missiles, which have a range of about 500 km, and which are not considered defensive weapons. Moscow also refused a previous Syrian request to obtain these missiles, and it has maintained its refusal to this date. In contrast, the supply of Sukhoi-24 aircraft cannot be considered a manifestation of restraint.

The change in Soviet policy toward the West, and the reduction of Soviet support for Syria and other radical states, would seem outwardly to reduce the danger of an Israeli-Arab war being ignited at Syria's initiative. Some say that Syria might initiate military activity in the short term to change the expected development of events, although the probability of such a development is low. However, in the long term, to the extent that tension between the superpowers lessens, and to the extent that

their willingness to be dragged into regional conflicts declines, the danger of a Syrian attack will diminish. Indeed, Syria does not need Soviet approval to start a war. It did not reveal to Moscow its plan to attack Israel in 1973, but it nonetheless obtained full Soviet support after the fact. However, Soviet support is no longer a given. According to Professor Rabinovitch, Zotov's remarks are intended to limit Syria's war option. Dr Mark Heller states that Syria must take into account that the Soviet security net is not assured under every condition. Syria knows that it will be taking a greater risk than in the past if it pursues a military course. It should be assumed that this knowledge will reduce its incentive to wage war.

Following the renewal of Syrian-Egyptian relations, the possibility was also raised that Damascus would in time join the political process. Professor Rabinovitch states that "the potential of this option has increased, and it is appropriate, now more than ever, to examine it." However, he still does not think that Syria has chosen the political option.

On the face of it, the thaw in East-West relations is likely to prompt the two superpowers to coordinate their positions to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the importance of the Middle East has declined, the two superpowers still have important interests in this region, and they do not intend to abandon it. It is clear, more now than in the past, that the United States is playing the main role in the arena. It won the cold war, and its economic and political system has proven its superiority over the Soviet model. Therefore, it should not be assumed that the U.S. administration will agree to make the Soviet Union an equal partner in settling the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. Dr Gold believes that if al-Asad chooses the political route, or if he leaves the stage, greater coordination between Washington and Moscow for the sake of an agreement is likely. Regarding the solution of the Palestinian problem, it seems to him that the chance for coordination between the superpowers is smaller than in relation to curbing the spread of ballistic missiles. Other experts state that the superpowers have intervened in our conflict mainly because the Arab states were a party to it, and not because of the Palestinians' distress. Since the superpowers' interest in the Arab states has waned, their motivation to intervene in the conflict, or to pressure Israel, will obviously decline. Therefore, those who have a say, believe that if no change occurs in the intifadah's dimensions or characteristics, the superpowers' interest in the Palestinian issue will be more humanitarian than political.

A settlement of the conflict understandably does not depend entirely on the action of the superpowers. They can look upon it with a certain indifference, even if it continues for a long time. However, Israel cannot act in this way, and there is no reason for its interest in an agreement, which would bring detente and peace, to decline owing to changes in the Eastern Bloc. On the contrary, the new order taking shape in the international

arena improves Israel's chances of reaching an agreement with conditions that will satisfy its security needs.

[Box, p 11] Israel as an Alternative to Greece

Will improved relations between the two superpowers reduce the strategic importance of Israel from the standpoint of the U.S. administration? Outwardly, the answer is affirmative, because the East-West thaw reduces fears of the Soviet threat. However, Dr Dori Gold states that the perceived Soviet threat will be replaced, in the opinion of policymakers in Washington, by other risk factors, including Iraq, Syria, and Libya, which have been equipped with ballistic missiles having nonconventional, chemical, and other warheads. In order to justify the continuation of the Star Wars program, it is currently being indicated in Washington that it is necessary to forestall the danger of mistakenly launched missiles or the danger of long-range missiles possessed in the future by such states as Libya.

The two superpowers also attach importance to the Mediterranean and the Middle East because of its oil resources. Therefore, the U.S. administration believes that it will have need in the future for installations and a foothold in the region. However, NATO members in southern Europe (e.g., Greece and Spain) might rely on changes in the Eastern Bloc in demanding a reduction of the U.S. presence on their territories. In such a case, according to Dr Gold, the Americans will need substitutes for these states, such as Israel.

At the same time, it should be taken into account that an isolationist trend could reappear in the United States, which could cause a large reduction in defense expenditures and military forces. If this possibility materializes, the American capability to intervene on behalf of Israel in a crisis would be reduced, and defense budget cuts could lead to a reduction in aid to Israel.

Contacts With Hamas Banned

44230091A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 15 Jan 90 p 3A

[Article by Eytan Rabin]

[Text] The Defense Ministry has ordered heads of the civil administration in the territories to sever impromptu contact with persons identified with Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement]. This was made known to the HA'ARETZ correspondent by senior security elements.

The order, which was transmitted to the heads of the civil administration through the coordinator of operations in the territories, Shmu'el Goren, is arousing anger in the administration. Security sources reported to HA'ARETZ that the order is intended to withhold legitimacy from Hamas, an extremist Islamic movement, in view of meetings held in recent weeks by the heads of the administration with senior elements in the territories identified with Hamas.

The sources further reported that great concern prevails in the IDF [Israel Defense Force] security system regarding the strengthening of Hamas, which is becoming more and more of a popular movement, as many PLO supporters in the territories move into its ranks. According to the appraisal of senior military elements, there is fear of a rapprochement between the PLO and Hamas. This fear is also based on a publication in the PLO mouthpiece published in Nicosia, FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH, which has made a call "to free Shaykh Ahmad Yasin." The publication is signed by the PLO, the National Organization of Palestinians in Kuwait. This is the first time that the PLO has expressed support for the Hamas organization.

One of the leaders of the administration stated, in reacting to the new order: "It is improbable that we will stop meeting with Palestinian elements identified with the PLO or Hamas. This is a matter of daily meetings of the administration heads, governors, and advisors in the strip and in Judaea and Samaria. The moment we are prohibited from meeting with elements in the strip, the civil administration's daily work is liable to be damaged. The administration's role is to meet with residents, as they are, and to reflect on the mood in the street. In Gaza, for example, there are 700 mosques, all of them of Hamas. How is it likely that we will not be able to be in contact with people who manage the mosques."

One such recent meeting that prompted a complaint in the Defense Ministry was that between the head of the civil administration in the Gaza Strip, Brigadier General Aryeh Ramot, and Dr Mahmud Azhar, who is considered the leader of Hamas in the strip. In that meeting, the head of the administration sought to ascertain whether Hamas was willing to participate in elections, and the mood in Hamas following the arrest of Shaykh Ahmad Yasin.

Islamic Movement Growing 'Alarmingly'

44230094A Tel Aviv DAVAR (Supplement)
in Hebrew 19 Jan 90 pp 5-9

[Article by Avital 'Anbar; includes interview with Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish; place and date not given]

[Text] Things are happening in your backyard, and you are not interested. It is more comfortable for you not to know exactly that control over Israel's Arab sector by the Islamic movement, a generic expression for the fanatic Muslim Brotherhood, seems outwardly more threatening than a PLO state in the territories. Perusal of press files reveals a lack of treatment of this internal phenomenon, compared to an abundance of talk about the Palestinian Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement]. The Islamic movement has been developing since 1980, but those responsible for this area have been aware of it only since 1986, and they are amazed by its true nature and dimensions (a map has not even been sketched). They are willing to express themselves, in a manner that

always arouses concern, only without attribution. Interior Minister Der'i stated that the movement is reactionary, and he went to Umm-al-Fahm to apologize. Arabs outside the movement viewed Der'i's apology as an exceptional weakness on the part of the State toward the growing Islamic movement, whose next goal is to enter the Knesset in 1992 on a massive scale.

Indeed, security elements maintain that the movement is exerting itself between the ballot box and the sword, and that the danger in the future is serious. Not for attribution, they are spreading dramatic forecasts, detailed below, which are based on similarities between the Islamic movements in Israel and the territories regarding the scale of their developmental processes. In the territories, this process led Palestinian Islam from in-depth community work to fanatic participation in the intifadah.

The leaders of the movement deny this: "The only jihad that we preach is the 'jihad of the soul,' the qualification of the soul." When pressured, they add: "If, nonetheless, out of great frustration, something explodes in the Arab sector, it will be general, and not particular to Islam." Out of a compulsive desire to convince their Jewish interlocutor, they declare that they are law-abiding citizens, who demand real, equal rights in the state and recognition of the political rights of their Palestinian brothers in the territories.

In order to advance the Palestinian cause, and to harvest the fruits of their efforts nationwide, they stand, organized, as in a military operation, for the next Knesset elections. "We are good players on the democratic playing field, and we will ultimately win," states Shaykh Hashim 'Abd-al-Rahman from Umm-al-Fahm, the alternate mayor. "We will measure the accuracy of the scales." If so, they will support those who advocate "land in exchange for peace," to enable them to apply this policy. Already, not openly, they supported the Labor Party in Histadrut [labor federation] elections, and they instructed their constituents to vote it into the National Council: In Nazareth votes for the Labor Party rose from 19 to 40 percent in municipal elections.

Despite the integration, there is enmity. Not long ago, slogans with an Islamic inspiration were painted in the square of the municipality of Tayybah, in Samaria, and in other settlements. They read: "We will transform Palestine into a huge cemetery of Zionist occupiers, with the help of God;" "fire, blood, and steel are the solution, because Islam is the solution." A wave of popular, religious awakening went forth from Tayybah, spreading like fire in the Muslim sector, routing fossilized communism—its main rival, which is perceived as a hostile "religion"—and energizing mobilization. In the stronghold of Umm-al-Fahm, 90 percent of the population streamed to the ballot box, granting a 76-percent victory—favoring one party to spite another—to Islamic candidate Shaykh Ra'ad Mahajinah. In contrast, all other parties that are active in the Arab sector, except the Citizens' Rights Movement, sunk, especially Labor,

RAKAH [New Communist List], and the Progressive List for Peace. Even the "Village Sons," which built on the intifadah, obtained only 200 votes in Umm-al-Fahm. "They are still in shock!" people chortled in the city.

Umm-al-Fahm is the location of the movement's mouthpieces, which are distributed in Israel and the territories. They include the monthly AL-SIRAT ("The Right Path") of 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish, and the new weekly, SAWT AL-HAQQ AL-HURRIYAH ("The Voice of Truth and Justice, one-half shekel, 30,000 copies) of Hamid 'Ajbariyah. All of their articles are translated into Hebrew and studied in the "system." A security source states that until local elections, AL-SIRAT spoke sweetly; now it is "like the mouthpiece of Hamas." Its pages contain an abundance of anti-Semitic expressions: "The Jews are on their way not only to laying the foundation stone for the Temple, but also to controlling the world based on their historical plot." The "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" are also mentioned. A security source claims that other newspapers in the Arab sector have also adopted an Islamic, nationalist, extremist line, such as AL-'AGMI of Jaffa, which called for the reactivation of abandoned mosques in the Jewish cities of Nes Tziyona, Hertzliya, or Rehovot, an idea that causes those in charge of the Arab sector to shudder. They recall Rabbi Kahana seeking to pray at an abandoned synagogue in Arab Shefr'am and being prohibited from doing so by the police. The question of how this virulent propaganda tallies with declarations of moderation perplexes the leaders with whom I met. They have no clear answer. One tended to agree that they are speaking in one voice to their people and in another voice to us.

Over the years, they have built their power through community activity, "without any prior intention to run in elections; people pressured us." When they felt strong, they made a first attempt, which was limited but assured of success (they make no rash attempts), to emerge from the mosque. They took by storm five out of the six local authorities in which they ran mayoral candidates. Although they ran in only a quarter of all settlements in the Arab sector, they swept 10 percent of all the seats on the councils. Their main power is in the triangle (the "green belt" adjacent to the Green Line), but they also penetrated frightened Christian villages in the Galilee, Nazareth, mixed cities, and into the Bedouin sector. Regarding the Bedouin sector, which is not especially religious, and which is close to the Israel Defense Force, progress is to blame for increased religiosity, because, when the nomads become settled, they build mosques and turn to religion.

"We are currently the main power in the Arab sector!" determines the movement's national leader, Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish, whom thousands follow. Indeed, society is inclining more and more toward religion. This process is attracting more people to an Islamic lifestyle. "We transport them from praying to essence." This essence is political. It is expressed in voting for a movement which is not a party and which is not institutionalized. It is organized in the form of

"courts of religious leaders," with liaison persons. The leaders are Ra'ad Mahajinah in Umm-al-Fahm, Kamil Hatib in Kafr Kana, and the senior leader, 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish, from Kafr Qasim. All of them are young men. Shaykh Ra'ad is 32, and Shaykh 'Abdallah is 42. All are politicians at heart, and preachers. Beyond the national leadership, each local "branch," especially those that prove their power at the ballot box, has its own position. They differ in their thinking and expression. Regarding the state, they range from being only law-abiding to "an Israeli at heart." They also differ regarding participation in elections in general (a matter which was decided), and in elections to the Knesset in particular, which will also be decided affirmatively. Externally, they maintain a united front.

Islam does not recognize lines and borders, and there are deep, reciprocal influences between the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Israel, and Jordan. One stunning success encourages others. After the large gain (40 percent) in October in Jordan, the Jordanian Islamic leader announced that they would increase their activity in the territories, and that they would request that King Husayn become involved again. The movement started when the Green Line was opened. "In June 1967, you celebrated, but we won," states Shaykh 'Abdallah. "Islam, a refugee in 1949, is returning to us!" The Arabs of Israel were exposed to the influence of Islam, from which they had been cut off for 18 years. Many hundreds of Arabs of Israel studied and are studying in Islamic colleges in Hebron, Nabulus, and Gaza, and in their branches in Qalqiliyah and Tulkarm: "Hothouses for hatred toward Israel," maintains an official element. Three friends, aged 22—Ra'ad Mahajinah, Hashim 'Abd-al-Rahman, and Hamid 'Ajbariyah—who returned in 1980 from the Hebron College, form the nucleus that has been active for eight years in Umm-al-Fahm. This nucleus built an alternative community infrastructure (see "Thus One Knits Together a Society"), it preached, and it took the population and the municipality by storm. Shaykh 'Abdallah was purged of communism at the Nabulus College.

The security system perceives "the growing potential of the crystallization of a propagandist bloc in the Islamic struggle in Israel. Such a bloc would comprise Muslims in Israel and the Gaza Strip, aided by their Jordanian and Egyptian brothers and Saudi and Kuwaiti money." However, a more serious scenario is that "Israeli Islam will align itself according to Hamas, just as the Progressive List for Peace is aligning itself with Fatah"—and the glue of Muslim faith is stronger than that of political influence.

Schematically, there are two parts in the unwritten master plan of the Islamic movement, such as it is. The first part, which is here and now, entails the conquest of Muslim society; in this part, the law of the land is binding. The second part is the realization of the dream of a large Islamic state and a world that is entirely Muslim.

In the first stage, the movement is to gain control of society, encourage it to return to religion on a massive scale, purge it of the evil of Western culture through religion and study, and eradicate crime, prostitution, drugs, and alcohol. The Islamic lifestyle that they are seeking to create is a combination of politics, religion, economics, and society; orthodox Islam views its social-educational mission as an end, not a means. The movement's community activity is gaining it the admiration of all of Arab society. They are establishing an alternative educational, health, and welfare infrastructure, and two soccer leagues. At the referee's whistle, the players and the audience spread their prayer rugs and pray.

In the second stage, the forces of Islam in the region will be mobilized against Israel, and a large, theocratic state will be established. "They have no timetable or drawer plans," it is said in Jerusalem. "They have historical patience, but this is definitely their goal." An additional phase is added to the Palestinian struggle, namely, a Palestinian state "from the sea to the river." All of the land of Palestine is a religious endowment, and any "compromise between the PLO and Zionism is rejected in advance. These ideas, belong—momentarily (?)—only to Islam in the territories, which is currently the most hard-line, rejectionist element in the arena, and whose main leaders are Shaykh Yasin from Gaza, whose influence also extends to Mt. Hebron, Shaykh Jamal Hamami in East Jerusalem (both are in jail), and in Nabulus, Shaykh Ahmad Bitawi and Shaykh Sa'id Bilal. In the administration, they speak of "a de facto distribution of labor: The Islamic movement functions as Islam's political-ideological arm in Israel, and Hamas as its military arm." If they do not outlaw the movement, it is because "actual collaboration has not been proven." However, the movement's leader denies any hint of an understanding with Hamas, and disassociates himself from the use of force by Muslims in the territories.

But perhaps declarations are one thing and intentions or the necessity of reality are another. Anytime in the 1990s, given the continuation of the intifadah, and confusion and national frustration on the part of the Arabs of Israel, one or both of the following fuses could be activated—the main one: A group of fanatic Muslims moves away from the cautious policy of the Islamic movement in Israel and establishes a new, extremist, violent, body; the second: The PLO returns to its uncompromising armed struggle for the "entire jackpot" and extends the struggle to inside the Green Line.

Shaykh 'Abdallah cautiously says that the first scenario, in which extremists would move away from the movement's policy of restraint in circumstances of political stagnation, is neither reasonable nor possible. If it were, he states, "I would convene a press conference at Beit Sokolov, and I would resign and disband the movement." But he emphasizes: "The great difference between our movement and Hamas in Gaza is that, in the strip, they do not listen to the voice of the Jewish peace camp. I listen to it. I am close to it. I do not want to disturb it. Did we ever dream that so many Israelis

would recognize the need for peace and the principle of 'territories in exchange for peace'? The peace camp is becoming stronger on both sides. As long as it exists, our movement will support nonviolence. If we do not find another Jew who is ready for coexistence, we will think about other means."

One clear morning, it can be estimated, from the stronghold of the triangle—not from the mosques, as there is currently no preacher like Mufti Amin al-Husayni—a holy war is liable to develop. A minority of armed fanatics would deploy on the outskirts of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, workers would kill their employers, buses would roll into the abyss, and passenger cars would go up in flames. This is already happening in dribbles, in terms of the heating up of barrels and blades, which is the work of fanatic Muslims in the territories. "Fifty armed groups of five persons would be sufficient to make our lives Hell," states a security element. You would be afraid to leave your house, to travel outside the city, to allow the children to walk to school. Allah's fear would fall upon us. Weapons are not lacking. Most of them were channelled to the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip in 1984, and they include, among other things, F-16 rifles purchased by Muslims from persons in Israel's underworld, in which there are no national dividers. Religion purifies transgressors for placing their connections at the disposal of combative Islam. If matters actually develop in this way, it is probable that, ultimately, without a choice, the large Islamic movement will be pulled after the extremists, who will acquire heroes' halos.

If indeed Islamic terror erupts in Israel, the most reasonable scenario would be that described above. It is derived—taking into account the required changes—from events that occurred in the territories before and during the intifadah, because the "infidel" government ironically pursued a laissez-faire policy toward Islam as a counterweight to nationalism.

The push to establish Hamas after the outbreak of the intifadah is attributed to the popularity of the "Muslim Jihad Companies," a competing minority of fanatics with an excellent operational ability, whose bold activities—more than once in the service of Fatah—won them heroes' halos in the refugee camps. The bulk of the Muslim Brothers, who supported relative restraint, had no choice but to join the armed struggle.

In security circles, they are already anxiously thinking about the Islamic intifadah. Every place in our tiny country would be vulnerable. Judging by the territories, fanatic, Islamic terror is the most sophisticated and dangerous brand of terrorism. Thus, operations to prevent and thwart it would be very difficult.

Theoretically, a Muslim Jihad does not exist in Israel, although recent fliers in the name of the "Muslim Jihad" in Gaza appeal to "fighters in all of Palestine." Nonetheless, something of this sort did in fact exist. Its leader, Shaykh 'Abdallah, formerly a communist activist, was

sentenced to prison in 1981 (at the start of the Islamic movement) for organizing an armed group called "the Family of the Jihad." He denies this to this day. The current view on both sides is that the thwarting of this group before it managed to carry out its intentions led many Muslims to conclude that it is not worthwhile to spill over into hostile terrorist activity, because SHABAK [General Security Service] would uncover it. Therefore, they said, "come let us build ourselves up from the foundation, so that we will be ready. We will exhaust the political course and decide later."

Eli'ezer Tzafrir, the prime minister's advisor on Arab affairs: "Those who obtained leadership posts in the local authorities are motivated by a positive, legitimate interest, which is also shared by the government, namely to be concerned for the welfare of the residents. However, the movement's political statements are very extremist. It preaches a society and an Islamic state in which there is no place for Israel. There is concern, and the system is examining different possibilities. The restoration of military rule? God forbid! Whoever proposes that does not know what he is talking about. There is no immediate danger, since some of the leaders have already been imprisoned and learned a lesson, which they declare. Connections between the movement and Hamas? I have no comment in this regard. I also do not agree to the definition of AL-SIRAT as the mouthpiece of Hamas. If that were the case, we would close it."

"A deterioration would not surprise us," they add in Jerusalem. As a matter of fact, the authorities' were alerted to the movement's activity only in 1986, when convicted "Jihad" members were released from prison and began to engage in legal activity. However, the authorities "are closely examining how the movement walks the line between 'freedom of religion' and 'violation of the law.' We are still in a phase in which there is a willingness to take risks to maintain the sanctity of freedoms, but even their open material testifies to the misuse of freedom of expression and religion."

The minister of police refused to be interviewed about the topic, but the police confirm that members of the movement are strictly law-abiding. SHABAK deals with "special problems." Religious Muslims from Israel have not been involved, or were not arrested, in the hundreds of security incidents recorded in the Arab sector since the intifadah began. Although the boldest terror acts were carried out by religious Muslims—members of Hamas and Jihad—from the territories. At the same time, Muslims in Israel and the territories have open, joint activities, such as "Islamic heritage" weeks, with the participation of delegations from the territories and from abroad. Such activities, according to a security element, "camouflage other activity." For example, in 1988, Shaykh Kamil Hatib from Kafr Kana organized an event during which Yusuf al-Islam, who is the singer Cat Stevens, was brought together with Hamas, and he made a contribution to its treasury. An indictment is pending against him in Gaza.

Members of the movement protest the atmosphere of concern being created by security elements, saying, "there are no grounds for concern. The facts speak for themselves." This is true if one judges according to the open facts. Regarding the future, they ask that we believe in the purity of their intentions. "We are pious people, we believe that we will stand before God tomorrow, and we do not want to stand before him as liars." I heard the preceding statement several times. Another person not worried about the future is Re'uven Paz, the only expert on the Islamic movement in Israel (the other one left the country and the field). Paz refused to share information. However, in a survey which he published, the group's participation in the political game is perceived "as one of the legitimate Arab factors" in Israel, and as the end of the process of alienation from the state. The main reason for this is that the size and success of their social effort—which brought them to power in several local authorities, gave them great responsibility, and created a high level of expectations on the part of the population—requires ample resources that are only in the possession of the authorities. They are pragmatic; Islam views its struggle as "an internal struggle that will end in victory....Whoever is confident of future victory, is willing to compromise on the way to achieving victory, even at the price of delays." Those who are like them have learned the lesson of the "short-cut" taken by the "Family of the Jihad."

An Arab-Israeli, who is an activist in the Labor Party, states that "the movement has undeclared intentions that must be studied in the coming years. Their recognition of the state is limited." A senior official adds that the municipal system is a cover for the political leadership of the Arabs of Israel, i.e., "the Committee of Council Heads." Accordingly, the Arabs do not perceive voting for the local authorities as a civic duty, but as a patriotic, nationalist act. Members of the movement also reject this, just as they reject charges of religious compulsion: "Our society is adapting itself to the changes bearing on it." It is known that female employees in the municipalities that came under the control of the Islamic movement "were transferred to other positions." Publicly, women are tending to dress more traditionally, but many still wear modern dress. Moderates also welcome the prohibitions on drinking alcohol in coffee houses, given that people have been killed in Tayybah in altercations after becoming intoxicated. The magistrate in Hadera approved an order of the Umm-al-Fahm municipality to close a restaurant that sold alcoholic beverages without a permit.

Islam is originally a tolerant religion. The "pact of 'Umar" in the eighth century assures Christians and Jews security for their persons and property, as against an inferior status (e.g., the prohibition against riding a horse, and the requirement that minorities wear yellow patches). However, since the mid-19th century, Islam has absorbed European anti-Semitism. It is currently saturated with hatred of Jews, and the equation between Jews and Israel is complete. Its borders are the borders of

Islam, not Arabism, and this can be seen in expressions of support for the Afghani mujahidin in Islamic publications in Israel, and in the fact that the Sunni, fundamentalist Islam of the Muslim Brothers, while disconnected from Shi'ite Khomeyni-ism, nonetheless made its ascent based on the Iranian pattern. Dynamism and fanatic enthusiasm have proven themselves in industrious activity. The religious have conquered the strip (80 percent of the activists), their gains in the West Bank are impressive ("a mirror image of the situation in Jordan," states a security expert), and their ascent in Israel is prompting hysteria among Christians. However, progressive Muslims—still the majority—view obscurantist Islam primarily as a danger to individual freedoms in Muslim society. They fear it more than they fear the Israeli authorities. What is more, the movement promotes populist Islam (it is not active among Arab students) and it has a low common denominator, which ignores, writes Re'uven Paz, the problems troubling Islam in the world.

At the end of 1992, the elected representatives of the Muslim Brothers will sit in the house of legislators. Perhaps they will not sweep, as in Jordan, 40 percent of the Muslim public, which corresponds to eight mandates. However, "if we work in elections as we have worked until now, we will obtain five to six mandates," estimates Shaykh 'Abdallah confidently. Shaykh 'Abdallah does not see himself as a member of Knesset, but declares that he too would come to the Knesset to swear allegiance. Member of Knesset [MK] Nawwaf Masalihah of the Labor Party predicts that the movement will obtain no more than three mandates on its first try. Other Arabs argue that the Islamic list will be regarded as a united Arab list: "Arabs move very quickly from the extremism of the left to the extremism of the right, especially when they are confused as they seek to express their national protest."

Members of the Islamic movement will describe themselves as relatively moderate nationalists, who do good community work. The political establishment has mistakenly ascribed to them the same goals of any Israeli, religious party, namely the advancement of their constituents' interests, money, and positions of power. It sanctioned them in the belief that they represented the lesser of two evils. However, this is not what they are seeking. When they join the big league, they will exploit it for political goals. The realization of the first part of the master plan will continue more strongly, exactly as in the territories, with the de facto support of the establishment, whose primary consideration is to gain time, and which views long-range hostile goals as a relatively minor calamity compared to the current terror. This realization will be facilitated by the continuation of the existing situation and its consequences, i.e., the strengthening of mutual suspicion, confusion in Arab society, and the search for solid values instead of the values of the old days, which caused disappointment, and instead of reliance on Israel, which has provided its Arab citizens with few good reasons to want to be Israelis like me and you.

As long as "they remain unwilling from within," they will not employ violence against Jews and the authorities. The violence will remain verbal, i.e., propaganda and incitement. Initially, the violence, if it occurs at all, will be directed at negative elements in Arab society and political rivals. The vision of the Islamic state is, in theory, postponed until the future. However it has not departed from consciousness. When Islam rules in Arab society, as dictated by the above-mentioned circumstances, the second stage is liable to develop, in which the soldiers of Islam will be most extreme.

This is unlikely to occur. A solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could satisfy the demands of the Arabs of Israel. However, a political agreement is not visible on the horizon. The continuation of the intifadah, Israel's failure to suppress it, and the impasse to which the intifadah is leading the Palestinians cannot but leave a wound on the Arabs of Israel, which money and goodwill alone will not heal. Nonetheless, an effort to move toward the Arab population has started. The government has established a joint development fund to be funded by it, banks, and contributors from abroad. It could be that the best investment that diaspora Jews can make in Israel's long-term security would be to channel their contributions to the Arab sector. 150 million shekels are needed for sewerage, and this amount would cover only a small fraction of the needs.

At the same time, a political process is liable to be an impediment, because elections in the territories might grant Islam an immeasurable gain that could further encourage the Muslims of Israel. It is difficult to accept as declarations of long-range intentions, the explanations of religious persons regarding the difference that they see between occupied Gaza and Tayybah: "In Tayybah, at least, we have Israeli citizenship and democratic rights. We are not fighting for independence." In putting yourself in their position, you might think: "If they obtain a Palestinian state, they will not be satisfied with it. If they do not obtain a state, they will certainly not be quiet." However, perhaps this is our logic of fear.

In any case, there is an important given, namely the qualitative gap between our perception of our right to what is inside the Green Line, and our perception of our right to the territories. Reaction to a Muslim-Israeli rebellion, would, at a certain stage, be very strong, precisely because they are Israeli citizens, and the danger, therefore, would be existential. The matter could end in a transfer, which would solve the problem of the Jewishness of the state. The Arabs are aware of this possibility, inasmuch as Israel has already twice proven, in 1949 and in 1967, that it is not deterred from this means. Perhaps the fear of deportation, which was so concrete in the West Bank in 1988, and which prevented the escalation of the intifadah, will deter them from excessive boldness that would endanger their presence in Israel, which they, as we, view as a homeland. Also, if an Islamic Jihad is established in Israel, which is a real possibility, it would involve a small, lunatic fringe. In the foreseeable future, Israeli Islam will remain faithful to its

clear interest, which is not to endanger what exists. It is possible to believe them, at least insofar as it is more important for the decisive majority of Muslims in Israel to exist in this country than it is to wage against it a religious war that has no chance of success.

[Box, p 6] We Are 100 Million—Believe Me, There Is Nothing to Fear

Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr is aware of his power and the strength of the young movement that obeys him. He does not speak as a member of a minority in your country, but as one who belongs to a great majority, in which you and your people are an insignificant minority. He speaks as a leader, in the first person singular, saying, "I will sign an agreement with the State." There is no servility, but neither is there an explicit threat. If you do right by us and the Palestinians, things will be fine. Otherwise, we will all have problems. When residents of Kafr Qasim are asked about the secret of his leadership, they respond with admiration: "He has a good head on his shoulders." A conversation with him immediately becomes a penetrating but polite debate in which he reveals his mastery of the secrets of rhetoric, but does not hesitate to respond biting. He is a popular leader, without noble and aristocratic manners, secretaries, and doormen. He still lacks even a telephone.

"We are 100 million, and we are all Muslims!" is his opening remark, so that you will know before whom you are standing. "Islam has no repenters. That is a Jewish concept. Nor does it have unbelievers. An unbeliever is one who does not believe in God and the principles of religion. I do not know such people in our society. Some drink alcohol and commit transgressions, but they are not unbelievers. Even when I was a communist, I was a believing Muslim. The Islamic movement does not aim solely to instill belief in the heart and understanding in the mind. I leave that to the old, wise people, to the Sufis. Rather, its main goal is to lead an Islamic lifestyle within the boundaries of society, the state, and the economy. If one wants to affect processes in the world as a Muslim, there is no possibility outside the Islamic movement. We are an ideological movement. With us, politics is not a tactical matter, but part of a way of life. We are prepared for commitments with other bodies to fulfill the needs of the moment, based on the following common denominator: 1) The desire for a comprehensive peace; and 2) Cultural coexistence between equals, not between masters and servants. Party names are not important to me, only principles."

[DAVAR] Should one fear you and your final objective, namely an imposed Islamic state?

[Darwish] Hostile elements have succeeded in arousing fear of the movement among the Christian and Jewish public. We will honor the Christians' faith. They are Arab Palestinians in the State of Israel just as we are, and they are pious regarding their religion just as we are regarding our religion. The Koran instructs us to honor each person's faith. We will cooperate with Christians

who are similar to us, such as Riyah Abu-al-'Asal and Shahadah Shahadah (the two in the Christian sector who most strongly oppose the state. Shahadah Shahadah, a Protestant cleric, is the head of the "Land Day" Follow-up Committee, and Riyah Abu-al-'Asal, an Anglican cleric, is number three on the Progressive List for Peace—Avital 'Anbar). I oppose violence, even if it is committed by my mother. I oppose the violence of Muslims in the strip. In 1981, when I was a communist, I dismantled an organization for violent activity. However, if I were in charge of a governmental ministry in Israel, I can understand how I might think that the movement was dangerous and had intentions such as those that you described. Therefore, I will attempt to explain our goals on a lecture tour of parties in Israel, which I will be making soon.

[DAVAR] Then why the venomous anti-Semitic propaganda in the movement's mouthpieces?

[Darwish] Anti-Semitic propaganda? I myself am Semitic. Am I against myself? This is not anti-Jewish propaganda. Rather, it is anti-Zionist propaganda. I would not even cooperate with my brother if he were anti-Jewish. I am an enemy of injustice, oppression, and the occupation of Palestine. History is a wheel. Today, you are strong. Tomorrow, you will be weak. Look at Muhammad 'Ali. Today, my youngest son can wave his fist at him! I would like you to say, now, while you are still strong, 'yes' to the Palestinians. I wish you no harm. I am a human being, the spirit of God is in me. But it is impossible to separate Islam from the Palestinian problem. We all live it, it affects us day and night.

[DAVAR] Do you recognize the state of Israel?

[Darwish] Whether I 'recognize' the state of Israel is secondary. Do I dream at night about the destruction of Israel? That is the important question. I do not dream about this. I do not wish to dream. If the divine decree is that Jews and Arabs in Israel are to live together, I am willing to accept this judgement. Until when? I do not know. If a Palestinian state is established based on the 1967 borders, and the agreement specifies that Kafr Qasim is in Israel, I will remain here as a citizen of the State of Israel. This is my home. A solution to the political problem is the key to everything. If the occupation is ended, I will sign an agreement with the State that says that I will act according to the principles of Islam, without causing a violation of the law, without endangering coexistence, and without damaging the State of Israel. We are law-abiding. If one breaks the law, there are the police and prison. However, at present, without breaking the law, we feel, and are subject to, psychological punishment that is harsher than prison. On the one hand, there is the need to uphold the law. On the other hand, one sees the mistreatment of our people. I have a conflict. I cannot act, nor do I wish to, and I hope that a situation will not come about in which I will wish to.

[DAVAR] Why?

[Darwish] The Jews have suffered enough. The Palestinians are currently suffering. The two peoples share suffering. A joint effort for peace and coexistence must be made. I do not want a Jewish mother to cry, considering the suffering that she underwent in Eastern Europe. I do not want you to be troubled by the question: Who will guarantee that this will not happen again? I believe in God. I believe that I will stand before him tomorrow. I too have children, and I want them to live in peace. But I also am unwilling for you to trouble the Palestinians. If only I had influence over the two sides. Each of the two camps has a minority that dreams of the entire land—all of Israel, and all of Palestine. Let us leave them with their dreams. I propose an agreement between two states, Palestine and Israel, a temporary peace agreement, for 10, 20 years, which we will transfer to the next generation, so that our children will not have to begin from scratch.

[Box, p 7] How Many and Where

In 1949, there were 1,174,000 Jews and 160,000 minorities, including 111,000 Muslims, in the state. The immigration waves of the 1950s improved the ratio: In 1959, there were 2,030,000 Jews, compared to 230,000 minorities, of which 160,000 were Muslim. However, since then, the rapid rate of natural increase in the Muslim sector (3.3 percent) has increased over the declining rate of increase in the Jewish sector, with the addition of immigration (a drop from 2 percent in 1976 to 1.3 percent). From 1960 until 1989, the percentage of Muslims increased from 7.7 percent to 14.4 percent, and the percentage of Jews declined correspondingly. From 1961 until 1988, Muslim settlements grew by a factor of 2.5 to 3, compared to 2.2 for Bney Braq, which has the highest birth rates, and two in Or Yehuda. Currently, there are 840,000 minorities in Israel, of which 650,000 are Muslims. They live in 72 urban settlements, 63 village settlements, and in several Jewish settlements (mixed cities). Eighty percent of them live in settlements having populations of 2,000 to 20,000 persons. Actually, in the Arab sector, there is no significant difference between a large village and a city. In Tayybah, "the largest village in the world," which has now become a city, there are 20,000 residents. There are 24,000 residents in Umm-al-Fahm.

[Box, p 7] Islamic Electoral Power

It is accepted that the strong Muslim abstention from voting in Knesset elections has been an expression of national protest, mainly toward the state. Whereas, in elections for the local authorities, there has been great participation, because those elected to the local authorities represent the Arab public. The results of the Islamic movement's electoral showing in the 15 settlements in which it ran in February-March—when figured as percentages of those who abstained from voting in the Knesset elections, which are transferred to the national level—yield an estimated Islamic electoral power of 80,000 votes at that time, or approximately four mandates. It is now greater.

Umm-al-Fahm, 7,984 votes (76 percent); Kafr Qasim, 2,370 votes (55 percent); Jaljulyah, 999 votes (51.5 percent); Rahat, 2,177 votes (66.5 percent); Kafr Kanah, 2,164 votes (48.4 percent); and Nazareth, 6,824 votes (30 percent). In another 10 settlements, including Lod and Ramla....

[Box, p 8] "Our Shasniks"

The system in use for a long time in the strip, which was transferred to Israel by the Islamic movement, is reminiscent of the methods of "El Hama'ayan" [To the spring] of SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim], which, in their time, frightened the secular public, and appeared mainly to fill a vacuum stemming from government neglect. Without great fanfare, SHAS established about 300 institutions amounting to an alternative welfare, educational, and religious system in needy settlements. It became preeminent wherever it operated among deprived, embittered populations needing as much assistance as possible. "The public has a thirst for such an enterprise" stated MK Levy of SHAS. It is also fine for Gaza and the Arab sector.

The al-Mujamma'ah [community center for social services] movement, which was established by religious students who were deported from Egypt, was made into a recognized, autonomous association in 1978. With financing from Saudi Arabia and international Islamic associations, and also from internal taxation based on the willingness of pious Muslims to be satisfied with little and to set aside one-tenth of their earnings for society, it has performed splendid community work. Throughout the strip, it has established an infrastructure rivaling that of the religious foundation "Waqf" [endowment] and the administration. They are the only body dealing with social justice. They have schools, kindergartens, clinics, and mosques, the vast majority of which are "private." In 1967, there were 70 mosques in the strip, 10 of which were private. In the 20 years of Israeli occupation, 80 were built, of which 75 are private. All of them were built at a time when building permits were not granted in the strip.

This social activity relies on tremendous volunteering. In the strip, the administration has forbidden the construction of mosques without permission, and the regional council activated reconnaissance patrols. It became clear to the Muslims that those carrying out the reconnaissance observed the Sabbath. Thus, with the help of contractors and hundreds of bricklayers, all of them volunteers, they would, in the space of one Sabbath, build a mosque, without a minaret, which, from a local and international standpoint, would be very difficult for the administration to destroy the next day. Ultimately, the rabbi in the settlements sanctioned a dispensation for the inspectors so that they could perform their reconnaissance on the Sabbath.

The Arab sector in Israel has thus come to nickname the thickly bearded, dignified members of the Islamic movement "our Shasniks." Islam is a government within a

government. Umm-al-Fahm provides an example: There are 17 Islamic committees—finance, public works, charity, monthly allocations for the poor, volunteering, sports, education, inexpensive books, a free medical center without bureaucracy, kindergartens, shelters, and a one-of-a-kind detoxification center: One week, on condition of imprisonment, at the expense of the community. The mosque loudspeakers and fliers recruit hundreds of people in a day for volunteer operations. They build a mosque every year. The new, huge mosque was built entirely with the contributions of money, tools, materials, and volunteer labor of residents. It has four levels and is 2,000 square meters. It features a sports hall, a public health clinic at a nominal price, and two floors for prayer. There are currently 12 mosques, which are completely full on Fridays. Over the years, they have competed in the RAKAH council of Hashim Mahmud. Thus, they have learned to manage a city. At present, they are the city, and they are continuing with the same type of activity. However, they were bequeathed a very weighty legacy: 50 percent are below the poverty line, about 1,000 are unemployed, most of them college graduates, and there are about 2,500 elderly persons. Currently, there is direct responsibility, as Shaykh Hashim states: "I am mobilized in the service of Islam, working 18 hours a day." In this poor city, religion comes easily to the residents. "I opened a Koran, I read, I interpreted several verses," states a restaurant owner, currently a member of the council on behalf of the movement. Not all of them like them: "A worthless city," a young Arab called out to me from one of the alleyways when I ask him how one reaches it, and he pointed to the freely flowing sewage.

Volunteer efforts exist in all of "their" settlements. In Kafr Qasim, the population was mobilized to remove tons of trash from the streets and to carve out a road. Properly equipped Muslim volunteers from the triangle, half-Christian Kafr Kana, and Bedouin Rahat lined up to pave a road. The head of the Tayybah Council, who is in a coalition with members of the Islamic movement, calls them "my public works department." In Kafr Bar', which is only 3 km from Kafr Qasim as the crow flies (they will soon pave a road), criminals are paid a living expense allowance, so that they will study the Koran.

Big money is going there. From where? Nothing is coming from the state for volunteer activities. It is said that much was transferred from abroad, and that the movement has a foreign currency account in a bank in Israel. There is a growing willingness in these settlements to pay municipal taxes and contribute. Many of the movement's members have a standing order to deduct contributions from their pay. Jews have also contributed to projects. In the Labor Party, it is said that they can be stopped only by a similar course of action. But no one in the party has the same enthusiasm and faith as members of the Islamic movement. "It is impossible to compete with their activity, and it is impossible to say there that what they are doing on the community level is not good. It is good, and it yields a benefit."

[Box, p 9] They Are the Authorities

"Until the elections, they were investigated many times by SHABAK on suspicion of having contacts with prohibited organizations, e.g., Hamas. Since the elections, this has stopped." The Islamic municipalities are currently waiting for the "bus of the directors general" and for Shim'on Peres. The party will see to it that it arrives. Rabbi Aryeh Der'i, a young person of their age, who initially offended them, is currently their declared love. "We did not want his apology, but it added to our respect for him. He is the wisest minister in the government. He takes care of us very well." Since the elections, he has met with them three times, and during my visit to the municipality, the facsimile machine discharged a "strategic plan for the development of the city," a research paper financed by the ministry. Umm-al-Fahm is poor, the luxurious enclaves on the hill overlooking the Wadi-'Ara highway camouflage the distress within. Much money is needed, but "the ministers' attitude is more important than money," they say in the city, indicating that Rabbi Peretz, when he was interior minister, declined to even come to the ceremony for the conferment of city status. "Nor did Olmert create a connection." The mayor, on his own initiative, visited the advisor for Arab affairs, Eli'ezer Tzafrir, and was "treated disrespectfully—Tzafrir did not receive him as a mayor, but interrogated him." The authorities claim that they are businesslike in their treatment of the problems of the local authorities, and they accuse the Islamic heads of the authorities with hypocrisy and lies. The Israeli Embassy in Washington reported on the echoes of a visit by a delegation of mayors in November in the U.S. media, and requested a reply. They claimed, for example, that the Arabs of Israel pay taxes totalling 400 million shekels annually, but receive services worth only 80 million shekels. The briefing will say that only the Education Ministry pays this amount in salaries to Arab teachers.

Arab Israeli Leader al-Tayyibah Profiled

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[Article by Yizhar B'er]

[Text] At the end of last week, Dr. Ahmad al-Tayyibah returned from 10 days in Jordan. His uncle, Dr. Subhi al-Tayyibah, had died, and Ahmad and his family had gone over the bridges to Amman for the mourning period. During his absence, something happened that turned al-Tayyibah for a full week into a media figure in demand. Since he returned, he ceased being a private individual. Strangers identify him on the street, and either shake his hand or curse him quietly, according to the division in the Arab street. The telephones don't stop ringing in the house in the neighborhood of Bayt Haninah and in the private medical office on Salah-al-Din Street in East Jerusalem. During our meeting, telephone calls came through from Ibrahim Nimr Husayn, the mayor of Shfar'amu and the chairman of the

Committee of Arab Local Authorities; Salem Jubran, the editor of AL-ITTIHAD and the assistant head of the local council in Kafr Bara in the Triangle; Ra'uf Shaghuri, editor of the pro-Iraqi newspaper AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, which is published in Paris. Radwan Abu-'Ayyash, chairman of the Society of Palestinian Journalists, also telephoned. The general message was "Blessings, blessings, blessings."

But not only blessings arrived. The complex and complicated identity of the Israeli Arabs also brought forth mixed responses of suspicion and rejection to the quick junkets of the gynecologist from Tayyibah between Jerusalem and Tunis. No less irritating was the fact that al-Tayyibah, aged 32, also skipped over several veteran Arab public figures in the competition for the role of mediator.

Two elements stand out as the critics in the Arab street: "The Sons of the Village," which did not like the role played by al-Tayyibah in the service of two masters; and the independent newspaper AL-SINNARAH, which is published in Nazareth. The latter came out with a flurry of verbal blows against the mediating doctor. The editor of AL-SINNARAH, Lutfi Mash'ur, published in the paper a translation of an article by Amnon Abramovitch ("It Would Be Better Were al-Tayyibah Involved in Gynecology and not in Diplomatic Affairs"), that had been published last week in MA'ARIV, in its entirety, and even added a "nasty introduction," in al-Tayyibah's words.

Aside from national sensitivities, complex games of prestige are involved, say knowledgeable sources. Al-Tayyibah, they say, is striding confidently towards a candidacy for the Knesset on behalf of a Jewish or an Arab list. "As one of those whom Mash'ur doesn't like, I'm in good company," says al-Tayyibah. "There is no one whom he does not attack: Darawishah, Mi'ari, the Communist Party, Tawfiq Tubi, Tawfiq Ziyad, Emile Habibi, Samih al-Qasim. As Weizmann said, Mash'ur uses the lowest level of person in the street in order to work against me."

Mash'ur isn't found lacking: "I don't respect al-Tayyibah even as much as a speck of dust. A lot of people bought his stories—but not I. This man raises many questions. He takes credit for things with which he has no connection. He's hot-headed. If I were to rely on someone who would destroy him, I would rely only upon the man himself. He's the kind of person who asks God to let him rule the heavens."

Al-Tayyibah has also been hit by occasional stray bullets from the Hebrew press. Last week 'Amos Gilbo'a wrote in MA'ARIV about the silk shirts that he wears and the money that he receives from the Persian Gulf. "But he wrote nothing about my opinions. If I have the opportunity to wear silk shirts, I'll wear them in spite of him," says al-Tayyibah, pointing to the simple cotton shirt that he purchased in Jordan. The echoes of the noise generated by the Weizmann affair reached Amman, and while

he was there, al-Tayyibah received specific information on the reactions to the uncovering of the affair. In an extraordinary appearance by an Israeli Arab on Hashemite television, al-Tayyibah raised the level of pride of the local Palestinians when he spoke of the walls that were falling down and the preconceptions that were collapsing throughout the world except around Shamir.

But the unexplained ease of his junkets between the hostile states aroused suspicions, as expected. "I learned something interesting," he says. "Many are waiting in the corner. You could fill an entire stadium with people whose sole ideology is opposition to those who succeed—the ones who grab the shirts of those who are climbing up the stairs and even stick a knife in their backs. Every time it happens, I am once again amazed at how many sick people there are on both sides, whose main occupation is character assassination and throwing a wrench in others people's gears."

Dr. Ahmad al-Tayyibah acquired his degree in the School of Medicine in 'En Kerem, Jerusalem. Prof. Rami Rachmimov, the dean of the faculty, awarded him a certificate of appreciation in 1982 and ranked him as the best student in his class. Up to two years ago, Dr. al-Tayyibah worked as a gynecologist in Hadassah Hospital on Mt. Scopus in Jerusalem. He was fired following an incident with the guard at the entrance to the hospital. The guard told the Arab doctor that to him, everyone is a potential terrorist, and asked to search his briefcase. Al-Tayyibah hit him in the face with the briefcase. Weizmann, who knew him then, tried to intervene in order to prevent his dismissal, but failed. Not long ago, he married a Palestinian dentist from Tulkarm. "I went to her office in Tulkarm because of a toothache, and ever since my heart began to ache. I suspect that my mother didn't recommend that office to me by chance," says al-Tayyibah. Aside from his wife, the dentist, al-Tayyibah's uncle, who died in Amman, and his brother are doctors. But al-Tayyibah is the only one in the family whose aspirations go beyond opening an office.

In order to understand the entry of the young doctor into sensitive diplomatic affairs, one must go back five years. 'Ezer Weizmann then became acquainted with al-Tayyibah when he visited Kafr al-Tayyibah in the Triangle. A friendship developed. The spontaneous and direct Weizmann then took an interest in the sharp, quick-talking youth, and since then they haven't stopped complimenting one another. "This man takes a fatherly attitude, bestows warmth and friendship, has the highest level of credibility. He wins great respect in the Arab sector in Israel and in the Arab world, and especially among the Palestinians, on account of his positions, his courage, and his statement that peace is made with an enemy. His military and ideological past is completely known. He is regarded as a brave man, and that is a characteristic that we respect," says al-Tayyibah of Weizmann.

"He is a Palestinian patriot who acts, in his own way, for the sake of peace. He is my friend, and if he gets into

trouble, I won't abandon him. Some of those who criticize him now came to me and asked to receive the important function that al-Tayyibah fulfilled, out of jealousy and envy," says Weizmann of al-Tayyibah.

Weizmann first used al-Tayyibah in negotiations for the exchange of prisoners. Israel wanted Samir Asad and the missing persons of Sultan Ya'aqov; the PLO wanted 'Umar al-Qasim, the assistant of Hawatimah in the Democratic Front. Al-Tayyibah, according to reports, hopped over to Tunis several times, but the deal didn't go through, apparently due to Hawatimah's opposition. Al-Tayyibah refuses today to place responsibility for the failure of the negotiations, but he asserts strongly that the negotiations began on the initiative of the PLO. "The PLO approached me and asked that I make contact with Weizmann in order to bring about a humane solution to the problem of the captives and the missing persons on both sides. The Palestinian side pushed harder for an agreement, but that is not to lessen the interest and the seriousness that was shown by the Israelis," he says.

At the same time, Bassam Abu-Sharif declared in THE LOS ANGELES TIMES: "The PLO has empowered Ahmad al-Tayyibah to conduct negotiations on the subject of the release of the prisoners." According to al-Tayyibah, Israel also empowered him for this mission. "The minister of defense approved my trip for the purpose of this task, and I met with the Captives Committee," he says.

In the Captives Committee that had been established in the Ministry of Defense there were at that time meetings with other Palestinian figures, such as the poet Samih al-Qasim, and MK's [Knesset member] Darawishah and Mi'ari. Through the negotiations over the captives, Dr. al-Tayyibah began to serve as a courier also on other diplomatic subjects, as he himself explains: "Clearly, when you are sitting with senior Palestinians from the PLO, you don't speak only about the captives or about Za'tar."

[HA'ARETZ] Do you know of meetings of Israeli figures with the heads of the PLO?

[Al-Tayyibah] There were meetings between very well-known Israeli figures and senior persons in the PLO in all kinds of places throughout the world. There were meetings at which I was present, and there were other meetings about which I know with certainty. What Weizmann supposedly did secretly, is not the least bit different from Weizmann's public declarations. His opinion on the subject is known, and he did not deviate from this opinion. The opinion of others in the government on contacts with the PLO does not differ from that of Weizmann, but he says in public what others say in the utmost secrecy.

[HA'ARETZ] You personally have heard comments in favor of contacts with the PLO from members of the government?

[Al-Tayyibah] Yes.

[HA'ARETZ] By whom?

[Al-Tayyibah] No comment.

[HA'ARETZ] What happened exactly in the Weizmann-Peres-al-Tayyibah three-way telephone conversation that blew open the Weizmann affair?

[Al-Tayyibah] Shamir will reveal it. The day will come and the truth will be revealed. I am only sorry that the support that Weizmann should have received at home, from his party, was not total.

[HA'ARETZ] According to your feelings, does the PLO today have expectations of the Labor Party?

[Al-Tayyibah] The PLO's main expectation of the Labor Party is that it will leave the government or give a clear "yes" to contacts with the PLO, but it also knows that this will not happen soon. There is in the PLO more than just a thought that a narrowly-based government headed by the Alignment could speed the convening of serious talks with the PLO and the opening of negotiations, with a change in the atmosphere and public opinion in Israel, even though it is clear that such a government would not last long.

[HA'ARETZ] There is a feeling that opposition to 'Arafat is growing, and we see a significant strengthening of Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] and the Fronts in the territories.

[Al-Tayyibah] The PLO is very sure of its new political path, but there is no doubt that the rigidity shown by Israel can aid the radicals on the Palestinian side, in the sense of "I told you so." The PLO knows how far it can go. It is definitely showing awareness of the strengthening of the opposition elements to the strategem.

[HA'ARETZ] That is to say, one should not expect further flexibility?

[Al-Tayyibah] The concessions that the PLO has made are maximum concessions. It has red lines. For example, who will stand publicly behind the dialogue of the Palestinian delegation. For example, the agenda. The PLO will not agree that the subject of the procedures for the elections will be the only thing on the agenda of the meetings in Cairo.

[HA'ARETZ] In your opinion, what can be expected in the near future?

[Al-Tayyibah] The increasing coordination between Egypt and Jordan should be viewed positively. The relations between the PLO and Jordan are gaining momentum, and the relations of trust and cooperation are increasing. The Jordan-Egypt-Iraq-PLO square is today the strongest force in the Arab world. I expect that the meeting of the three foreign ministers will still take place, and that if it doesn't, the government will fall, and I don't view such a development negatively.

[HA'ARETZ] Meanwhile, has it turned out that there is surveillance on your telephone?

[Al-Tayyibah] It bothers me that Shamir listens in on my telephone calls. Someone has told me that Shamir even knows what I say to my wife. To put it mildly, I find that unpleasant.

[HA'ARETZ] Avi Farhan submitted a complaint to the police that you had contact with the PLO. Did you also meet with 'Arafat?

"'Arafat is a warm and friendly person, who takes a fatherly attitude towards his guests," says Dr. al-Tayyibah, and he smiles.

IDF Criticized for Budget Calculations

44230106A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 30 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Re'uven Podhatzor]

[Text] "We are not certain that the data that the IDF [Israel Defense Force] presents on the cost of its operations regarding the intifadah are true and real." This serious assertion is being voiced by senior figures in the Ministry of Defense, in view of the submission of the government budget and the debates on the desirable size of the defense budget.

According to these individuals, the IDF did not present serious calculations, which could support its assertion that the cost of military operations since the beginning of the intifadah until the end of 1990 will reach an enormous sum, exceeding IS [Israeli shekel] 1.5 billion. Also, when senior IDF officers were asked to present the calculations that give the details of the various expenditure items, they were evasive and gave only general figures.

The senior figures in the Ministry of Defense estimate that the method of calculation used by the IDF in determining the cost of the intifadah is the reason for the presentation of the very high amounts. According to this method, every corps and arm of the IDF submits the list of its expenses on account of the intifadah, and the total is the figure that the IDF submits.

In this manner, it is possible to ascribe also to the intifadah expenses that would have been incurred in any event by the particular corps. For there are operations that the IDF includes in the framework of the expenses of the intifadah, among them the preparation of infrastructure, current procurement, and training—the largest portion of which would have been carried out even without the intifadah.

The individuals in the Ministry of Defense assert that it is not logical to assume that the Army's expenses on account of the intifadah are so high. There are current expenditure items where monies actually are being saved. Thus, for example, training expenses went down

considerably, at least in the first two years of the intifadah. In this manner many engine-operating hours of tanks and many vehicles were saved. Likewise, expenditures were not made because, with the cancellation of a considerable part of the planned training, expensive ammunition was not fired.

These individuals point to several more activities that were not carried out by the IDF in the two years of the intifadah, and whose cost is much higher than the activities of the IDF soldiers in the territories.

The basic problem, these individuals stress, is due to the fact that the Ministry of Defense does not have serious tools for taking on the figures presented to it by the IDF. There are no professional frameworks within the ministry that are capable of examining the operational and professional assertions and assumptions that the IDF presents. Thus, a situation is created in which the IDF in fact determines its requirements with full autonomy, without any control activity being carried out, or any real supervision by the civilian level.

The IDF Will Not Be Able To Cope

Senior individuals in the IDF, who are acquainted with the details of the preparation of the IDF's annual work plan, responded to the assertions voiced in the Ministry of Defense, saying that the costs presented by the IDF are the true costs, and that these are exactly the expenditures that the IDF incurred due to the intifadah.

According to them, the IDF's operations in the territories involve considerable expenditures mainly for extensive construction work, which includes setting up new bases and prison facilities.

These activities are very expensive, and it is these that are pushing up the cost of the intifadah in the annual calculation. To this should be added also the expenditure involved in financing the numerous reservists' days that the IDF is forced to use in order to meet all the needs that arose in the territories.

According to them, the Ministry of Defense cannot evade its responsibility as the one that is supposed to present to the government the IDF's requirements, by casting doubt on the Army's considerations and calculations. Up to now, the Ministry of Defense has been ignoring this duty, and it is leaving to the IDF the job of persuading the ministers of the need to allocate additional resources to the defense budget.

"In the situation that has been created, and to a great extent due to the acquiescence of the minister of defense with the fact that the Ministry of Finance does not compensate us for our expenditures on account of the intifadah, a deficit of IS 900 million has been created, which does not allow us to carry out the work plan that we had prepared," they assert in the IDF.

Senior military figures expressed great dissatisfaction with the agreement that was concluded between the

ministers of defense and finance, according to which the Ministry of Defense undertakes not to request a supplementary budget during the coming fiscal year. "The implication of this agreement is that in 1990 the IDF will be forced to grapple with an impossible mission—to ensure for the civilian level an answer to all the threats that are developing in the theatre, and at the same time to invest in building the future strength of the Army. The senior political level must understand that it is not possible to do this with the financial resources that are at our disposal," they say in the IDF.

Departing Gaza Commander Reviews Troop Behavior

90OL0303A Tel Aviv BAMAHA
in Hebrew 7 Mar 90 p 7

[Article by Ya'el Shapira']

[Excerpt] Brigadier General Tzvi Poleg, commander of the Gaza Strip, departed the area this week, having arrived here 20 months ago at the peak of the intifadah, for the purpose of finding a way of dealing with the new situation. Last week, when he took his leave from the division on his way to studies abroad and then to a senior position in the IDF [Israel Defense Force], the situation in the Gaza Strip was described as relatively quiet. The Medina bazaar was quiet, and Rafiyah was still under curfew after rioting at the beginning of the week.

[BAMAHA] Brig. Gen. Poleg, you are leaving Gaza at a time when the echoes of the Giv'ati A and B trials are still resonating. What are your conclusions?

[Poleg] "One important lesson we learned is that orders must be completely clear to everyone, down to the last soldier. Currently, all the regulations on opening fire and on the use of various weapons are, in my opinion, clear. The problem is that there can never be an end to education. Every few weeks a new group arrives here and has to be trained all over again. Much to my regret, the men who come here often think they know the regulations, when in fact they only have totally wrong information on the subject."

[BAMAHA] And the problem persists?

[Poleg] "The most difficult job was to explain to the troops the regulations concerning and the handling of disorderly behavior. We had difficulties inculcating in the troops the fact that this is a military mission for all intents and purposes. There are orders, there are guidelines, reports to commanding officers, and investigations of incidents, and that this is the only way to deal with the situation. Some things became clear only in time: We thought that if a man is killed here, that will induce quiet, but we discovered that the opposite was true."

[BAMAHA] To what extent did you personally instruct the troops assigned here on operational duties?

[Poleg] "I personally instructed the commanding officers of each company assigned here. Every week we had an orderly instruction time for company commanders, and at the end of its tour of duty, every company reviewed its operations here with me. There is a great difference between the troops who came to the Gaza Strip one and a half years ago and those who come today. Those who came at the beginning of the intifadah were insecure about what was permitted and what was forbidden. Currently, with crystalized and clear regulations, the situation is different. In the future I hope that new conscripts will not be brought here at all. It is bad for their training, and they don't have the emotional maturity to deal with what goes on here. Much longer periods of time must be devoted to their training."

[BAMAHANE] Do you see a change among the local population, too?

[Poleg] "In my view, the locals have learned to live with the intifadah. If there is disorderly behavior in a school, the market remains open and workers go to work. Each one has a role: Wage earners go to work, shopkeepers sell their wares, and rioters do their thing. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the motivation is not present only among one category: Everyone identifies with the idea, but they express it in keeping with their existential needs." [passage omitted]

Officers Work Abroad Without Permission

44230109B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 16 Feb 90 p 2

[Text] IDF [Israel Defense Force] officers from elite units, including battalion commanders, work abroad during vacations training various units, in violation of military regulations and orders, through Israeli security agencies that employ them even though this is not permitted.

Some of these officers have stated that they do these jobs without permission "in order to supplement their pay."

Such officers take vacations during their regular service and tell their commanders that they are traveling abroad on holiday. At the same time, they get in touch with security agencies, whose managers are former senior officers, and come to agreements on the time and place of jobs.

The managers of security agencies that employ officers are aware of the ban on such activities, but they ignore it, paying the officers for forbidden work.

In addition to permission from the IDF to take on additional jobs during the regular service, every security activity abroad requires a special permit from the Defense Ministry.

Officers who work abroad don't apply for such a permit, thereby violating the relevant law.

Officers who were asked why they consciously disregard the law and get involved in violating military orders, said that they were unable to feed their families on their army pay, and that this was the best way to increase their income.

The officers in question totally ignored the extensive facets of their illegal occupations abroad, and were unaware of the negative implications of their activities for Israel's political relations with the respective countries. According to them, they stick only to training and never used weapons or other military equipment themselves. They also claimed that they don't see anything particularly serious in their actions, because they only provide advice.

Military sources reacted by stating that the IDF is not aware of this phenomenon. A soldier on vacation must have permission to do outside work, and permission would not be issued in cases such as the above. If the identity of such officers is revealed, investigations will be carried out.

Need for Paratroopers Contested

44230109A Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 15 Feb 90 p 15

[Article by Avi Benyahu]

[Text] When the special U.S. forces were dropped over the capital of Panama a few weeks ago on their way to catch Colonel Manuel Noriega, the patrons of IDF [Israel Defense Force] paratroopers beamed with pride: "You see, who said that the time of paratroopers is gone never to return? If the United States keeps up this capability and its forces, we, too, need our paratroopers," they probably said to each other.

IDF's regular and reserve troops include a large paratrooper force, made up of several brigades and well trained. Aside from service in the territories and along the borders, and aside from infantry and APCs, reserve paratroopers are from time to time called up for what is known as "parachute refresher courses." They go to their bases, go over procedures and orders, get on Dakota or Hercules aircraft, are dropped over the sand dunes of Palmahim, then go home in peace. On the other hand, who the hell needs such an enormous paratroopers' force in Israel in the year 2000? Still, this is a question to which it is difficult to get an answer.

The last time that the IDF used the paratroopers in action was in 1956 in the Sinai passes during the Qadesh Campaign. Since then, for 33 years, the IDF has not needed airborne troops either in the wars or between them. However, the experts claim that "we'll still need them in the future."

In the meantime, during all those years, the regular IDF paratroopers' brigade continued to induct hundreds and thousands of youth into its ranks every year. They undergo training in the famous parachuting course that

entitles them to the very desirable wings, return to jumping a few times, and are then assigned to reserve formations where they keep up their skills.

Paratroopers commanding officers consulted on the matter stated that aside from the operational need for parachuting capabilities, the course also serves as a center of attraction for youth and allows the corps to snatch the best among new recruits. The proof is that, out of every five recruits who ask to join the paratroopers, only one is accepted, and that after tests and training. In addition, parachuting serves as a means of instilling motivation, establishing physical condition standards, and as a "carrot" for those soldiers.

Others, too, get to taste this carrot, because for some reason, other trainees, which have nothing to do and never will have anything to do with parachuting, go through the paratroopers' course in order to win their wings. Trainees who distinguish themselves in their units are assigned to parachuting courses, and in the case of girls, to folding parachutes and serving as company clerks in the brigade.

However, at a time when cuts are threatening the IDF and commanding officers claim that they are looking for built-in fat in the Army, it would be a good idea to consider whether the paratroopers units do not fall under that category. The Air Force, which uses its transport aircraft to carry and drop paratroopers, is forced to invest millions of dollars every year in this sector.

In view of the IDF's missions in the battlefield of the future, defending the borders, and fighting terrorism, the paratroopers, in their present configuration, resemble the Polish cavalry before World War II. If the Army wants to preserve parachuting, then it should keep only the regular paratrooper's formation and a minimum of reservists, and give up the "parachute refresher training" throughout the reserve system, courses, and so forth, because, while weighing on the Air Force, the rest of the IDF doesn't have much use for them at all.

Police Fail To Catch Siccaris

44230092D Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 14 Jan 90 p 13

[Text] A year has passed since the various activities of the organization called the Siccaris began to be reported, starting with the burnings of front doors and automobiles and threats to the lives of persons identified with the left or who occasionally voice opinions defined as leftist, and ending with the planting of a dummy hand grenade under the automobile of the wife of the assistant prime minister and finance minister. And the police, which has also brought the SHABAK [General Security Service] into the investigation, has not succeeded in arresting suspects and accusing them of direct participation in the activities of the organization.

At the start of the organization's activity, senior persons in the police admitted that they hadn't the slightest clue,

aside from the initial assumption that a small group of persons from the extreme right is involved. Investigators from SHABAK and the Inquiry Department of the Central Unit in Tel Aviv very, very slowly began to recognize the signs of the planners and succeeded, in their opinion, to distinguish between actions carried out by the group of persons calling themselves Siccaris and other acts carried out in their name, but not by them.

Such an investigation is naturally very difficult. The subject is apparently a small and closed group of individuals, some of whose members served in the IDF [Israel Defense Force], which demonstrates expertise in methods of surveillance and evasion. To this will attest the various journalists who occasionally receive an anonymous telephone call from an individual with an Anglo-Saxon accent, who identifies himself as belonging to the group. This individual speaks briefly and to the point, and if he wishes to speak longer or to answer additional questions, he takes care to hang up after a short time and then call back from another telephone.

And it is difficult to plant an agent in this group or to use one of its members as an informer. Rumors and assumptions are not enough. It is necessary to gather evidence and, if possible, even to catch someone red-handed and to record it. But the members of the group are extremely cautious. The police sometimes make an arrest for an investigation on one subject, on which the investigators have, as it were, sufficient evidence, while the investigators look into possibilities of another investigation.

Following the planting of the dummy hand grenade under Sonia Peres' car and the threats to the lives of various Knesset members, great pressure was exerted on the investigators to come up with even a partial success.

Provoking the Police

With the arrests of activists of the "State of Judaea" organization on suspicion of having committed arson at the Grapholite Press in Tel Aviv, the question immediately arose as to whether there was a connection between these suspects and the members of the Siccaris. The police are formulating a cautious answer that denies for now the discovery of any connection between the two organizations, although in off-the-record conversations they find it difficult to deny completely such a link.

The investigation of the arson at the Grapholite Press was assigned to the Detective Branch in Tel Aviv, headed by Superintendent Hayim Pinhas, who is considered to be a "winner" in the unit. He and his men have succeeded in accumulating enough supposed evidence to bring about the arrest of a number of activists of the organization, including the president of the "State of Judaea," Michael Ben-Horin, and even to present to the court a large amount of secret evidence that the judge regards as most serious.

Nevertheless, the escape of two additional activists over the weekend from the detectives of YAMAR [expansion unknown], who arrived at their homes early in the

morning to carry out a search and, perhaps, even to arrest them, shows that the members of these organizations learned the lesson of the "Keshet" affair, and they trust no one. As in any underground organization, they took care to provide themselves with escape routes and do not even hesitate to provoke the police and conduct their escapes over the radio waves, as they contact various reporters and keep them informed of the developments. They also did not hesitate to contact in the middle of the week MA'ARIV's Jerusalem reporter and to tell him that they intend to escalate their activities.

SHABAK and police investigators know that the activities of this underground organization must be stopped as soon as possible. But it appears that the great sophistication of the Siccaris has taken the initiative away from them, and they must wait patiently for the moment of opportunity when the members of the organization slip up, and must hope that they will be aware and quick enough to catch them.

Youth Lean to Right, Strong Leadership

44230108E Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR
in Hebrew 15 Feb 90 p 7

[Article by Avner Regev]

[Text] Towards the end of last week the press carried the results of elections held at Ramat-Gan's Blikh High School. One of the newspapers even bothered to note that previous elections held at that high school at the time foreshadowed the political changeover of 1977. The school management, which released the results, added that that is the reason that important political parties pay attention to these results.

The press headlines that appeared stated things like: "The Majority in Favor of Negotiations with the PLO," but also "The Right Wing Wins Blikh Elections." These contradictory headlines were based on the following results: 22.6 percent voted for Alignment, 17.6 percent for Likud, 17.2 percent for Moledet, 14.3 percent for the CRM [Citizens' Rights Movement], 10 percent for Tehiya, 2.1 percent for the NRP [National Religious Party], and 1.5 percent for Tzomet. The right-wing bloc won about 48.6 percent, as compared to 38.8 percent for the left-wing bloc. Some 73 percent noted that they were willing to meet with Arab youth; 76 percent were against the law banning meetings with the PLO, and if that law were repealed, the majority would support direct negotiations with that organization.

These apparently contradictory results are indicative of the mood of the new generation: Support for the right-wing is greater, there is a need for a strong hand and tough leadership, but there is also willingness to talk even with "the most dangerous of our enemies," on condition that our deterrent force is preserved—76 percent are in favor of instituting the death sentence for terrorists and of ensuring that the right-wing views predominate at negotiations.

Since 1984, national unity governments fostered great political sensitivity among the youth, and both right- and left-wing positions became more extreme. When leftist spokesmen appear before high school seniors they are met with ridicule, heckling, and lack of willingness to listen to them. It seems that one of the reasons for that reaction is the view popular among young people that the left "is prepared to give up everything" even before negotiations begin.

For many years the left-wing had the leading majority in the country. The ideology of those parties contributed and helped shape young people through youth organizations, kibbutzim, etc. In recent years that type of ideology has been in regression and has not been doing well. During this time, kibbutz movements failed to preserve their special characteristics and some found themselves needing aid from the national budget, something that did not do much for their image.

The inability of center and left-wing movements to crystallize a joint political platform makes it difficult to pass on a clear and consistent message capable of being heard by students and young people. While a similar split exists among the right wing, too, its slogans, despite the nuances in them, are more readily absorbed by the youth, who make up a good slice of the electorate.

Knesset Member [MK] Rehav'am Ze'evi appeared at a discussion organized for senior army officers. His lecture elicited considerable response and won support among the higher ranks. He won a similar reaction in an appearance before senior police officers. Many of them stated after his lecture that his ideas may not be possible to implement now, but we should seriously prepare for them because there will be no recourse but to carry them out in the future.

The rise of the right wing and the extreme right was also reflected in a study recently done by three professors from Tel Aviv University. To the question (which was also asked before the intifadah) whether it was preferable to have a strong leadership capable of keeping order in the country without depending on Knesset elections, 22 percent answered that they fully concurred (as opposed to 15 percent in 1987), 23 percent expressed agreement (compared to 19 percent in 1987), 13 percent had no opinion (seven percent in 1987), 21 percent were against (21 percent in 1987), and 21 percent were strongly against (38 percent in 1987). Since the outbreak of the intifadah, the number of Israelis willing to risk a limitation of democracy increased by one-third—about 45 percent are prepared to give up democracy in Israel.

Throughout the world, particularly among the communist bloc and in South America, some people are killed and others are thrown in jail for their struggle for democracy and for freedom of speech and of opinion. In Israel the reverse situation is rapidly gaining ground. Democracy is merely tolerated in the Jewish sector. In connection with relations between Jews and Arabs, the request among the youth, especially high school seniors,

is to revoke democracy and take away rights from Arab citizens. It is today difficult to explain to young people why the Arabs can run around freely in Jewish cities and neighborhoods, while Jews are afraid to go to Arab villages, even within the Green Line.

It is today also difficult to explain (we're not talking about facts and data) why there is a difference between Israeli Arabs and Arabs in the territories. If they are potentially hostile to the state, they should be treated the same way—that is the reaction currently heard from many young people at lectures by center and left-wing speakers.

These data show that as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is becoming more acute, solutions are not forthcoming, and especially if in the future religious elements will be added to the struggle between Islam and Judaism, the rightist trend among young people will progressively increase.

In his lectures to army and police officers, MK Rehav'am Ze'evi estimated that his party will win about 10 mandates in the coming elections. In his opinion, the votes will come from the Likud and Alignment, from both left and right. The results of the elections at Blikh High School and the findings of the professors' study should be viewed as a warning and an alarm signal against such trends. A weak Likud leadership and a tired Alignment leadership are a certain prescription for the blossoming of extreme movements, which feed on public distress.

Leaders of center to left parties would do well to convene a general conference with the participation of representatives of various parties, to discuss findings such as the above. Abandoning the stage to the right-wing and its ideology may bring about a situation in which the balance between Jews and Arabs will be disrupted, the Arabs will be deprived of their legitimate right to equal rights, and two norms of behavior will be established in the country: democratic norms for Jews and undemocratic for the Arab citizens.

In the longer term there is of course no solution other than a peace agreement between the two nations. Without such an agreement, the right wing's rise to power is only a matter of time, while the strength of the Islamic movement will grow on the other side, and both movements constitute a great threat.

Problems Expected in Absorbing Scientists

44230108D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 15 Feb 90 p 4B

[Article by David Nordel]

[Text] One of the prominent aspects of the new wave of immigrants from the Soviet Union is the large number of scientists and engineers expected to arrive in the coming year. According to informed forecasts, of the 100,000 new immigrants expected in 1990, no less than 2,000

gave their profession as scientists and researchers, and 11,300 as engineers in various specialties.

The overall scientific staff employed in higher education institutes in Israel numbers about 4,700, and thousands of engineers and scientists were laid off in recent years.

Consequently, this addition of new scientists is very problematic, more so since it is reasonable to assume that this immigration wave will not end with the above figures.

The importance of providing employment for the Soviet immigrants is all the more significant because some of them were not allowed to work in their profession before their emigration. Mathematician Dr. Viktor Brailowsky, who in the past was refused permission to emigrate and who today works at the Tel Aviv University together with his wife Irina, also a mathematician, said: "If a newly arrived scientist from Russia cannot find work, he feels unsettled, psychologically abnormal. I think this can be a real problem for immigration."

Organizational preparations and initiatives concerning the absorption of new scientists began during the previous immigration wave from the Soviet Union. In 1971 Professor Yuval Ne'eman, who was then president of the Tel Aviv University, came to the conclusion that absorption should be organized systematically, instead of individual efforts for each scientist separately. Thanks to Ne'eman's pressure, the Center for Scientific Absorption [CSA] was established in 1973 as part of the National Committee for Research and Development.

The CSA had two main objectives: on the one hand, to find suitable jobs for scientists as an alternative to the professionals' labor exchange, and on the other hand, to subsidize jobs, particularly at the universities and non-profit organizations, with a view to allowing the new immigrants an adjustment period of two to three years in which to study and master Western scientific conditions. CSA, which in the mid-1970's was transferred to the Ministry of Absorption, is still fulfilling those functions. Since its establishment, the CSA handled more than 4,000 new immigrants, 1,900 of them from the Soviet Union.

One decade later Ne'eman was once again responsible for establishing the second governmental authority in charge of immigration absorption, the Ministry of Science and Development (currently Ministry of Science and Technology). Dr. Barukh Ayyal, head of the department for the absorption of scientists at the ministry, said that in contrast to the detailed handling of the Absorption Ministry, the Science and Technology Ministry considers the national aspect of the situation.

For that purpose, the ministry hammered out a plan to establish new institutions in which to employ new immigrants in science and education. Most of the plan is still only on paper and waiting for a budget allocation, but one part of it has already been implemented: The ministry issued several public offers for research projects to

be carried out by new immigrants in research areas that the ministry has declared preferred (biotechnology, materials, computers and artificial intelligence, electrical optics and lasers, neurobiology, superconductors, and environmental studies).

The trouble for both the CSA and the Science Ministry is that the resources are smaller than the mission. The CSA budget for 1989 was IS [Israeli shekels] 8.5 million and will be increased to IS 31.5 million this year (based on 40,000 new immigrants). The CSA has already been forced to limit its support for candidates and to cut the level of support for each scientist. The Science Ministry earmarked IS 1.5 million for research grants for new immigrant scientists for 1989-90.

The shortage of allocations is not only the result of the general deterioration of the scientific system in Israel, but also reflects another phenomenon, namely the tendency to wait until the last moment. In 1985 Knesset Member [MK] Avraham Burg, then adviser for diaspora affairs to Prime Minister Shim'on Peres, predicted in this author's presence that the Soviet Union may open up its gates to all those who want to leave. The National Science Academy in April 1987 prepared a position paper in which it urged a plan for the absorption of scientists. Upon the arrival of the first new immigrants of the current wave two years ago, Professor Ne'eman worked out a plan to absorb several scientists as university lecturers along with research work.

Nevertheless, most institutions are not yet prepared for the immigration wave. The industrialists' association and the umbrella organization of advanced technologies are only now carrying out studies on manpower demand and absorption programs, including one for scientific and technological manpower. In the past few weeks, the Ben-Gurion and Hebrew Universities announced plans to take on new immigrants on their faculty, in research, and as students. Tel Aviv University this week announced the appointment of an immigration dean and the establishment of a higher committee for absorption which will coordinate its efforts, while the Tekhnion is scheduled to make a decision on a similar program in the coming few weeks.

There is no dispute about the fact that these new immigrants can be a valuable asset for our scientific research and industry. In point of fact, the state is receiving a great gift of thousands of experienced scientists without having to invest in their education, something that constitutes a savings of hundreds of thousands of dollars for each scientist.

Perhaps because of perestroika, the new Soviet immigrants are showing more initiative and are more intensely motivated to succeed than their predecessors. Dr. Barukh Ayyal went even further: "I think that in recent years there has definitely been stagnation in Israeli research and development....Our estimate is that this great wave of immigration will give a fresh upsurge to scientific research."

The National Science Academy agrees with these expectations; it recently announced that it will earmark a \$6.5-million "welcoming fund" for the absorption of 15 senior scientists in the coming years. Dr. Me'ir Tzadok, director general of the academy, said that the benefits of the fund—five years' salary, research grants, and even easy loans to purchase housing—are designed to attract first class scientists to Israel and to promote scientific excellence.

Difficulties in Detecting Non-Jewish Immigrants

44230106B Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 12 Feb 90 p 21

[Article by Ya'el Gewirtz]

[Text] The minister of the interior, Aryeh Dar'i, heard only yesterday morning, at the government meeting, about the hard descriptions brought by the camera of 'Amos Karmeli from the Gomulski family in Haifa. As asserted by Mrs. Gomulski's son, Dar'i's officials refused to register them as Jews under "nationality" [on the identity card] because he could not produce the official documents, including his mother's birth certificate, which had been burned in a pogrom. Today, the director general of the Ministry of the Interior and the official responsible for registering residents took part in an examination of the assertions. "We were not acquainted with this family," Dar'i explains. "We know of at least 30 families in the northern region regarding which there are problems in making an entry under 'nationality'—these are hitchhikers, non-Jews, who immigrated and were given new immigrant rights on the basis of a false declaration. These persons will not be expelled, because they are families that acted out of distress, but we will take care of the matter by legal means after we have examined all sides of it."

[HADASHOT] Immigrants are arriving laden with baggage that was packed in haste, and when they arrive, it turns out that they were not able to be registered because they had not brought the proper papers.

[Dar'i] Every Jewish immigrant who arrives according to the Law of Return must be registered according to the Population Registry Law. For every detail of registration, he must bring a public document, which proves his assertion to be correct. Nevertheless, the law takes into account the possibility that the immigrant may not have the required public document, and a declaration may be given instead, and proven by two witnesses.

[HADASHOT] That is to say, an immigrant could arrive at Ben-Gurion Airport who could be found to be ineligible to immigrate to Israel?

[Dar'i] No. A distinction must be made between the Law of Return, which grants the new immigrant certificate and all the rights it involves, and the Population Registry. The immigrants do not receive their immigrant status from us, but from the Foreign Ministry and the Liaison Bureau of the Prime Minister's Office. Those

bodies are the ones that send them the invitations to immigrate, and approximately 500,000 such invitations have been issued up to now. We have no connection with the invitations. The moment that the candidates receive an exit permit and arrive in Israel, they automatically receive the status of immigrant, an immigrant certificate, and rights. We give them the certificate according to the computer's data.

[HADASHOT] But still, during the past month there have been more than rumors about the difficulties that you [plural] have caused.

[Dar'i] It is correct that, regarding the subject of nationality, we have been receiving information for some months now about several dozens of problem cases, which are concentrated mainly in the north. We have received information, through the Liaison Bureau, that among the immigrants there are those who have hitched a ride on the possibility of immigrating to Israel and receiving generous new immigrant rights. We have actually found that non-Jews also have immigrated, and that they received certificates on the basis of false declarations of their supposed Jewishness.

[HADASHOT] How many cases are there?

[Dar'i] There are at least 30 cases whose details are known to us beyond any doubt.

[HADASHOT] We are talking about immigration from countries where all connection to the Jewish religion has been lost.

[Dar'i] True. Therefore, the Law of Return also provides an opening to mixed marriages. Even the grandson of a Jewish grandfather who, according to the regular interpretation, would not come under the Law of Return, receives all the rights, but will not be registered as a Jew under nationality.

[HADASHOT] Rather?

[Dar'i] According to the ethnic group that he declares or for which he brings documents.

[HADASHOT] That is to say, you don't have a problem with these?

[Dar'i] No. Our problem is only with those who received certificates fraudulently. Persons who clearly are not Jews. There are four such families in Haifa alone, and there are also some in Karmiel and 'Akko. We have not had any contact with them, because they did not even request an identity card. But we were notified of them.

[HADASHOT] Informers?

[Dar'i] No. Reports by the persons handling the cases.

[HADASHOT] Will measures be taken against them?

[Dar'i] I have given an order in the ministry not to begin proceedings against them in the meantime. For we are

talking about cases of distress. First, let them be absorbed, and afterwards we shall decide what to do.

[HADASHOT] Will you consider expulsion to Russia?

[Dar'i] Absolutely not.

[HADASHOT] The case of the Gomulski family in Haifa seems to be different. An elderly woman who survived the pogroms is not recognized here as a Jew only because she lacks documents?

[Dar'i] This elderly woman never appeared at the Ministry of the Interior. They received an invitation to immigrate on the basis of an immigration request, and they received as is customary a visa and immigrant status. One and a half months ago, Mrs. Gomulski's son came to our office in Haifa and requested an identity card for himself and for his mother. According to standard procedure, we asked him for official documents, including a birth certificate, and he said that he would forward the request to the Russian Ministry of the Interior. An accepted action. We did not hear from him again.

[HADASHOT] Perhaps there is a technical difficulty in receiving certificates that were burned in a pogrom.

[Dar'i] If the certificates had been burned in a pogrom, then it is possible to make a statement. After all, the correctness of the details are important not only for the nationality category, but also for questions such as marriage or age for pension considerations.

[HADASHOT] The impression on television was that he had given up because of the officials.

[Dar'i] And it is my impression that this case is very important. Apparently, he has good reasons for not being able to produce evidence that he is Jewish, because he is not a Jew, and not even the son of a mixed marriage. He didn't find a way of dealing with us, so he hoped to get around us by running to the media.

[HADASHOT] What is so difficult about registering the Gomulskis conditionally, according to the solution that you have proposed?

[Dar'i] It is inconceivable that a non-Jewish man be registered as a Jew, just as a man whose height is 150 cm cannot be registered as having a height of 180 cm, or someone with blue eyes as having brown eyes. And, in any event, they did not appear and did not complete the form, and, apparently, with good reason.

[HADASHOT] It seems that the case is more sensitive than is indicated by your words.

[Dar'i] I am not ignoring the existing sensibilities, and, therefore, also due to the subject, as well as taking into account additional problems that could arise from such a volume of immigration, I've called an urgent meeting with all elements handling immigration. Every effort

must be made, and the consulate in Moscow should be used, so that the problems will be found over there first.

[HADASHOT] Do you mean a better briefing of the immigrants or the identification of hitchhikers?

[Dar'i] Both. Clearly, the fact that they are leaving Russia in haste must be taken into consideration, and it may be that they do not know that they must obtain documents.

[HADASHOT] How do you propose to deal with the matter of the hitchhikers who infiltrate?

[Dar'i] In my opinion, not only as minister of absorption, but as a part of the government, we must decide on our basic position on this subject. It has already been said, "the poor of your own city come first."

[HADASHOT] There are rumors that assertions such as that of the Gomulski family are finding their way to Russia, and are harming us there.

[Dar'i] I spoke today with the official in charge in the Foreign Ministry, and they are not frightened by it. In their opinion, it is precisely something to be welcomed, which will deter hitchhikers.

New Police Leadership Style Expected

44230092C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 16 Jan p 3B

[Article by Re'uven Shapira]

[Text] On 31 March at midnight, Chief Inspector David Kraus will end 40 years of active service in the police, five of them as inspector general, and will give up his uniform. Kraus, a professional policeman who grew up within the police from the position of patrolman and knew the police thoroughly, is turning over command to Inspector Ya'akov Turner, an officer and senior pilot in the Air Force, who came to the police only five years ago.

Turner's appointment as inspector general is the most revolutionary step in this sphere in the last 10 years, since the appointment of Major General (Reserve) Herzl Shafir as inspector general in 1980, an appointment that lasted only one year. In the opinion of Minister Bar-Lev and many others, he represents openness, amiability, credibility, flexibility, and a new spirit in the police.

Turner gained command experience in the field in the last year as the commander of the Central District. He is known as an efficient commander, who is well-acquainted with the subjects for which he is responsible. But both within and outside the police, there are those who would like to see him fail in his position, if only to justify their argument that the inspector general must be appointed only from among the senior officers of the police.

Turner has received a well-functioning police. Under Kraus, the police organized quickly for the tasks that were assigned to it both before and after the intifadah. It

became adjusted by setting the correct priorities, improved its links with the community, and instituted norms of increasing the credibility and responsibility of the commanders, and waged war on police violence (with exceptions, which are the result of a large body with a great deal of activity).

Turner will let time and the natural processes operate, with little direction on his part. It is expected that as a result of this process, which has already begun, the face of the senior command will change by the beginning of next year. Dozens of officers at the senior level will move to new jobs, a few senior and veteran officers will be asked to retire, simply because they have passed the retirement age.

He is a known exponent of lowering the ego of the officers, and will want to enforce the retirement age of 55. As long as a veteran inspector general, who had grown up within the police and who had many relationships with and obligations to veteran officers, was above him, Turner could not act as he saw fit. When he is inspector general, his path will be easier.

Under him, assignments and appointments will be more planned and for a longer term, and will generally be known in advance by the individuals concerned. There will not be many last-minute improvisations. "Discussions of potential," which were already begun in the last two or three years, and by means of which every officer knew what awaited him throughout the course of his career, will remain consistent. Turner already started this in the last two weeks, since the overlapping began in preparation for filling the position of inspector general. He interviewed dozens of officers at every level, inquired as to their expectations of the police, and what they thought should be done for improvement. At the end of each interview, Turner sums up the situation regarding the officer and the expectations regarding his future in the police, without making any final commitments. The officers generally leave satisfied. Many will be interviewed in the coming weeks.

The picture of the police leadership in the coming years is already becoming clear. With the completion of Inspector Gabi 'Amir's present assignment as assistant inspector general and chief of operations, an assistant inspector general will not be appointed for the next two years. Assaf Hefetz, a relatively young officer who began his police career about 14 years ago, will be appointed to the position of chief of the Operations Branch. He came from the IDF [Israel Defense Force] to the position of commander of the special antiterrorist unit of the Border Police.

Inspector 'Uzi Berger, who came to the police from SHABAK [General Security Service] only 10 years ago, will be appointed chief of the Investigations Branch. He is to replace Inspector Yehoshu'a Caspi, who is retiring after not being appointed inspector general. At this stage,

Berger's assistant will remain Subinspector Alex Ish-Shalom, one of the investigation experts of the police and an attorney, as well.

Young and capable persons will be promoted quickly, care will be taken to put the right man in the right job, appointments will not be made solely according to seniority and age, although seniority is important: If there are two equally suitable candidates for the same position, it will go to the one with more seniority. The police will not be flooded with IDF officers. Good army officers will be recruited, but they will be accepted only according to their suitability and their abilities, and according to the needs of the police.

Unlike the police force that Inspector General Kraus received from his predecessor, Aryeh Ibtzan—which was torn, stormy, and involved in internal struggles between its senior officers—Turner is receiving from Kraus a well-organized police, operating as a quiet and well-oiled machine, a fact that is reflected in the praises heaped not infrequently upon the police in the government, the cabinet, and the Knesset.

Nevertheless, police manpower utilization was stretched to the limit, and it exhausted the possibilities of internal efficiencies. At least at this stage, it appears that even if Turner brings a new spirit and a better image to the police, he still will not have, with all his good intentions, a panacea for the problems and ills of the police.

He will bring with him his own priorities. Innovations, initiatives, and ideas in all spheres will be more easily accepted. He is not imprisoned by conceptions of the conventional police, on which every officer who grew up within the police in the last dozen years was educated.

It is already possible to predict with certainty that within one year the Israel Police will have a small air force to assist it in all patrolling, keeping the peace, and the war on crime. This will not happen because Turner is a senior pilot in the Air Force, but because for a long time there have been those in the police and the Ministry of Police who believed that the time had come for the Israel Police to be like other police forces, and to exploit the advantages of helicopters and light airplanes, whose use opens new horizons in police activity and brings good results. Turner will give a push to this subject, which has been under examination for a long time in the police and in the Ministry of Police. He is also aware of the importance of other initiatives in the sphere of increasing the police presence on the roads and streets for the war on traffic accidents and on crime.

Turner has imposed a public silence on himself on everything concerning his plans for the police, until he assumes the position of inspector general. Meanwhile, he is engaged in learning the subjects on the police agenda

and in planning his steps for the future. He was not willing to be interviewed for this article, but it is possible to learn about his intentions as police inspector general from his discussions and statements in various forums and from an analysis of his activity as commander of the Central District. He will emphasize an intensified police presence, mainly at night. There will be a very small number (not to be reduced) of policemen and patrol cars on patrol every hour of the day. The police organization that engages in enforcing the traffic laws will be reinforced, also at night, and will be available for use also for ordinary events in the patrolling organization. There will be a third shift for traffic patrolmen on the interurban roads, and they will be linked by a radio network also to the local police stations for immediate activation at times of emergency.

An effort will be made to increase the number of volunteers for the Civil Guard, including an increase in the number of trained volunteer units that will be integrated into police patrol and traffic activity. This trend began on a large scale during Kraus' tenure. Also planned is a greater integration of the Border Police units in the police presence in the field and in assignments in the war on crime, mainly preventing break-ins and vehicle thefts.

Emphasis will also be placed on getting ready for increasing activity in the sphere of internal security (among other things, in the Arab sector in the regions that border the Green Line), including the setting up of special units for patrolling and intervention (in addition to the four that have already been established). Priority will also be given to increasing police activity in the war on drugs, possibly by establishing district units and a national unit.

The main goals that Turner has set for himself as inspector general are, so far as is known: an improvement in police services to citizens (including a shorter response time to civilian calls), a continuation of the war on all kinds of crime, and broader activity for the policeman and his welfare.

Reality does not necessarily allow the speedy and full implementation of these goals, but Turner may have luck, and he may receive in the coming months a "gift" for which Kraus, the present inspector general, has long fought. Following lengthy negotiations with the IDF and the Ministry of Finance, there is a chance that the Civil Defense positions that the police receive from the IDF for guard duty and internal security will be converted into 400 positions for permanent policemen, who would be transferred to police functions in the field. Aside from this, the government has already decided to add 250 positions to the police at the expense of IDF positions. These 650 new positions can be a great help to Turner and the police.

KUWAIT

Government Projects Increase in Expatriate Workers

90OL0246A Kuwait AL-SIYASAH
in Arabic 14 Jan 90 p 6

[Article by Husayn Salamah]

[Text] The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor estimated that there will be a 20-percent increase [as published] in expatriate workers in the overall population figures in Kuwait during the years of the 1990/91-1994/95 five year plan.

The assistant deputy minister for labor affairs, Mr. Muhammad al-Shabnan al-Thamir, said in a talk with AL-SIYASAH that on the basis of this percentage, the number of expatriate workers will increase during the aforementioned five years by about 187,964 workers who will be entering the labor market. He said that this figure is deduced from the difference between the number of workers expected to enter the country for the first time, and those expected to withdraw from the labor market for good during the aforementioned years.

Mr. al-Shabnan brought out a study that had been made to this effect.

He said that the study made use of figures pertaining to the movement of expatriate workers in the country during 1988 as the basis for the projections contained in the study, which was submitted to higher authorities in a "memo on the expected increase in the labor force in the private sector in the years of the five year plan."

Factors of Increase and Decrease

Mr. al-Shabnan explained that the increase or decrease in the expatriate labor force in the country is affected by several factors, some of which are attributable to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, while others are attributable to parties and causes with which this ministry has nothing to do.

Concerning these factors he said: The first factor is attributable to the ministry and is the fact that the hiring principles the ministry follows and implements affect expatriate labor negatively or positively

He stated that the latest ministerial decree No. 87 of 1989 regarding the regulation of labor in the private sector was put into effect last March 22, and that it will have a negative impact on workers coming to Kuwait for the first time, in addition to establishing the sectors which are permitted to bring workers from abroad. These are no more than 10 sectors, in accordance with ministerial decree No. 87 of 1984 on restricting the issuing of work permits to specific sectors which was put into effect on April 15, 1984, and is still in effect.

Outside Influence

As for the second factor mentioned by Mr. al-Shabnan, he said it came from outside of the ministry, and is affected by the following policies:

- The policy of issuing commercial and industrial licenses, which are seen as the natural way of increasing the expatriate labor force, since workers are counted as one of the elements of any project, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry, which regulates these licenses, does not put restraints on a citizen's freedom to exploit his capital in the commercial and industrial sectors.
- The state's development policy, which might consider setting up ambitious development plans in the principal sectors such as housing, education, health, and other huge projects which affect the comfort of society and the citizen. All these sectors need labor in their first stage for construction, then in the next stage for the operation of these facilities, and thus they have an impact on the increase in the expatriate labor force.
- The policy of the state in its capacity as a member of the Cooperation Council, since whenever the citizens of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] states are given the right to work and to pursue commercial and industrial work, and to practice certain free professions, it is expected that the expatriate labor force will increase.

The Plan's Projections

Mr. Shaban went on to say that the aforementioned factors all affect the course of the labor force by increasing or decreasing it, which makes it extremely difficult to make projections in the next plan for the labor force. However he stated that it is possible to make estimated projections of the workers coming to work in the private sector in the following manner.

The assistant deputy for labor affairs explained that the natural increase and decrease in the expatriate labor force is obtained from the work permits issued to expatriate workers. He said that it is a real increase in the labor force and thus in the population.

He pointed out that if this labor force is decreased by workers in the private sector leaving and withdrawing for good from the labor market, then consideration must be given to subtracting this labor force from the workers coming for the first time, so that the balance in the end will be the real rate of increase in the labor force.

Mr. al-Shabnan said that an increase in the labor force from within Kuwait does not affect the population, although the work status of the individual might change, such as a change in status from the indigent and domestic servants to real laborers. Or there might be a change in the kind of sector, such as government employees transferring to the private sector. He mentioned that these changes affect the labour force in the private sector, without affecting the population.

He also explained that a decrease in the labor force within Kuwait does not affect the increase or decrease in the

population, even if workers are lost by the private sector, as when some working members of this force become nonworking by changing their work status, like those wishing to change their status to indigent or to domestic servants and those in their control, or when some transfer from the private sector to the government sector.

Mr. al-Shabnan said that the research plan that was made used figures pertaining to expatriate workers in 1988 as a basis for projections and estimates. These figures are as follows:

- There were 63,959 expatriates coming to the country for the first time, on the basis of work permits.
- The number of those withdrawing from the labor market and leaving for good was 27,812.
- The remaining balance, which is the rate of additional natural annual increase of workers coming for the first time, was 36,147. This figure represents the workers who add to the population.

The deputy explained that if the rate of increase in the next five years was expected to be around 20 percent, then the population increase caused by expatriate workers would be as follows:

- Two percent in 1989-90, or a rate of 36,870 workers.
- Three percent in 1990-91, or a rate of 37,231 workers.
- Four percent in 1991-92, or a rate of 37,593 workers.
- Five percent in 1992-93, or a rate of 37,954 workers.
- Six percent in 1993-94, or a rate of 38,316 workers.

The total percentage, 20 percent, is 187,964. That is the expected figure for the balance of the increase in the expatriate labor force, which must be considered in the population increase in Kuwait.

And it must be taken into consideration that as much as expatriate workers are allowed to bring their families, the more that increases the population.

Year	Annual Percentage Increase	Number of Workers Coming to Kuwait
1989-90	2	36,870
1990-91	3	37,231
1991-92	4	37,593
1992-93	5	37,954
1993-94	6	38,316
Total	20	187,964

BANGLADESH

Election Commission Gives Rules for District Polls

46001317 Dhaka THE NEW NATION
in English 2 Feb 90 pp 1, 8

[Text] The elections to the Chairmen of the Upazila Parishads throughout the country will be held from 13 March to 24 March as per the schedules announced by the Election Commission, a press release of the Election Commission said yesterday, reports BSS.

The Election Commission has already announced a gazette notification on 22 January announcing the date of elections for each upazila.

The elections to the Upazila Parishad Chairmen will be held as per the Local Government (Upazila Parishad and Upazila Administration Reorganisation) Ordinance, 1982, and Upazila Parishad (Chairman Election) Rules, 1983.

Under Section 4 (2) of the above Ordinance, each upazila chairman would be directly elected by the universal franchise.

Quoting Section 6 (1) of the Local Government (Upazila Parishad and Upazila Administration Reorganisation) Ordinance, 1982, the Election Commission said that any person who is a citizen of Bangladesh and is 25 years old and his name is included in the voter list in the concerned upazila would be eligible for contesting the polls.

The election Commission said that a person would not be eligible to contest on the following grounds:

- If he/she is a member of Jatiya Sangsad or Chairman of Union Parishad or Pourashabha,
- If he/she is declared bankrupt,
- If he/she has been stripped of his/her nationality of Bangladesh or if he/she has adopted nationality of any foreign country or if he/she has been declared or accepted as the nationality of any other country,
- If he/she is convicted by any criminal court and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for at least two years and if he/she has not passed at least five years from the date of release from prison,
- If he/she holds any full time and remunerative post or position in the republic or in the concerned upazila parishad for performing any task or for supplying goods or if he/she is involved by any means with financial transactions or if he/she is appointed a dealer of essential goods by the government, and
- If he/she fails to repay loan taken from any specific bank within the stipulated period.

By specific bank, the Election Commission press release meant, the Sonali Bank, Agrani Bank and Janata Bank, Shilpa Rin Sangstha, Shilpa Bank, House Building Finance Corporation, Krishi Bank, Bangladesh Investment Corporation, Rajshahi Krishi Unnayan Bank and the Rupali Bank Ltd.

Besides, as per the amended Section 7 of the Ordinance, the members of the union parishad or commissioners of Poursabha would be eligible for contesting the upazila parishad chairmen election. But on election, they would lose their position as members of union parishads or commissioner of Poursabha.

Communist Party Leader Urges Opposition Unity

46001318 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 15 Feb 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] Khulna, 14 Feb—Mr Saifuddin Manik, General Secretary of Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) said that unless the opposition parties are united throw people-oriented programmes, there is no chance of ousting the present government from power. Addressing a number of public meetings at Rupsa, Dakoke and Paikgachha of Khulna district on Monday and Tuesday Mr Manik again made a strong plea for opposition unity and asserted that his party would continue its effort to bring them on minimum programmes to carry forward the movement against the present government.

He also called for putting up one candidate from opposition parties in the ensuing upazila polls to ensure opposition victory in the elections. Bitterly criticising the present government Mr Manik said that the government is squandering away public money in the name of development though thousands of young and educated men are employed and farmers have been burdened with debts and poverty.

Local communist leaders including Sheik Moniruzzaman, Mr Feroz Ahmed Advocate and Mr Nuruzzaman Bachchu also addressed the meetings.

INDIA

Prime Minister Meets With Former Pakistan Minister

46001306 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 19 Feb 90 p 1

[Except] New Delhi, Feb. 18 (PTI)—The Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh, today said India respected Pakistani frontiers and had no aggressive designs on that country, but wanted these sentiments to be reciprocated by that country.

This was stated by the former Pakistani information minister, Maulana Kausar Niazi, after a 45-minute meeting with the Prime Minister here.

He said Mr V.P. Singh had told him that recent happenings in Jammu and Kashmir had hit the normalisation process between the two countries and expressed hope that the Pakistan government and the people would not allow the situation to escalate.

The Pakistani leader, who broke away from the ruling People's Party in Pakistan, said Mr V. P. Singh had told

him that the Indo-Pakistan joint commission meeting would be held next month despite the strain in relations.

He said these meetings would continue till July and could lead to visit to Pakistan by the minister for external affairs, Mr I. K. Gujral. The Pakistani leader did not rule out the possibility of meeting between the Prime Ministers of the two countries later.

This was his second meeting with the Prime Minister in a week. He had met Mr Singh earlier on February 14. He said the meeting was constructive.

Maulana Niazi, who is now closer to the opposition Ittehad Jamhoori Islam (IJI) of Mr Nawaz Sharif, said there were some compulsions on either side which were straining their relations.

The former information minister, who was here in connection with the Allami Urdu conference, said the exchange of goodwill missions between the two countries could improve their ties. The secretary of the conference, Mr Ali Siddique, said an Indian goodwill delegation led by the famous musician, Maushad Ali, would be touring Pakistan.

Mr Siddique said the delegation was earlier to be led by the former President, Giani Zail Singh, but changes had to be made as Pakistani authorities could not guarantee his safety because of the reported presence of a large number of Sikh terrorists in Pakistan. According to some circles, the former President had expressed a desire to play a mediatory role between the two countries.

The former Pakistani minister said during the meeting Mr V. P. Singh had also referred to the Ram Janambhoomi controversy and said his government's approach was to resolve the issue through dialogue. [passage omitted]

Work of Indian Lobbyist in U.S. Termed 'Useful'

46001284 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH
in English 17 Feb 90 p 7

[Article by Seema Sirahi]

[Text] Washington, 16 Feb—At a time when opening windows and maintaining dialogue at all levels has become crucial, a retired Indian naval officer has been making inroads into the conservative lobby in Washington and influencing its thinking about India.

Admiral K.K. Nayyar, former vice-chief of naval staff, spent 10 fruitful weeks at the Heritage Foundation talking, meeting, listening and explaining facts about India's security situation. He was invited to spend some time as a fellow at the Heritage Foundation when he visited Washington as a member of the Indian defence delegation late last year. The invitation was the first such from a conservative think-tank known for its hardline views on India.

The visit was extremely useful in that he was able to meet several top U.S. administration officials at the National Security Council (NSC), the Pentagon and the State Department. He also gave a talk at the National Defence University about the Indian Navy's goals and the rationale for its expansion.

In the United States, think-tanks occupy a uniquely important status in higher circles of policy-making. The Heritage Foundation, which reached its peak during the Reagan Administration, still exercises major influence in official Washington. Its members are asked by the Bush White House to "position papers" for the President as the Republican Party's right-wing is a vote bank that Mr George Bush cannot ignore. Admiral Nayyar, who ends his trip tomorrow, said that his objective had been to "win friends for India and not polarise people."

He may have succeeded in changing the perception of India to some extent in the conservative circles which have traditionally regarded India as a Soviet ally prone to leftist tendencies. The reception he got from the NSC and senior State Department officials was "extremely positive" he said. He stressed the need for regularly having Indian officials and scholars at U.S. think-tanks to provide inputs. "A positive reassessment of India is going on at the moment within the administration. They see India as a power but they also stress that there are certain responsibilities," he said.

A senior White House official dealing with south Asia told Admiral Nayyar that India had to be responsible in its role. "You can't be a power on Monday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday and issue an irresponsible statement on Tuesday," he quoted the official as saying. The official also told the admiral that India should "maintain a dialogue with the United States at all levels."

Among the ideas that the admiral discussed in front of his audience were the reasons and rationale for Indian naval expansion, India's security perceptions vis a vis its neighbours and the need for developing a system to recognise international boundaries as they exist today to prevent redrawing of the world map because of the ongoing changes in eastern Europe. "This would be an effective way to lower the military profile of the world. I am suggesting putting a moratorium for a length of on frontiers as they exist. It would prevent further tribalisation of the world," he said in an interview.

U.S. officials were a little surprised at the idea but did not contest it, he said. If there is to be stability in the world after the upheavals in eastern Europe and if the "peace dividend" has to be enjoyed, world leaders have to prevent old territorial claims from becoming an obstacle. "Otherwise we will spend the next century fighting the same wars," he said.

USSR Envoy: Solution to Kashmir in Simla Agreement

46001295 Calcutta *THE STATESMAN*
in English 13 Feb 90 p 16

[Text] New Delhi, Feb. 12—On the Kashmir issue, the Soviet Union stood by India in 1971, and "less than a week ago, we have again emphasized that the country stands by the territorial integrity of India, that we are for a peaceful solution of the problem and we believe there exists a framework and a judicial basis of a solution in the Simla agreement," Mr Viktor Isakov, Soviet Ambassador to India, said at a Press conference today.

Mr Isakov had been asked to spell out his country's future attitude to rupee-trade with India, in view of the expected changes when the likely adoption of a free market system might change the entire course of thinking in the Soviet Union and East European COMECON [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] countries.

The Ambassador spoke on the expansion of trade and economic cooperation with India, asserting "we look upon our ties on a very, very long term basis, and not merely as of today or tomorrow," and then, on his own, touched on the Kashmir issue.

It had been said that "a friend in need is a friend indeed," and true to that dictum, the Soviet Union stood by India on the Kashmir issue. "When you were in trouble," he told the Indian correspondents, "the Soviet Union publicly emphasized its friendship. On February 6 again we emphasized that we stand by the integrity of India, we stand by peaceful methods of solution and non-acceptance of outside interference in the affairs of India, and we said there exists a judicial basis of an agreement in the Simla agreement."

A foreign correspondent asked if he saw any connection between the uprising in Azerbaijan, a Soviet republic, and the violence in Kashmir, Mr Isakov brushed away the question, pointing out that the two situations were not comparable and "there is no question of nationalities in Kashmir as in the case of Azerbaijan and Armenia."

He said the question of introduction of the market economy and what results would flow from it vis-a-vis the COMECON countries was not an easy one. Some COMECON countries were already toying with the idea of trade in hard convertible currencies, but as far as India was concerned, "the Soviet Union has obligations to India not as of today, but for years." There were so many economic projects in power generation, local-mining, metallurgy, etc., and the volume of Soviet-India trade was going to increase 2 1/2 fold. This has already risen in the past few years from Rs 70 to Rs 77 billion. The plan was that it would be of the volume of Rs 87 billion, for which agreement had already been signed, and in future going up to Rs 100 billion.

"The trade and market India has with the Soviet Union is tremendous in the years to come. And it is not as if we

are disappearing and running away from our obligations. The projects and enterprises we have undertaken will go over a very long period of time. The Soviet Union-India trade and economic cooperation would go for a long time. India is not only a political partner in the international arena, but also an important economic and trade partner," he said.

Replying to a question whether the Soviet Union would accept the U.S. plan for Afghanistan whereby President Najibullah should first quit to make way for changes in the transitional period, Mr Isakov said: "It is not for us to determine what arrangements should be to bring about the political changes in Afghanistan. It is for the people of Afghanistan to say what they want."

New Soviet-Indian Joint Venture To Search for Oil

46001297 New Delhi *PATRIOT*
in English 12 Feb 90 p 9

[Text] Moscow, 11 Feb (UNI)—A new Indo-Soviet joint venture has been set up in the Soviet Union designed to help oil and gas prospecting.

Called "Eloilgeo," the joint venture will be engaged in the development and manufacture of automated working stations to process geophysical information for geological prospecting, said member of the Eloilgeo Board and Geological expert Vladimir Leviant.

In effect, it would mean the development of a new generation of processing and interpreting systems enabling specialists to obtain more accurate and reliable geological results from available factual data.

In practice, it would result in a substantial rise in the effectiveness of prospect boring, he said. Mr Leviant pointed out that at present out of every three exploratory boreholes, only one yielded oil or gas, or a little over 30 percent probability of success. With the help of the systems to be developed by the joint venture, the probability of success could be raised to 50 percent.

Indo-Soviet Talks on Rupee-Ruble Exchange Reported

Problems at Issue

46001290 Madras *THE HINDU*
in English 22 Feb 90 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, 21 Feb—India has suggested that working groups be formed to sort out the two important aspects of Indo-Soviet economic relation—a realistic fixation of the rupee-rouble exchange rate and repatriation of profits of Indian joint ventures in the Soviet Union. While Dr C. Rangarajan, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India [RBI], will be the leader of the Indian team for the first issue, the name of Mr Nitin Desai, Chief Economic Advisor to the Government, has been proposed to head the group for the second problem.

The Indian suggestion came forth during preliminary discussions here today between the visiting Soviet delegation and officials of the economic ministries. While the Finance Secretary, Dr Bimal Jalan, headed the Indian team, the Soviet side was led by its Deputy Minister for Finance, Mr V.V. Sitnin. On its part, the Soviet delegation made available certain draft proposals which are under the consideration of the Indian officials.

Bilateral talks on these two vital issues have been pending for some time now, having first begun in June last year in Moscow at the first meeting of the working group on developing new forms of economic cooperation. Subsequent discussions were held in September when a high ranking Soviet official visited India but the follow-up planned for November was postponed in view of the general elections here. While the question of repatriation of profits of joint ventures has an immediate bearing on new forms of economic and technical cooperation between the two countries and requires a quick resolution, the first issue is expected to involve numerous rounds of discussions before it is resolved to mutual satisfaction. As of now, the talks are scheduled to end on Thursday and in all probability will be continued at a later date.

Complicated Procedure

The need for a realistic fixation of the rupee-rouble exchange rate has emanated from the Soviet decision to make the rouble a convertible currency in the coming years and the general expectation that its value will drop drastically after that. Currently, the rupee-rouble exchange rate is fixed on the basis of a complicated procedure with both sides privately maintaining that the currency of the other is over-rated. Consequently, there is an anxiety on both sides to protect respective interests in case the rouble value dips in the future. In simple terms, what the Indian side has been proposing is that Soviet credit be designated in rupee terms only so that when repayments are made in future, the dollar equivalent (and thereby the rouble equivalent) could be paid back to the Soviets at the prevailing rates then. The Soviet side, on the other hand, is insisting on the credits being designated in dollars.

In other words, the Indian view point is that if Rs 100 crores is extended as Soviet credit today, the dollar equivalent of this amount at the then prevailing rate be paid back in due course. The Soviets, on the other hand, want that Rs 100 crores designated in dollars and the same amount paid back, irrespective of the then prevailing rupee-dollar or rouble-dollar rate. Although not officially stated, the underlying assumption on both sides is that the current arrangement of trading in rupees may undergo drastic changes in the coming years.

Team Proposed

To sort out this issue, which could lead to the expediting of clearances for a number of projects for which rouble

credit has been offered, the Finance Secretary has proposed a team of eight Indian officials comprising the Deputy Governor of RBI, Dr C. Rangarajan (leader), the Executive Director of RBI, Mr R. Janakiraman, the Economic Advisor in the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), Dr Shankar N. Acharya, the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce, Mr V.N. Kaul, the Joint Secretary in the DEA, Mr Narayan Valluri, the Minister (Economic) in the Indian Embassy in Moscow, Mr Nirupam Sen, the Chief Officer of RBI, Mr P.B. Kulkarni and the Under Secretary in DEA, Mr R. Desikan.

Reflecting the Indian stand in this context, Dr Jalan told the Soviet delegation that during the transition period before the rouble becomes a convertible currency, it is important to devise suitable arrangements not only to maintain and improve the bilateral and economic relationship but also to permit both the economies successfully negotiate the periods of transition.

On the second subject, the Finance Secretary told the Soviets that the repatriation of rouble profits of Indo-Soviet joint ventures in the USSR had created some problems in further developing this form of cooperation and Indian businessmen had been seeking conversion of these profits into rupees for transferring back to India. For this, the Indian side has proposed a six-member team for negotiations, led by the Chief Economic Advisor, Mr Nitin Desai, along with Mr N.K. Sabharwal, Joint Secretary in the DEA, Mr Rajiv Sikri, Joint Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry, Mr O.P. Sodhani, Controller (foreign exchange) in the RBI, Mr Nalin Surie, Director in the DEA and Mr B.M. Suri, Desk Officer DEA.

Outcome of Meeting

46001290 Madras *THE HINDU*
in English 24 Feb 90 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, 23 Feb—India and the Soviet Union have decided to continue talks on the parity between the rupee and the rouble within a mutually agreed time-frame while reaching an understanding in respect of repatriation of rouble profits of Indian joint ventures in that country.

The discussions between Indian officials and the visiting Soviet delegation ended here today with the signing of an agreement on the second aspect by the Union Finance Secretary, Dr Bimal Jalan, and the Soviet Deputy Finance Minister, Mr V.V. Sitnin. According to the agreement, the profits due to the Indian partners can be utilised for procuring for exports the products manufactured by the joint ventures and for investment in other joint ventures in the Soviet Union as well as for repatriation to India under the rupee payment arrangement established between the two countries.

Where the products of the joint ventures in the Soviet Union result in substitution of imports from the general

currency area, the Soviet side will devise further means for repatriation of rouble profits due to the Indian partners.

Equity Capital Subscription

It has also been decided that talks will continue on the categories of joint ventures to which this understanding would apply as also on certain other issues concerning subscription of equity capital of the joint ventures. About the 1978 protocol which determines the exchange rate between the rupee and the rouble, the two sides agreed to continue the discussions in a mutually agreed time-frame on certain aspects of the protocol since it was recognised by both sides that the arrangement had contributed greatly to the growth and development of bilateral trade and economic cooperation between the two countries.

Training Soviet Personnel

The Soviet delegation also held discussions with the officials of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in Bombay on cooperation in the training of Soviet personnel in banking and exchange of information on capital markets and stock exchanges.

India, USSR Discuss Collaboration in Aviation

Latest Soviet Fighter

46001293 Madras *THE HINDU*
in English 23 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, 22 Feb (UNI)—The Soviet Union today offered its latest air defence fighter, the Su-27, to India.

The new generation fighter with long range interception capabilities was unveiled to top Air Force and Defence Ministry officials at Palam Airport where it has been brought for demonstration.

The offer was made by the Soviet Minister of Aviation Industry, Mr A.S. Systsov, who is here to have discussions with Indian officials on collaboration in the field of aviation. The Soviets have also brought the Su-27 B, a two-seater operational conversion aircraft, for demonstration.

The Su-27, which has evoked considerable interest in the western military aviation circles, has been code-named by NATO as "D-Flanker."

The intercept radar of the Su-27 has a range of 100 km and the plane can carry beyond visual range missiles which can hit targets 40 km away.

According to aviation experts the Soviets consider the Indian Air Force as the most capable of receiving such a sophisticated weapon system.

The Su-27 was displayed at the recent air show in Singapore and flew in here on its way to Moscow. The

fact that the Su-27 was flown to New Delhi non-stop from Singapore, proves its "terrific endurance," the experts said.

The Soviets also demonstrated the latest Kamov-32 helicopter in its civil version, for possible use by the Helicopter Corporation.

Outcome of Talks

46001293 Madras *THE HINDU*
in English 27 Feb 90 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, 26 Feb (PTI)—India and the Soviet Union today completed discussions on signing of a protocol on joint production and technology upgradation of the MIG series of fighter aircraft.

The protocol, likely to be signed soon, would also deal with exploring areas for collaboration for the development of a passenger aircraft, official sources said.

The Indo-Soviet joint working group on technical and scientific cooperation in aviation industry today completed its five-day deliberations.

Upgradation of MIG-21 and MIG-27 figured prominently in the final round of discussions between officials of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) and the Soviet Aviation Industry here today.

Both the fighter aircraft are being assembled in India at HAL (Nasik) under licence from the Soviet Union.

Though the aviation protocol was scheduled to be signed today, informed sources said, it was delayed as the officials are yet to take a final decision on the crucial joint production of the front-ranking IAF [Indian Air Force] aircraft, the MIG-29.

India had acquired four of these frontline Warsaw Pact air superiority and air defence fighter aircraft, which aviation experts consider more than a match for Pakistan's U.S.-supplied F-16's.

Joint Production Deferred

But, India had earlier deferred the decision regarding joint production. The decision for joint production of MIG-29 could mean soft pedalling on the country's indigenous light combat aircraft project.

The two sides, it is learnt, have deferred the signing of the protocol in view of the important upcoming meeting of the joint Indo-Soviet working group on defence, which opens here from Wednesday.

The working group, which conducts a high-level review of the two countries cooperation on defence, would hold meetings here till 7 March. Some of the members of the aviation industry delegation are taking part in the working group meeting.

According to official sources, the two sides affirmed commitment to strengthening and broadening of cooperation in the aviation industry at today's meeting.

While the Minister of State for defence, Dr Raja Ramanna, led the Indian delegation, the Soviet side was led by the Aviation Industry Minister, Mr A.S. Systsov.

The visiting Soviet Minister as well as the delegation also held talks with the Minister for Civil Aviation, Mr Arif Mohammad Khan.

During their stay, the member of the Soviet delegation also visited the HAL at Nasik and held talks with officials of the Ministry of Defence.

PRC, Middle East Countries Stands on Kashmir Issue

PRC Offer Rejected

46001307 Madras THE HINDU
in English 20 Feb 90 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, 19 Feb (PTI)—India today rejected the Chinese mediation offer to solve the "Kashmir problem" between Islamabad and New Delhi.

"Our stand is perfectly clear that the Simla Agreement provides the framework for resolving any issue—that means bilaterally and in no other way," an External Affairs Ministry spokesman said at a press briefing here.

The Chinese Premier, Mr Li Peng, was quoted by a special Pakistani envoy of the Pakistani Prime Minister, Ms Benazir Bhutto, as saying that Beijing was willing to assist India and Pakistan in an appropriate way to solve the "Kashmir problem."

The Pakistani envoy, Mr Iqbal Akhund, is currently visiting Beijing, Moscow and Washington to win support for his country's stand on the issue.

Direct Intervention

The External Affairs Ministry spokesman reiterated that the difficulties in Kashmir were primarily the result of the "direct intervention in our affairs by elements operating from the territory under the control of Pakistan."

When pointed out that India had sought Chinese help in maintaining a friendly environment in the region, the spokesman said it did not amount to seeking Chinese mediation on the issue.

India, he stressed, had apprised China and other countries of the situation created by Pakistan's interference in Kashmir as part of its diplomatic initiative to counter Islamabad's virulent disinformation campaign.

Iran Seeks Role

46001307 Madras THE HINDU
in English 20 Feb 90 p 9

[Article by F.J. Khergamvala]

[Text] Manama (Bahrain), 19 Feb—From various indications it is apparent that Iran is trying to inject itself into mediating between India and Pakistan on Kashmir.

The Iranian Ambassador in New Delhi has said as much in an interview (THE HINDU dated 17 February).

Officially Iran welcomes any method to resolve the Kashmir problem, including outside mediation. Quite subtly and as if lacing the proposed intention into the interview, the envoy, Mr Ebrahim Rahimpour said "Even we are ready to do whatever we can to solve the problem on behalf of both India and Pakistan."

In Teheran, Indian officials coming into contact at various levels with their Iranian counterparts report of casually put out feelers along similar lines. It is not known if there is any link between Ms Benazir Bhutto's widely reported offer of third party umpiring and Teheran's intentions.

Soundings made in Teheran from one journalist and an academic confirm that the Rafsanjani Government is feeling the ground to play such a role. In the process, Iranian officials have begun nudging India to reschedule the oft postponed joint commission session. The External Affairs Minister, Mr I.K. Gujral, was to go to Iran late last month before Iran sent a clear message that the timing had become inconvenient. Earlier, Iran had categorically come out against India on events in Kashmir.

Interestingly in its quest for a role in the sub-continent, official Teheran is also making statements that may not sound as harsh as its media's attitude toward India. For instance, the Iranian Ambassador's expressed hope that negotiations be started to resolve the Kashmir problem. This would be construed as tacit support for the Shimla Agreement. More to the point, he did not mention UN resolutions at all. In fact, he favoured some sort of assessment about ascertaining the views of the people of Kashmir, but distanced himself from recourse to a plebiscite.

Backtracking

There is a definite element of backtracking on earlier very harsh anti-Indian statements and the purpose of the Iranian Government seems to be to recover some credibility in India as a potential mediator, while not discouraging the official media's continued pelting at New Delhi.

Quite cleverly, Mr Rahimpour has dangled the carrots of the reconstruction process and its contracts before India in order to induce a rescheduling of the joint commission. Officials in New Delhi do not seem to be inclined to make up their mind in a hurry.

It is not yet clear to officials in New Delhi whether Teheran's revised stance has been partly influenced by the sudden tilt India has displayed toward Iraq. Mr Muchkund Dubey, Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry, had visited Baghdad earlier this month and

among other things he "supported" the January 1990 initiative of the Iraqi President, Mr Saddam Hussein, in resolving problems between Iran and Iraq. Teheran had dismissed the Iraqi proposal out of hand.

It is in any case unlikely that India would welcome any kind of third party role on Kashmir. For, this goes completely against the Shimla Agreement. But even otherwise in the normal bilateral context an attitude of wait and watch prevails in New Delhi so far as Iran is concerned. There is no inclination to nibble at Iranian moves. One of the reasons for this is the sudden eruption of large scale anti-Government protests on Teheran.

It is apparent that the Rafsanjani government has not been able to get a grip on problems and Iran may well be in the early stages of another phase in its revolution. One East European diplomat in Teheran mentioned that the rallying cry to reiterate the death sentence on Salman Rushdie on the first anniversary of the "fatwa" and the 11th anniversary of the revolution is a very good sign that little else brings together various colours of the spectrum.

Support From Kuwait, Iraq

46001307 Madras THE HINDU
in English 10 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by K.K. Katyal]

[Text] New Delhi, 9 Feb—Both Iraq and Kuwait—which were recently briefed by India on Pakistan's role in relation to Kashmir—disapproved of separatism based on religion, did not like India to be weakened by separatist movements and were against interference in its internal affairs. Also clear was their opposition to the re-drawing of the map of the world on the basis of religion or ethnicity.

The Secretary, External Affairs Ministry, Mr Muchkund Dubey, is just back from the visits to these two important West Asian countries undertaken as part of the bid to forestall or to counter Pakistan's Islamic diplomacy. In Kuwait, he met Sheikh Al Sabah, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and in Iraq, he had talks with Mr Taraq Aziz, again Deputy Minister and Foreign Minister—each an important figure in the ruling hierarchy.

Sheikh Al Sabah wanted India and Pakistan to solve their problems in the framework of the Simla Agreement—which was what New Delhi had been advocating as Pakistan, while professing faith in it, had sought to wriggle out of its provisions of bilateralism and non-use of force for settling differences.

Kuwait is the current Chairman of the Organisation of Islamic Conference [OIC], to which Pakistan had turned for sympathy and support. Islamabad had succeeded in getting a statement, heavily slanted against India, released by the OIC's secretariat. There was strict separation of functions at the summit level and at other levels of the OIC, Mr Dubey was told. Sheikh Al Sabah came to

know of the Secretariat statement, when it was read out to him by Mr Dubey. The Secretariat statements, it turned out, were generally motivated by the predilections of the senior members of the Secretariat and by the pressure of the interested Government, and did not represent the consensus of the OIC.

Whether Pakistan succeeds in getting the Kashmir issue inserted in the OIC agenda is doubtful, as of now. Islamabad, of course, has the advantage of Iran and Saudi Arabia which of late, had competed with each other in expressing solidarity with Pakistan (of course, at India's expense). The latest Saudi statement could not but have given extreme comfort to Pakistan. Conversely, India was sore at it and this, perhaps, accounts for the second thoughts on the plan to send an emissary to Riyadh.

Mr Dubey's trip to Baghdad was significant for an additional reason—it marked a tilt in favour of Iraq (in relation to Iran), as was evident from the reports of his discussions and the contents of the letter, carried by him, from the Minister for External Affairs, Mr I.K. Gujral.

Mr Gujral expressed appreciation of the Iraqi President, Mr Saddam Hussain's plea for the exchange of war prisoners with Iran on humanitarian grounds. Iran, on the other hand, wanted the exchange to be made a part of the comprehensive settlement with Iraq. India's policy of course, was within the framework of the overall policy—as Mr Gujral explained to Arab envoys—of consistent espousal of the Arab causes, which were considered just and based on morality and fairness. Though India did not have common land boundary with any of the Arab countries, the geo-political situation was the same and as such your cause is our cause, to use Mr Gujral's phrase.

Also, India agreed to highlight in its statements on the world situation the need and importance of world peace in the Gulf region—as suggested by Iraq.

On the main subject of Mr Dubey's talks, Mr Taraq Aziz made it clear that Iraq could not support provocative actions based on appeals to primitive sentiments of the people. Iraq, it was stated was opposed to intervention in internal affairs—a course which could be abused and prove counter-productive. Iraq, it was stated respected secularism—which was the only basis for cohesion and security for a country of India's dimensions—and was opposed to establishment of states based on religion.

India, Nepal Talks on Bilateral Relations End

46001294 Madras THE HINDU
in English 23 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by K. K. Katyal]

[Text] New Delhi, Feb. 22. India and Nepal today signed the minutes of the two-day discussions at the official level, thus taking another step towards a comprehensive settlement of bilateral issues, their agreed goal.

The delegations of the two countries led by their respective Foreign Secretaries, Mr. S. K. Singh and Mr. Narinder Bikram Shah, yesterday concluded their talks, covering nearly the entire gamut of relationship. The minutes recorded the positions of the two sides, as outlined by the members of their delegations, and the next step is for each side to prepare the draft agreements. When this stage is reached Indian officials will go to Kathmandu to coordinate the documentation.

The Nepalese delegation took some time off from the discussions yesterday to call on the External Affairs Minister, Mr. I. K. Gujral, who told them of his effort to stick to the earlier idea of a visit to Kathmandu in March—obviously for the signing of the agreements. His Nepalese counterpart, Mr. Shailendra Kumar Upadhyaya, was here in the first week of January—for establishing contacts with the new Government and for preliminary discussions. The understanding on the broad components of the bilateral relations, it was then agreed, be given a concrete form by officials. This was the background of the discussions in the last two days.

There was nothing in the talks to suggest that Nepal questioned the premise of the 1950 Treaty being the bedrock of bilateral ties. The first indication to this effect, both direct and indirect, was available during Mr. Upadhyaya's visit, and it was confirmed by the latest exercise. This meant that Nepal would be sensitive to India's security concerns. There could be a review of the working of the Treaty but not its contents, as was suggested by Kathmandu after strains developed in their ties in the wake of the lapsing of the trade and transit agreements in March last year. India, as was known, was upset by the purchase of arms, including such items as anti-aircraft guns, from China and told Kathmandu about it.

Good augury: What the two sides appeared to be working for was a comprehensive umbrella settlement—specifying their agreed positions on the various irritants that created distance between them. New Delhi, both before and after the change of government, was prepared for a generous attitude towards the small neighbour but was firm on matters concerning India's security. Also, it wanted a comprehensive settlement, not piecemeal agreements. Nepal's main concern in the past, on the other hand, was for fresh trade and transit agreements, but its attitude on other issues was considered vague and non-committal. That was the position last year. The attitudes are different now—which is a good augury for the removal of irritants.

The new Government was prepared to accommodate Nepal's demand for fresh separate agreements on trade and transit. The previous Government had insisted on a single arrangement covering both the issues. This was among the subjects uppermost in the mind of the Nepalese delegations. Other issues that figured in the discussions included security perceptions, economic cooperation, treatment of Indians in Nepal and of

Nepalese in India, border trade, smuggling, narcotics, water resources, and the proposal envisaging Nepal as a zone of peace.

A joint statement issued today spoke optimistically of the prospects of early agreements on bilateral matters, now that the two delegations had made progress "towards a comprehensive solution of all outstanding problems," and their discussions contributed "to greater mutual understanding of each other's serious concerns and sensitivities."

High priority: The Indian side, according to a joint statement, spelt out the new Government's policy—that high priority was to be given to improving relations with Nepal and that its problems and concerns were to be treated with understanding, sympathy and friendship. On its part, Nepal gave the assurance that it would meet India half way. Both sides were confident that "there should be no insoluble problems."

Austrian Foreign Minister Meets New Delhi Press

46001299 Madras THE HINDU
in English 10 Feb 90 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, 9 Feb—The Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr Alois Mock, said here today that the Austrian firm which had made an unsuccessful bid to sell 155 mm guns to India was now determined to try again for the contract. Although the subject did not figure in his talks with Indian leaders, Dr Mock said "We will do everything that needs to be done since it is a commercial venture and Austria is interested in increasing economic cooperation with India."

Speaking to newsmen at the end of his two-day visit, the Minister, responding to intermittent queries about the possibilities of Austria stepping in to fill the void created by the blacklisting of Bofors, said that it was up to the firm concerned to make a fresh bid in case there was another tender. Asked whether he could give an assurance about the elimination of middlemen in the deal, he said "When I talk about a deal, it is only in terms of what is legally permitted." He said that there had been an investigation in his country about possible financial irregularities in the bid and at present another investigation in Parliament was on but the focus was on political issues, particularly on legal aspects which restrict the export potential.

German Reunification

On the possible reunification of Germany, Dr Mock said that unification of a divided nation was a normal process and, therefore, it was a move towards normality. His forecast was that formal unification would take place sometime next year, after the elections in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and West Germany. Ruling out any possible threat to Austria from a unified Germany, he said "If the unification is done in a democratic manner, it is fine with us."

Welcoming the changes in East Europe, he said that while it was easy to bring about political reforms, it was more difficult to introduce economic changes since these involved austerity measures. "The people there are in the hope that since the political changes had taken place, economic reforms would also come quickly which would raise their standards of living. To cater to this hope, it will require mature political leaderships in these countries to manage the situation."

On Cambodia, Dr Mock felt that it would be worthwhile to explore the capabilities of the neighbouring countries to settle the problem satisfactorily and with this objective, he was scheduled to visit Nepal, Thailand and Bhutan during this trip. The Austrian plan which envisaged a Namibia-type model in which the UN had a major role during the transitory phase "was a good beginning" but the attempt to involve Cambodia's neighbours was also a good idea. In Thailand, he intended to meet Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

On Afghanistan, he said it had been decided to reopen the Austrian embassy since the security situation had improved significantly. Prospects of peace were, however, not yet promising and his view was that the Kabul regime had to show more compromise and improve its relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union. The freedom fighters too had to be better united to bring about lasting peace in that country. Asked about the former King Zahir Shah, Dr Mock said since he was highly respected and had good contacts with the Soviet Union, he could be a good prospect for peace.

Dr Mock said his discussions with Indian leaders centred around increasing economic cooperation, including the possibility of Austrian help in improving hydro-electric generation, tunnel drilling and railway communication. He also met the Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh, today and discussed these issues besides electoral reforms.

Indo-Bangladesh Economic Panel Meeting Ends

46001304 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 7 Feb 90 p 10

[Text] New Delhi, Feb. 6—The officials of Bangladesh and India have agreed to intensify efforts to expand and diversify trade between the two countries with emphasis on rectifying the present "severe trade imbalance" against Bangladesh, reports BSS.

According to the agreed minutes signed by the two sides at the end of the fourth Secretary-level meeting of the Standing Committee of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Economic Commission [JEC] here today, they considered joint venture industrial investment with buy-back arrangement as a method of bridging the trade gap. India exported commodities worth Taka 3,318.26 million to Bangladesh and imported goods worth Taka 290.36 million from Bangladesh in 1988-89, according to official figures.

On commodities trade the Indian side took note of Bangladesh's request for an "annual and enhanced quota" for import of jamdani sarees from Bangladesh. Both sides noted that approximately Indian Rs. four lakh of the quota of Rs ten lakh offered by India for duty-free import of jamdani sarees from Bangladesh had been utilised.

The Bangladesh side noted that India had offered tariff concession for jamdani sarees up to a quota of Indian rupees 15 lakh under the Bangkok agreement.

The Indian side expressed an interest in a long-term agreement for the import of 3 lakh bales of raw jute per year from Bangladesh.

Jute Carpet Import

The Bangladesh side agreed to convey India's request to the concerned authorities for consideration. The Indian side announced that the adhoc quota of the jute carpet imports would be raised.

The standing committee agreed that "specific project proposals" would have to be drawn up by both the countries for the establishment of joint ventures in 12 possible sectors "preferably with buy-back arrangements," as proposed by Bangladesh at the trade review talks held between the two countries in September 1989.

The committee agreed that both the governments should give "high priority and assist" in the early implementation of the proposal of Bangladesh Steel and Engineering Corporation (BSEC) for setting up a "sponge iron and steel complex" of six lakh tonnes capacity in collaboration with India.

The Committee expressed satisfaction at the signing of MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] between Birla Technical Services and BSEC in August, 1989 to set up the joint venture with the "arrangements for supply of agreed quantities of the finished product."

Dhaka's Request for Credit

Regarding Bangladesh's request for a fresh government-to-government credit line of Indian rupees 500 million made at the Third Standing Committee meeting in December, 1986, the Indian side informed that it was under consideration of its government.

The committee expressed satisfaction at the full utilisation of the credit line of Indian Rs. 200 million and Indian Rs. 400 million Exim Bank Credit, both offered by India in 1983.

But the Bangladesh side indicated that in general they would prefer "not to take fresh credits on commercial terms."

Technical Cooperation

The Standing Committee also reviewed the developments in the field of technical cooperation. The Indian

side agreed to expedite its response when Bangladesh side reiterated its interest in cooperation to the seven sectors listed during the last meeting of the committee.

The meeting expressed satisfaction at the renewal of Indo-Bangladesh trade agreement for 3 years from October, 1989, and that of the protocol on inland water transit and trade for 2 years from September 1989. It also noted with satisfaction the positive outcome of the visit of the Indian Confederation of Engineering (CEI) delegation to Dhaka in January, 1990 in the shape of signing a MOU between the Bangladesh Shilpa Bank and the CEI and the interest generated for joint collaboration in the private sector.

Both sides reiterated their interest in holding more regular meetings. And in the optimal functioning of the standing committee which would effectively monitor the implementation of the decisions taken by the commission to initiate action in new areas and strengthen economic and technical cooperation.

The Standing Committee held its third meeting in December, 1986 in preparation for the third session of JEC which was scheduled for July, 1987. But it was postponed in spite of all preparations made by Bangladesh side. The JEC was revived last year.

The three-day Standing Committee meeting which was held in an atmosphere of cordiality goodwill and understanding from February 4 to 6 in New Delhi was in preparation for the long pending third ministerial level meeting of the Joint Economic Commission likely to be held in April-May next in New Delhi.

The Bangladesh delegation was led by Mr. Enam Ahmed Chowdhury, Secretary External Resources Division Ministry of Planning.

The Indian side at the opening session was led by Mr Muchkund Dubey, Secretary (ER) External Affairs Ministry and subsequently by Mr. Bimal Jalan, Finance Secretary.

Held after a lapse of more than three years, the fourth meeting of the JEC's Standing Committee had two plenary sessions in which the leaders of both the sides expressed their common interest in intensifying economic cooperation, which would provide the framework for even closer ties between India and Bangladesh. They also exchanged views on regional and international issues, particularly in the economic field of interest of both countries. Intensive and wider discussions were held by the working groups on specific fields of cooperation.

Namboodiripad Comments on Election Aftermath

46001303 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 20 Feb 90 p 9

[Article by V. R. Mani: "CPM Won't Soften Towards BJP"]

[Text] Trivandrum, Feb 19—The CPM [Marxist Communist Party] general secretary, Mr E.M.S. Namboodiripad, does not think that the unilateral truce announced

by the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] president, Mr L. K. Advani, against, the Marxists sometime back, would have any bearing on his party's attitude towards the BJP.

In an exclusive interview to the TOINS, the Marxist octogenarian said the CPM and the BJP were cooperating with the National Front government at the centre and in that sense there was a working relationship. But our party is basically opposed to the policies of the BJP and therefore will have to fight them, he said.

"There is no question of 'not rubbing the BJP the wrong way' as it is a question of making no compromise with the Hindu communal and reactionary stand of the BJP."

To the suggestion that a split in the Congress after the assembly elections would only help strengthen the Janata Dal and therefore the BJP, and the left forces could be marginalised, Mr Namboodiripad said the situation in the country today was such that neither the Congress nor the Janata Dal or its supporters were in a position to assert themselves as a party of monopoly.

"Each of them will have to take the help of two more other forces. Cooperation among as many parties as possible is thus inherent. And therefore there is no question of any party being marginalised.

The veteran Marxist leader and the first chief minister of Kerala, did not respond directly to a question whether seat adjustments between the BJP and the Janata Dal despite their fundamental differences over vital issues like Article 370, Ram Janambhoomi, and minorities commission was an act of convenience.

Though politics was the art of the possible, he said, the Janata Dal and the BJP cannot go beyond certain definite limits.

Mr Namboodiripad did not think that the invitation to big houses to invest in Kerala betrayed any change of attitude towards monopoly capitalists. "While we as a party are opposed to monopoly capitalists, our government has to get their help for industrialisation."

He said that even as early as in 1957, "We invited industrialists from outside including the Tatas and the Birlas and the latter came and started the Mavoor Gwalior Rayons," he added.

He did not think the developments in eastern Europe would have any direct impact on Kerala. To him the happening there concern developments in socialist countries and Kerala was a "state in a developing capitalist state."

He added that "Socialism has been in practice for seven decades in the Soviet Union and for shorter periods in other countries. Experience has been accumulated out of the experience of socialist construction in this period. It has been found that some of the policies which were

correct earlier have ceased to be so now. There have been cases where wrong policies were pursued and all these are now being subjected to criticism and correction."

Plan Commission Approves Eighth Plan Draft Paper

46001296 Calcutta THE STATESMAN
in English 13 Feb 90 pp 1, 9

[Text] New Delhi, Feb. 12—The full Planning Commission, with Mr V. P. Singh presiding, this evening approved a draft approach paper to the Eighth Five-Year Plan. It emphasizes "total social transformation" rather than "numbers, targets and growth rates."

A number of suggestions were heard from the Finance Minister, Mr Madhu Dandavate, Mr Ajit Singh, Industries Ministers, and nine full-time members of the commission.

Mr Ramakrishna Hegde, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, later told a Press conference the suggestions would be incorporated in a final paper before it was sent to the Union Cabinet for approval. It would then be presented to the National Development Council.

Mr Hegde said in reply to questions that many of the 263 Centrally-sponsored schemes would be transferred to the States along with the resources for these.

Employment was a thrust area and drinking water would receive the highest priority as 1,50,000 [as printed] out of 600,000 villages still did not have an assured source of drinking water.

"Whereas previous approach papers dealt with numbers, targets, growth rates, etc., the approach paper now deals with human beings," Mr Hegde said.

The Fourth Plan had aimed at growth with social justice. "We had growth no doubt with varying degrees but justice to all was denied," he said.

It has been claimed that the growth rate is a little more than 5 percent but unemployment and poverty have increased.

"There will be complete reorientation of priorities and change in strategies." The yardstick would be whether the common man's life improved, Mr Hegde said.

The position on resources would be clear in a month or two after the Finance Commission's recommendations and Government's decision on it were known, he said.

Annual plans have been discussed over the past three weeks. All Chief Ministers felt that schemes with no inter-State implications should be transferred to the States. The Centre could have some control over the money spent, Mr Hegde added.

"We have told the Chief Ministers that decentralized institutions must be built up in a year." The rural-urban disparities "will be taken up in the next meeting."

Mr Hegde favoured cuts in administrative and public sector expenditure as well as curbs on conspicuous consumption. But there need not be any retrenchment, only redeployment, of Government staff.

Indiscriminate import of technology "is not good for the country," he said. In reply to questions he said he was "worried about the substance, and not the size of the Plan." The private sector too had a role to play in large-scale industry, he added.

Mr L. C. Jain, commission member, said the commitment to right to work "is serious and how work can be created without straining our resources" had to be worked out. Rupees 25,000 crores had been spent on poverty alleviation schemes. "Have we made a dent? A change in direction is called for," he said.

The Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme had worked well; fewer people were asking for jobs because many had become self-reliant.

Mr Hegde said the Plan approach aimed at strengthening the federal structure, decentralization of authority, people's participation, development of the rural sector and focus on women's role in economic activity.

The Prime Minister and Chairman of the Planning Commission, Mr V. P. Singh, said the approach to the Eighth Plan should give a "ray of hope to the sections of society which have been denied their due share of economic development. The Planning Commission's approach is in the right direction."

He praised the emphasis on employment, fiscal and balance of payments policy and the role of the public sector highlighted by the commission. He was happy that the new mode of discussion initiated by the commission had been welcomed by States.

Planning was not merely planning of Government budgets. Total planning of all types of resources was required. The commission's approach "is consistent with this concept. However, the commission should also indicate broad quantification of commitments," he said.

The Planning Commission should move away from a rigid difference between non-Plan and Plan and between development and non-development expenditure. Maintenance of capital assets, though non-Plan, were crucial to development.

The commission could play a "special supportive role" in curbing Government expenditure, the Prime Minister said.

Decentralization, Mr V.P. Singh said, should not be confused with abdication of the Planning Commission's role in setting national goals and targets, monitoring and correction. Any lapse on the part of a State or region to make specified levels of investment in irrigation could distort the national effort in this crucial area. "It should be kept in view that the country is an organic economic entity."

Special thrust to the rural sector had to be within an overall view of the economy. Development of infrastructure was an essential requirement for rural development, he said.

Controls in licensing policies "do harm when decisions become largely discretionary. Instead, encouragement of priority areas through the instrumentality of financial institutions can be attempted along with reducing discretionary decision-making procedures."

The Finance Minister, Mr Madhu Dandavate, said social and economic justice to the poor should not become a matter of charity. An adequate rate of growth should be planned so that there "is a big enough cake from which vulnerable sections of society claim their due share."

Mr Ajit Singh stressed the need for focussing on the population problem and providing employment to larger numbers. He felt that specific targets had to be laid down to measure achievement.

The Prime Minister today went to Yojana Bhavan for the Planning Commission meeting, the first time in nine years that a Prime Minister has done so. Mrs Gandhi went there once in 1981. Mr Morarji Desai had revived the practice but Mr Rajiv Gandhi did not do so even once in five years.

The Planning Commission will generally meet in the South Block office of the Prime Minister.

Mr V.P. Singh not only attended the meeting for 100 minutes in the morning and joined the members for lunch but also returned to Yojana Bhavan at 4 p.m. for a second session of 90 minutes. He has promised to meet the planners once in three months. Mr Hegde was happy at the restoration of the old tradition.

There was fairly tight security at Yojana Bhavan today.

Indian Plan for Handling of Third World IMF Debt Told

46001298 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 11 Feb 90 p 11

[Text] Washington, Feb. 10 (PTI)—India has presented to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) executive board a plan for a voluntary special fund that would enable the IMF to clean up its books while at the same time provide Third World countries in arrears to the fund—and hence ineligible to get aid from the organisation—to earn their way out by coming under a monitored IMF programme.

The matter has become very urgent, for the IMF badly needs to expand its quotas—it would like to double it—but the Americans are opposing any quota increase unless it takes credible measures to collect arrears totalling three billion SDRs from the delinquent members.

It is understood that the Indian plan was presented to the IMF executive board recently by Dr Gopi Arora, the

Indian director, and that it builds on an earlier plan dealing with the larger issue of Third World debt presented to the board by the then executive director, Dr Arjun Sengupta, who is now a special adviser to the IMF managing director, Mr Michel Camdessus.

It sparked considerable interest but much more discussion will be needed before it will become clear whether it will fly.

The Indian plan begins by acknowledging that under the IMF chapter the IMF cannot lend to any country, however dire its needs, so long as it is in arrears. That precisely is the position with regard to 14 countries, including Guyana, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Vietnam, Zambia and Somalia among others.

The United States has said it is not going to agree to any quota increase so long as the problem, involving three billion SDRs (one SDR equals about \$1.28). The United States has made a formal link between the two.

India has agreed that the two should not be linked and that IMF quotas and a solution to the problem of arrears should be considered independently. However, the Americans are insistent on that, and nothing can be done on the quota increase without U.S. co-operation. The board, therefore, has been debating how this problem can be solved.

On the larger problem of indebted countries, the IMF approach from 1988, when Dr Sengupta became adviser to the managing director to debt-related problems of the Third World, has been to put willing members under the fund plan while mobilizing support groups to provide them help both in clearing arrears—so that they will be eligible for IMF help too—as well as in dealing with their economic problems.

The money has not been forthcoming from support groups in adequate measure even when some countries have come under IMF programmes.

The Indian point of view is that there is no need to depart from that basic strategy but it is essential for creditor governments to find liquid financial resources to help members in arrears.

Nobody wants to be in arrears for the pleasure of it. They are part of the debt problem. Already members have accepted the principle of burden-sharing under which countries that borrow from the Fund have to pay an additional interest charge to make up for the arrears of countries unable to pay. Every borrower is paying additional charges, including India which has so far paid thirty million additional SDRs by way of interest charges.

As part of the burden-sharing, countries whose currencies are used by the Fund have foregone their remuneration.

Against this background, India suggested to the board that to help other members in difficulty, the burden should be borne in a more equitable manner.

Under the plan, all members of the Fund will pay one or 1.5 percent over and above their subscription to the new quotas, to be set aside in a special fund to take care of the problem of arrears. This would enable the United States to agree to a quota increase. As part of the package, the creditor countries would provide credible assurances that they will arrange adequate financing for countries in arrears so that they can undertake "adjustment" programmes.

The IMF will devise a mechanism by which countries that have implemented adjustment programmes will earn rights to SDRs. Over two or two and a half years of a monitored IMF programme, the countries in arrears may have earned enough rights to enable them to tell the IMF to use them to write off their arrears. Once enough rights have been earned, the Fund can use those to clear the arrears.

With the support the Indian plan has already obtained from not only developing countries but also some of the industrial countries, it is hoped that the interim committee scheduled to meet in May will generate enough support for the fund.

Congress-I Issues White Paper on Punjab

46001288 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH
in English 21 Feb 90 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, 20 Feb—More than 400 civilians have been killed in Punjab since the National Front government took over at the Centre in December, according to a Congress(I) White Paper on Punjab issued here today.

The document was issued by the AICC(I) [All India Congress Committee-I] general secretary, Mr K.N. Singh.

Vast areas in the border districts of Gurdaspur, Amritsar, and Ferozepur had gone out of the control of the government and terrorism was spreading its tentacles in large areas of Punjab, according to the White Paper.

Earlier, a party delegation on Punjab, which included Mr Dinesh Singh, Mr K.C. Pant, Mr R.L. Bhatia, Mr Satpal Mittal and Mr K.N. Singh, called on the President, Mr R. Venkataraman, and submitted a copy of the memorandum. Mr Singh later told newsmen that the President was "surprised and shocked" to learn the details from the delegation.

Mr Singh said from the responses of Mr Venkataraman it was clear that the President was not being properly briefed about the developments in the state. Mr Singh said the President emphasised that there should be a dialogue to find a solution to national issues, such as the Punjab problem.

The White Paper said the situation in Punjab has worsened with the National Front government taking over the reins at the Centre. Mr Singh said certain actions of the government has in fact, encouraged terrorist activities. Mr Singh described the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Devi Lal as a "buffoon" and said while he called extremists of Jammu and Kashmir and Assam terrorists, in the case of Punjab he chose to call them "political militants."

The White Paper pointed out that was an "effective breakdown" of administration in the state and the rank and file in the police were totally demoralised. "There was not even a word of regret from the government when the terrorists shot dead the IPS [Indian Police Service] officer Gobind Ram," Mr Singh added. The White Paper said "Khalsa panchayats" were being formed all over the state and they were virtually running a parallel government.

"The Golden Temple in Amritsar and other gurdwaras has once again become sanctuaries for criminals and arsenal for terrorists. Granthis are once again obliged to perform religious duties under the shadows of gun and gunmen. The sanctity of these holy places is once again being desecrated," the White Paper added.

"While economic development in the state has come to a standstill, the forces of destabilisation and secession have become more active than ever," the White Paper said. He said slogans on Khalistan are being used without impunity.

It underlined an "immediate need to determinedly resume the struggle against terrorism, revamp and revitalise the police and administration in the state, put an end to the misuse of holy shrines, ensure conditions for the full expression of the natural sentiments of communal amity, and take firm action against subversion and intervention of hostile elements abroad."

Restrictions on Foreigners' Movements in Sikkim Lifted

46001280 Calcutta THE STATESMAN
in English 19 Feb 90 p 9

[Text] Gangtok, 18 Feb—The Union Government today lifted the restrictions on the movement of foreigners in certain inner areas of Sikkim and granted the right to issue inner line permits to the State Government, reports UNI.

Announcing this to reporters after inaugurating an eight-room tourist centre here the Union Tourism and Commerce Minister, Mr Arun Nehru, said the Union Home Ministry would issue the required notification within two days.

The Central Cabinet headed by Mr V.P. Singh, which recently met at New Delhi had decided to lift the curbs on the movement of foreigners in some areas of the State, Mr Nehru said.

The Union Minister who arrived here yesterday and toured extensively the tourist spots of the State, assured the State Government of providing necessary help in boosting tourist traffic to this land-locked picturesque Himalayan State.

The Chief Minister, Mr Nar Bahadur Bhandari, and other high civil officials were also present at the Press conference.

Mr Nehru said the Centre would assist the State Government in setting up an institute of woodcrafts to encourage the local artisans and craftsmen.

"We will do what we can for the development of tourism in Sikkim as not only it has immense potential but it can generate adequate employment opportunities vital to the State," Mr Nehru remarked.

He, however, favoured development of the tourism infrastructure both by the public and private sectors. The areas opened to the foreigners are Phodong in north Sikkim, Gangtok East, Rumtek monastery, Pemayangsee and Zongri in the foothills of Mount Kanchengunga in West Sikkim. Mr Nehru left for Delhi this evening.

Permits to visit Sikkim are currently controlled by the Union Home Ministry and foreigners have to apply for them four weeks in advance through the Indian missions in their respective countries. The application must be approved by the Home Ministry in Delhi.

The State Tourism Secretary, Mr K. Gyatso, told reporters that the Centre was yet to take a decision on reopening the three valleys—Yumphang, Laching and Lachung in North Sikkim and Changu and Memenson lakes in east Sikkim obviously for its strategic location.

He said Mr Nehru promised to hold the international flower festival in Gangtok sometime in May this year. Sikkim grows around 600 species of archids apart from some rare flowers.

Sailen Dasgupta Replaces Deceased Left Front Chairman

46001281 Calcutta *THE TELEGRAPH*
in English 18 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] Calcutta, 17 Feb—Mr Sailen Dasgupta, CPI(M) [Communist Party of India-Marxist] state secretariat member, was today unanimously chosen the Left Front chairman within hours of his selection as the CPI(M) state secretary.

The CPI(M) state committee held a brief meeting at the party office at 9:30 am today, at which the chief minister, Mr Jyoti Basu, who was also the convenor of the meeting, announced Mr Dasgupta's name to fill up the post that has fallen vacant following the death of Saroj Mukherjee. The state committee members endorsed the state secretariat's choice without any debate.

Mr Basu also announced at the Front committee meeting, preponed from 10 March to this morning, Mr Dasgupta's name as the CPI(M)'s choice for Front chairman. Mr Basu's suggestion was endorsed by all the Front partners.

Mr Dasgupta, considered to be a centrist in the organisation, was acceptable to the Front partners because they felt he would be amenable to their arguments just as his predecessor, who became their last resort in many an intra-Front wrangle, had been.

Mr Dasgupta's selection as the Front chairman maintains the tradition of the CPI(M) state secretary becoming Front chief—a process that began with Promode Dasgupta, who became the chairman of the Left Front when it was first constituted in 1977.

Mr Dasgupta's selection as the CPI(M) state secretary and Front chairman was publicly announced by the veteran party leader and state minister for land and revenue, Mr Benoy Chowdhury, at a meeting to condole the death of Saroj Mukherjee at Netaji Indoor Stadium this afternoon.

Mr Dasgupta also read out the resolution adopted at the meeting, describing Saroj Mukherjee as one who believed in the "purity of Marxism."

Mr Dasgupta's selection as the CPI(M) state secretary makes his berth the party's Politburo almost certain. But the selection will not be made before the next party Congress.

CPI-M on Party Cooperation, Stand on East Europe

46001279 New Delhi *PATRIOT*
in English 19 Feb 90 p 6

[Text] Trivandrum, 19 Feb (PTI)—CPI-M [Communist Party of India-Marxist] general secretary E.M.S. Namboodiripad, today sought the cooperation of all parties and organisations in creating a new political culture that laid stress on 'development politics' rather than on the 'politics of subversion.'

Every elected government has the right to stay its term in office, be it at the State or Centre, he told a press conference here, adding, it was wrong to go on a 'perpetual agitation' to overthrow governments. Instead, opposition parties should offer constructive cooperation for the overall development of the state or country. Mr Namboodiripad said Mr V.P. Singh had the right to rule the country till 1994 and Kerala Chief Minister E.K. Nayanar, the State till 1992, he said. Every Government should rule on the basis of consultation and conference with all political groups, the CPI-M chief added.

Mr Namboodiripad said Kerala had been plagued by agitations to bring down elected governments right from 1959. This sort of politics had in a way 'destroyed' the State, the most affected areas being education, agriculture, industry and science and research, he said.

Commending the Centre for soliciting the cooperation of all parties in resolving the Punjab, Kashmir and Ram Janmabhoomi tangles, he said such a cooperative approach was needed in the States also.

He called on the Congress led opposition to give the path of 'constant struggle,' adding that they were free to agitate on issues but not for the sole purpose of bringing down governments.

Referring to the criticism of the Kerala Government's decision to extend financial assistance to the DYFI-sponsored programme of creating 50 million mandays a year through voluntary work, Mr Namboodiripad said it was the youth wing of the CPI(M) which took the initiative for the programme, the youth wings of other political parties could also emulate them.

To a question on CPI-CPI-M merger, Mr Namboodiripad said 'merger is not in our agenda, but we are cooperating with each other as never before.'

Referring to the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe, the CPI-M secretary reiterated his party's politburo resolution of January 1990 which said the changes were a blow to world socialism and world peace.

It could even result in a counter-revolution, he said adding that the changes were a result of the 'bad' implementation of socialism in those countries and not due to any basic flaw in socialism itself.

CPI-M Politburo Condemns 'Repression' of Nepal

46001276 Madras THE HINDU
in English 20 Feb 90 p 6

[Text] New Delhi, 19 Feb—The Politburo of the CPI(M) [Communist Party of India-Marxist] has strongly condemned the crackdown launched by the Government of Nepal and called upon all democratic sections in India to express their solidarity with the struggling people of Nepal and to demand an end to the "repression."

Drawing attention to the arrests of thousands of people, including the leaders of the Nepali Congress and of the left parties there, the Politburo, in a statement, pointed out that these parties had jointly given a historic call for launching the movement from 18 February, for restoration of democracy in that country. This call had been issued on the occasion of the conference of the Nepali Congress held in Kathmandu in January.

Police Repression

The Nepali authorities had responded to the struggle by widespread police repression in which, according to reports, so far 10 people had been killed, 150 injured and over 1000 activists arrested in different parts of the country.

The democratic forces in Nepal had been struggling to restore democracy since 1960 when the King of Nepal banned political parties and instituted the so-called

partyless democracy and panchayat system, the Politburo said. Expressing their confidence that the people of Nepal would continue the struggle successfully for the establishment of a democratic system, the Politburo extended its full support to the movement.

Pepsico Project

The Politburo has urged the National Front Government to review the Pepsico project and to take steps to ensure that such multinational penetrations is stopped.

In a statement issued here, the Politburo said that it was opposed to the induction of the multi-national company into the agrarian sector for a project which had no relevance to the development of the country. The project could not be justified on any grounds, either in the field of soft drinks or fruit processing.

Now the project costs had been revised and the fruit processing part of it had been shelved. All the claims about benefits for Punjab farmers had proved to be illusory. In principle, such projects were unnecessary when sufficient indigenous technology was available for this sector. The CPI(M) was also opposed to the project because it opened the door for the first time to the multi-national companies to exploit the agrarian resources.

Expert Says India Can Make Own Air Defense System

46001282 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 18 Feb 90 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, 17 Feb—Given the political go-ahead and the requisite resources, Indian scientists and technologists have the capacity to produce the country's own airborne earlywarning system as a vital element of air defence.

This observation was made here yesterday by Dr K. Ramchand of the ASWC, an aerospace research institution of the Ministry of Defence. He was speaking at the national seminar organised by the Defence Ministry's high-powered radar and communications projects office (RCPO) at Vigyan Bhavan here.

The seminar was inaugurated by the defence secretary, Mr Naresh Chandra.

The RCPO, headed by Air Marshal Thomas Mathew, was set up two decades ago with its board chaired by the Prime Minister himself and the defence minister as vice-chairman. It was the first time that the RCPO held such a seminar to discuss emerging trends in modern radar systems, airborne earlywarning systems, air defence network and the use of artificial intelligence.

Its aim was to initiate a discussion among engineers and scientists to meet the "requirements of the electronic counter measure, stealth-craft technology and radar techniques to identify low-lying objects and fast aircraft and missile."

The defence secretary outlined the important work done by the RCPO and the radar and communications scenario in the country as a result of the inputs. Well-known scientists like Dr Rajendran, Dr K. Ramchand, defence top-brass like the vice-chief of the IAF [Indian Air Force], Air Marshal N.C. Suri, its assistant chief, Air Marshal B.D. Jayal, and foreigners including Mr Claude Legendre of Thomson CSF, France, and Mr Temy Allouche of Alcatel, France, took part in the seminar.

In his inaugural address, Mr Naresh Chandra pointed out that the RCPO had put India on the world map of communication during the last two decades as the largest user of tropo-cum-los (line of sight) microwave dedicated communication system. Such a vast network does not exist anywhere else in south-east Asia.

The defence secretary said the RCPO had achieved great capability in the field of system engineering of large, medium- and low-power radars and "today in this regard we do not have to look towards developed countries. In fact, requests are in hand for such tasks to be undertaken for various agencies other than the IAF.

He pointed out that the RCPO had installed a number of high- and medium-power radars in western, northern, central and eastern sectors and the southern peninsula. It had also carried out design and installation of a complete chain of troposcatter and line of sight microwave system to link these radars to associated command formations to provide dedicated, reliable jam-resistant communication.

Plans for Second IRBM Trial Told, Progress on Prithvi

46001283 Madras THE HINDU
in English 17 Feb 90 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, 15 Feb—India is to carry out the second test of its IRBM technology demonstrator, Agni, some time in March-April 1990 from the Interim Test Range on the Orissa coast. Considering its strategic ramifications, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is awaiting clearance from the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs to carry out the test.

The first test of the Agni took place last May and at that time U.S. officials admitted that they had pressed India not to carry out the test.

According to informed sources this second test of the two-stage Agni will also focus on the behaviour of the re-entry vehicle. However, while in the previous test the trajectory was deliberately lofted to achieve maximum stress on the composite-fibre heat shield, the present test will be over a longer range and also emphasise the accuracy of the missile.

The Agni project, which got Rs 30 crores for the 1983-1992 period, is a small segment of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP). However,

it is the most significant portion of the programme as it will give India a strategic strike capability it has been lacking so far.

Meanwhile, the Prithvi, the 250 km range battlefield support missile is nearing the end of its development trials. The single liquid-propellant stage missile has been tested with a warhead over the sea. Some trials have to be carried out on the surface-to-surface mode the missile is designed to operate in. The test is likely to be carried out in the Pokharan area though the range will be kept well below its 250 km maximum for safety considerations. This missile is likely to be inducted by the Indian Army some time late next year.

Arun Nehru Heads Newly Constituted Board of Trade

46001287 Madras THE HINDU
in English 24 Feb 90 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, 23 Feb (PTI)—The Government has reconstituted the 28-member Board of Trade with the Commerce and Tourism Minister, Mr Arun Nehru, as chairman, an official press release said today.

The terms of reference will remain the same, namely to advise the Government on policy measures, both short and long term, for increasing exports in the light of the emerging national and international economic scenario.

The members are: The RBI [Reserve Bank of India] Governor, the Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, the Finance Secretary, the Department of Economic Affairs Secretary, the Ministry of Industry Special Secretary, the Prime Minister's Office Secretary, the Ministry of Textiles Secretary, the president, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) President, Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASSOCHAM) president, Confederation of Engineering Industries, president, Federation of Indian Export Organisation (FIEO), president, Federation of Associations of Small Industries of India (FASII), Development Commissioner (Small-Scale Industries), Ministry of Industry, Mr S.L. Kirloskar, Chairman, Kirloskar Brothers Ltd., Mr Ratan Tata, Chairman, Tata Industries Ltd., Mr Hari Shanker Singhania, Chairman, J.K. Industries, Mr A.S. Ganguli, Chairman, Hindustan Lever Ltd., Mr B.M. Khaitan, Chairman, Macneill and Magor Ltd., Chairman, HMT Ltd., Bangalore, chairman, IRCON, New Delhi, Mr M.V. Arunchalam, Managing Director, Tube Investments of India Ltd., Mr H.P. Nanda, Chairman, Escorts Ltd., Mr P.R.S. Oberoi, vice-Chairman and Managing Director, East India Hotels Ltd., Mr H.S. Sandhu, Chairman, Chinara Exports, New Delhi, Bhai Mohan Singh, Chairman, Ranbaxy Laboratory Ltd., New Delhi, Mr A.C. Padamasee, chairman, Eagle Flask Industries Ltd., New Delhi.

The Special Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, will be the member-secretary.

The Board will review the export performance of various sectors and suggest measures to be taken by the Government and trade and industry to maximise export earnings. It will examine the institutional framework for exports and take measures for improving it.

It will also review the policy instruments, incentives and procedures and suggest measures to rationalise them. The objective of the Board is to promote a dialogue with trade and industry on a continuing basis for the formulation and effective implementation of export strategies.

Papers Report Further Developments in Bofors Case

Swedish Bank Documents

46001291 Madras *THE HINDU*
in English 15 Feb 90 p 9

[Article by Chitra Subramaniam in Geneva and N. Ram in Madras]

[Excerpts] Authoritative documents are now available from the internal official record of the Swedish central bank, Sveriges Riksbank, to show that between September and December 1986, A. B. Bofors admitted that it had made large percentage payments as "commission" on the howitzer contract with India, that the payments were scheduled to continue till 1990, and that "the principal beneficiary" behind Svenska Incorporated was "an Indian who has been an agent for Bofors for 10-15 years." Bofors also offered, during this period, to make available the names of other beneficiaries if the Swedish central bank required this information.

These documents—coming on top of hundreds of pages of contractual agreements, payment documents, diary entries, letters, notes and other items already published on the scandal in India and Sweden—knock the bottom out of the "winding up," "no Indian recipient," "no kickback" story trotted out by Bofors and accepted readily by the previous Government and also by the Joint Parliamentary Committee [JPC] as the basis of the cover-up. The Swedish National Audit Bureau based its findings on these documents and included excerpts from them in the secret part of its Report, which was presented to the Swedish Government on 1 June 1987.

Morberg's Visit to Bank

The most important among the documents made available in the recent period by morally outraged sources in Sweden is the note of "minutes on Visit on the 18th of December 1986 of Per Ove Morberg, Bofors." The facsimile of the notes of Minutes recorded on the letterhead of Sveriges Riksbank is being published along with an English translation. It was recorded on 18 December 1986 by Mr ulle-Reet Jakobson of the Department of Currency in the Swedish central bank.

At the insistence of the Riksbank, Mr Morberg (who came to India twice in 1987-88, in the company of Mr

Lars Gothlin, the lawyer, to discuss the problem with the Government of India and also to testify before the JPC) visited the bank "to show the agreement on commissions between A. B. Bofors and Svenska Inc" and "to orally present the content as an answer to the request of Riksbanken." Mr Morberg showed the central bank's officials a commission agreement specific to sales in India of a certain type of product (the FH-77B howitzer). The agreement showed, incidentally, that Svenska Inc acted as an agent "also for non-Swedish companies and also for a few other Swedish companies, among them, Saab-Scania."

Commission Payment

Mr Morberg stated, with specific reference to the Bofors-Svenska arrangement, that "the commission on the India deal totals around 3 percent of the order value. Most of it has already been paid in connection with the advance payment got from the Government of India. 0.96 percent of the delivery value will further be paid to the agent at every delivery from Bofors to India.... The payments will probably be made quarterly. After 1990, it is planned that the commissions for this specific deal will cease. The payments will be reported under Code 62." Under the Swedish banking practice, this code stands exclusively for "provision," that is "commission."

Mr Morberg, who later became acting president of Bofors, revealed that "the principal beneficiary in Svenska Inc is an Indian who has been an agent for Bofors for 10-15 years." This was a clear and unambiguous reference to Mr Win Chadha, the sole Bofors representative or agent in India for official purposes. The Bofors representative indicated that in case the central bank required "more detailed information about the beneficiaries," this information could probably be provided.

Elaborate Arrangement

The background to this admission is interesting and, in fact, it lights up the route of the run-up to the exposure of the Bofors-India kickback scandal in early 1987. How was suspicion aroused in the first place? A letter, dated 24 September 1986, recorded on the letterhead of Sveriges Riksbank by Mr Jakobson, reveals that "during a statistical investigation into your payments in the month of May, we have noted 4 payments dated 86-05-06 with reference to bank code 62, commissions, and with Svenska Incorporated, Switzerland, as receiver." Interestingly, these payments, made through Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken in Stockholm, were divided into portions made in French francs, U.S. dollars, Swiss francs and the European Currency Unit—suggesting an elaborate distribution arrangement based on detailed instructions to Bofors. In addition, there was a large payment made in Swedish kroner. The Riksbank asked Bofors to "send us a written explanation for the payments above and the documents, for example invoices, that these are based on."

Bofors replied to this communication through a letter dated 3 October 1986 and admitted this much (which is completely inconsistent with the "winding up" story): "During the spring of 1986, we got an order from the Government of India on deliveries of guns and ammunition. In connection with that order we received an advance payment on the 2nd of May 1986 of SEK 1,682,132,196.80. After that we instructed, in accordance with an agreement, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken to make the commission payments that you have asked about."

Legal Requirement

The Riksbank, in a letter dated 20 November 1986, made clear to Bofors the nature of the legal requirement. "According to paragraph 15 in regulation of currency, anybody who is a resident of this country or otherwise stays here is obliged, to the extent that the Riksbanken finds appropriate, to give the Riksbanken information about the payments he caused to be made to or receives from somebody who is a resident of a foreign country or otherwise stays there." The Swedish central bank—the equivalent in that country of the Reserve Bank of India—also asked the arms manufacturing company to send it a copy of the agreement between Bofors and Svenska that provided "the basis for the payments of commissions 1986-05-06." It further asked pointedly: "Which owner interests lie behind Svenska Incorporated, Panama?" It gave the company 14 days to come up with the answer.

These four documents throw important light, in an undeniably official way, on the nature of the large Bofors payments and also on *why* and *how* the Bofors-India kickback scandal surfaced in Sweden in the first instance. While the Swedish Government participated in the cover-up, the Sveriges Riksbank and the National Audit Bureau played the role of exemplary official institutions which helped to expose the corrupt nature of the Bofors-India transaction. These specific official documents, which relate to the confidential Riksbank-Bofors communication of late-1986, constitute direct evidence on the character of the payments. They are highly relevant to the criminal case which has been registered in India by the CBI [Central Bureau of Investigation]; they make it very difficult for the Swedish Government to pretend that bank secrecy laws make it impossible for it to come up with the official information required by Mr V.P. Singh's Government.

The Documents

The following are the documents from the Swedish Central Bank, the final disclosure in original with its translation, and the others providing the sequence of events in full in translation: [passage omitted]

Translation

Sveriges Riksbank.

Minutes on Visit on the 18th of December 1986 of Per Ove Morberg, Bofors.

Attending from the Riksbanken: C Linton-af Petersens, u-R Jakobson.

Purpose: to show the agreement of commissions between A.B. Bofors and Svenska Inc and orally present the content as an answer to the requests of Riksbanken (rb: s) 1986-11-20.

M showed an agreement that seemed to be an ordinary commissions agreement with a number of clauses. The agreement was valid only for sales in India and for a certain type of product.

The agreement also showed that Svenska Inc acted as an agent also for non-Swedish companies and also for a few other Swedish companies, among them, Saab-Scania.

The commission on the India deal totals around 3 percent of the order value. Most of it has already been paid in connection with the advance payment that Bofors got from the Government of India. 0.96 percent of the delivery value will further be paid to the agent at every delivery from Bofors to India.

This means that for 1987 around 10 million SEK will be paid.

1988 around 20 million SEK will be paid.

1989 around 20 million SEK will be paid.

1990 around 10 million SEK will be paid.

The payments will probably be made quarterly. After 1990, it is planned that the commissions for this specific deal will cease. The payments will be reported under Code 62.

We stressed that Code 62 is correct and must be used also in the future.

The principal beneficiary behind Svenska Inc is an Indian who has been an agent for Bofors for 10-15 years. Whether there are any other partners, M didn't know. If Riksbanken wants more detailed information about the beneficiaries, this can probably be obtained, according to M.

uRJ 18/12 1986.

(The handwritten notations state that Bo Sandberg, RRV (Audit Bureau) has today 15/5 read the above memorandum/etc.

Note (Not in original): This page from the record of the Swedish central bank (the Minutes of Morberg's visit) is a vital piece of evidence. It was obtained by the National Audit Bureau [NAB], headed by Bo Sandberg, in its enquiry in 1987. The relevant excerpt is included in the secret part of the NAB Report.

Translation

SVERIGES RIKSBANK

u-R Jakobson

tel: 08/787 02 20
1986-09-24
(September 24, 1986)
Riksbankens dnr:
860924-110
AB Bofors
691 80 Bofors

Regarding payments to foreign countries during May 1986.

During a statistical investigation into your payments in the month of May, we have noted 4 payments dated 86-05-06 with reference to bank code 62, commissions, and with Svenska Incorporated, Switzerland, as receiver.

The payments have been made through Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken in Stockholm, clearing number 5201 and amounts to:

French Franc	27,957,875.
U.S. \$	16,070,412.
Swiss Franc	7,346,128.
European Currency Unit	2,720,363.

Besides that, there is a payment on 86-05-22, bank code 62, receiver Credit Suisse, for SEK 11,774,925 through the same bank.

We request you to send us a written explanation for the payments above and the documents, for example invoices, that these are based on. The documents should be sent to Riksbanken at the following address given below with attention to the official mentioned above within 14 days from this date. Riksbanken will return the original documents as soon as possible after the investigation. If copies are sent to us, we want to know if you wish them to be returned.

Sveriges Riksbank
Department of Currency
(Signed)
ulle-Reet Jakobson
(Handwritten notations) Addresses etc, etc printed at bottom of letterhead.

Translation

Bofors
Nobel Industries.
Date.
1986-10-03.
(October 3, 1986).
FCF 1/Nnu
Sveriges Riksbank.
Box 16283.
103 25 Stockholm.
Attention u-R Jakobson.
RIKSBANKENS DNR: 86-09-24-110.

In response to your request about foreign payments of SEK 188,398,806-00 on 1986-05-06 and SEK 11,774,925-00 on 1986-05-22, we give the following explanation.

During the spring of 1986, we got an order from the Government of India on deliveries of guns and ammunition. In connection with that order we received an advance payment on the 2nd of May 1986 of SEK 1,682,132, 196-80. After that we instructed, in accordance with an agreement, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken to make the commission payments that you have asked about.

We enclose copies that show the formal basis for the payments. We do not wish the copies to be returned.

With kind regards.
AB Bofors.
Department of Finance.
(Signed).
Ulla Nilsson.

(Handwritten notations etc. Addresses etc printed at bottom of Bofors' letterhead).

Note (not in original): Ulla Nilsson signs the documents dated 1982 on the Hinduja connection—"Pitco c/o Mr G.P. Hinduja, Sangam Ltd" (See THE HINDU of 22 April 1988 or 25 June 1988). The documents on the Hinduja angle published in THE HINDU of 25 June 1988 (these five documents were republished from THE HINDU of 22 April 1988) have been authenticated by Mr Ringberg in a telex message to Mr Katre (published in THE HINDU of 9 October 1989).

Translation

SVERIGES RIKSBANK
u-R Jakobson.
tel: 08/787 02 20.
1986-11-20
(November 20, 1986)
Riksbankens dnr:
860924-110
AB Bofors.
Department of Finance.
691 80 BOFORS.

Regarding foreign payments during May 1988, your letter of 1986-10-03.

According to paragraph 15 in regulation of currency, anybody who is a resident of this country or otherwise stays here is obliged, to the extent that the Riksbanken finds appropriate, to give the Riksbanken information about the payments he causes to be made to or receives from somebody who is a resident of a foreign country or otherwise stays there.

With reference to the paragraph in law mentioned above, we ask you to send us a copy of the agreement between A.B. Bofors and Svenska Incorporated, Panama, that is the basis for the payments of commissions 1986-05-06.

- Which owner interests lie behind Svenska Incorporated, Panama? We await your answer to the address below with attention to the official mentioned above within 14 days from this date.

SVERIGES RIKSBANK
Department of Currency.
(Signed).
ulle-Reet Jakobson.

(Handwritten notations—addresses etc at bottom of letterhead).

Note (not in original): The Swedish central bank demands information on the interests behind Svenska and the agreement between Bofors and Svenska. Following this, Mr Morberg showed up with the agreement and reveals that the "principal interest" behind Svenska is "an Indian who has been an agent for Bofors for 10-15 years" etc.

Swiss Account, Hinduja Summoned

46001291 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 20 Feb 90 pp 1, 8

[Text] New Delhi, 19 Feb (UNI)—The sixth Swiss account, frozen last month in connection with the Bofors scandal, has deposits of more than Rs 64 crores, a sum generally thought to be the pay-offs in the Rs 1,600-crore gun deal.

Sources close to the team of Indian officials which recently went to Switzerland and Sweden said here today that the unidentified account might have deposits from alleged kickbacks in other deals, including the HDW submarines deal.

The sources said the Indian investigators were in the process of unravelling the mystery as to who was the authorised signatory of the sixth account and who was the real holder.

They said the indication that the account had "deposits much more than the kickbacks in the Bofors kickbacks" was made available to the three-member team of Indian officials which visited Switzerland for submitting them a letter rogatory.

A deputy inspector-general and a superintendent of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) are currently in Switzerland to find out the details about the sixth frozen account so that a court notice may be sent to its authorised signatories.

A Swiss court had last week issued notices to the authorised signatories of the five frozen accounts in the names of the Services Ltd, Svenska Inc., Mont Blanc, Lotus and Tulip.

Meanwhile, the sources cited five major achievements of the team of Indian officials that visited Switzerland and Sweden for investigation in the Bofors scandal.

They said the myth about "the impenetrability and untouchability" of Swiss accounts had been shattered.

"The Swiss accounts are no longer Alibaba caves which can be opened and closed secretly by a chosen few," the sources said.

The sources said another achievement was the discovery of the six accounts, and the third, the action (of freezing the accounts) taken by the Swiss authorities after this finding.

The Swiss authorities had also found their letter rogatory in order paving the way for further investigations.

"A perceptible change in the attitude of Swedish officials," was another achievement.

The sources said, earlier, the attitude of the Swedish Government was not at all encouraging, but this time they extended their utmost cooperation.

Meanwhile, the CBI has issued a fresh summons to British industrialist, Mr G.P. Hinduja, to appear before it for "assistance" in probing the gun deal.

CBI sources said the summons was sent to Mr Hinduja, one of the 14 accused in the Bofors case, through diplomatic channel a couple of days ago. Mr Hinduja has been asked to file his reply and appear before the CBI by this month end.

The sources said the Indian embassy in Dubai today sent a communication to the CBI here that the alleged Indian agent of Bofors company, Mr Win Chadha, was "still evading" the summons.

The sources said the CBI could not initiate any legal action against Mr Chadha till they got a reply from the postal authorities of Dubai as they had issued a copy of the summons by registered post also.

They said they had sent a reminder to the Dubai postal authorities to tell whether the summons had been served on Mr Chadha or whether these also had met with the same fate as those sent through the diplomatic channel.

Mr Chadha and Mr Hinduja were issued summons in the last week of January and asked to appear before the CBI by 12 February. The CBI had extended the deadline as the two could not be served the summons till that date.

In a related development, the Delhi high court today dismissed a petition filed by Mr S.S. Siddique seeking a copy of the FIR in the Bofors case.

The petition was dismissed by Mr Justice S.B. Wad.

More on Swiss Account

46001291 *Calcutta THE STATESMAN*
in English 21 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by Raju Santhanam]

[Text] New Delhi, 20 Feb—Besides Mr Ajitabh Bachchan, three other prominent persons suspected to be close to the previous Government have been named in the Central Bureau of Investigation [CBI]'s confidential request for the mysterious sixth account which holds substantially more than the Rs 64 crores said to have been involved in the Bofors pay-off.

Those connected with the investigations in Stockholm and sources close to an international investigation agency overseas told *THE STATESMAN* that the sixth account was a "named account." "It is not in the name of any non-descript lawyer but contains the name of a prominent person whose links with the previous Government may be well known."

The sources said that besides Mr Win Chadha, the Hinduja brothers and Mr Ajitabh Bachchan, the CBI suspected some other prominent persons. They include a former Defence Ministry official, an Italian and a personal friend of the former Prime Minister.

Sources in Stockholm and Geneva said that although officially the names would be out after the Swiss authorities completed all legal formalities—likely to take at least a month—the possibility of the names being unearthed by investigators, particularly in the Swedish media, is not ruled out.

Considering that most of the investigations had been done by the media, particularly *THE HINDU*, the chances are that those leaking the stories, described as "morally outraged persons in Sweden and Geneva" would be prepared to stick their necks out to reveal the names even "unofficially" if need be. The Swiss and foreign officials, it appears, have been piqued by the previous Government's role in the entire affair and are extremely anxious to be helpful.

The sixth account is in Geneva and there are intra-account transfers to the Geneva account. The five originally named by the CBI and later frozen by the Swiss authorities are Mont Blanc, Lotus, Tulip, A.E. Services and Svenska. These accounts in Switzerland have been traced as payments by Bofors as a result of investigations done by the National Audit Bureau in Sweden.

Sources in Geneva say that there is evidence of some, if not all the Bofors money travelling to a sixth account in Geneva. The account was discovered following information gathered by the CBI in Delhi and inquiries made in Stockholm. By freezing the account the Swiss authorities have confirmed that the sixth account is linked with Bofors. Interestingly, the account is in the name of a person or persons and is being regularly operated. A Swedish paper had claimed that it belonged to Mr Ajitabh Bachchan and there are also reports that the account could be held by both the Hinduja and Mr Ajitabh Bachchan but lawyers of both have so far denied having a Swiss account linked with Bofors.

The Bofors investigations have also taken a curious twist with suspicion based on some information that the sixth account may also contain money said to be involved in the HDW deal.

The authorities appear confident that the Government of India would be able to nail the HDW pay-off recipients although payments are known to have been made way back in 1980. Sources in Geneva say that if the Government is prepared to launch a similar criminal conspiracy case against those involved in the HDW case, it would be easy for the Swiss authorities to reveal the identity of those involved in the HDW submarine deal.

Whether it is the sixth account holder or not it seems curtains for the mysterious account holder who has collected huge commissions in several Indian deals.

New Record Expected in 1990 Food Grain Production

46001289 *Madras THE HINDU*
in English 21 Feb 90 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, 20 Feb—After recording an all-time high in foodgrain production of 170.8 million tonnes in 1988-89, the country is well poised to make a new mark this year also. Agricultural experts anticipate a production of over 172 million tonnes of foodgrain in 1989-90.

However, the new mark will fall marginally short of the target of 175 million tonnes set for the year. Much of the gain in foodgrain output this year will be from the rice front. Rice production is likely to exceed 71 million tonnes. In kharif, rice production was about 63 million tonnes, and in rabi it may be about 8 million tonnes. Wheat production has stabilised around 54.5 million tonnes.

Cotton and sugarcane are also set to create new records with cotton heading for a production of 102 lakh bales of 170 kg each, and sugarcane reaching a production figure of 212 million tonnes. Coarse cereals have also done well, and the Rabi production is expected to be 5.8 million tonnes, registering a marginal increase over the target of 5.6 million tonnes. The total coarse cereal output will be about 33.9 million tonnes.

Pulses production may suffer a minor setback, as the rabi crop is likely to be lower than the targeted 9.4 million tonnes. With the gram crop in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Haryana hit by moisture stress, the output may drop to about 8.2 million tonnes. However, the good kharif output of 6.05 million tonnes, will offset the rabi loss and make up for the overall production. In oilseeds the kharif production has exceeded the target and stands at 9.76 million tonnes, and the results of Rabi crop are good.

Great Feat

This year's high production is reckoned to be a great feat in the agricultural front, as it was achieved with less moisture and under difficult cropping situation. Last

year, when the country saw unprecedented foodgrain output, about 88 percent of the arable land had received good rains, and this year only 77 percent of the area received rains and held enough moisture to sustain farming.

The fertilizer off-take is a good barometer to gauge the success in the production. This year as much as 120 lakh tonnes of NPK nutrients have been consumed as compared to 113 lakh tonnes last year.

The year started on a comfortable note and made much out of a beneficial Kharif season. But rabi turned out to be a difficult phase. There were lower levels of water storage, and it had resulted in moisture stress almost all over the central and peninsular India. Major river basins showed poor storage and in many pockets in South India rabi programme had to be called off. In Maharashtra, sunflower, jowar and gram suffered heavily and in Karnataka, jowar, ragi, paddy, maize and groundnut have been hit.

But the rice crops in most parts of the country has managed to escape. The rains in the last week of December, and recent showers have benefited the late North-Eastern monsoon-based rice crop in the South.

A recent assessment of the rabi crops indicated that the irrigated wheat crop in the entire north-west is satisfactory, and in the central region it is expected to produce average yields.

Composition of Panel on Hindu Temple Scored

46001277 Madras THE HINDU
in English 20 Feb 90 p 7

[Text] Lucknow, 19 Feb—The national Babri Masjid Action Committee (BMAC) has opposed the composition of the three-member committee set up recently by the Union Home Minister, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, under the chairmanship of the Union Finance Minister, Mr Madhu Dandavate, to work out an amicable solution to the Ram Janmabhumi/Babri Masjid dispute. The BMAC's reservation is particularly against the inclusion of Mr Dandavate and the Uttar Pradesh Health Minister, Mr Mukhtar Anees.

The BMAC's central working committee met here yesterday to review the developments following the postponement of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)'s programme to build a Ram temple (which was to begin from 14 February) by four months and the Union Government's initiative to resolve the dispute. The BMAC, in a resolution, wondered why the earlier Central committee under the chairmanship of the Union Home Minister was replaced. The two other members of the original panel were Mr Dandavate and the Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister, Mr Mulayam Singh Yadav. The initiative was taken by the Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh, earlier this month to explore avenues of a solution to the Ayodhya issue after the VHP [Vishwa Hindu Parishad], on his appeal on 7 February, agreed to postpone its programme.

Mr Mulayam Singh said he wanted to be left out of the committee, after VHP leaders and saints at a sammelan in Ayodhya passed a resolution accusing him of being close to the BMAC. Although the VHP had no such reservations about Mufti, he too sought to step out because of his preoccupation with other issues and perhaps the desire to keep out of the controversy. The two new members inducted were the Railway Minister, Mr George Fernandes, and Mr Mukhtar Anees, a protégé of Mr Mulayam Singh. Although the BMAC did not want to put it on record, its reservations against Mr Dandavate were because of his stated closeness to the Shiv Sena chief, Mr Bal Thackeray, and his views on the Shahbano case and criticism of the Muslim women's bill. And Mr Anees was not acceptable since he is a Shia Muslim, while the BMAC is dominated by Sunnis. There is no love lost between the two sects in Uttar Pradesh.

As long as Syed Shahabuddin called the shots, the BMAC, right from 1986, brought out its own programme. Now it takes a cue from the VHP to counter the latter's action plan. It had given a call to resist the VHP's foundation laying programme in Ayodhya on 9 November. But while the VHP went ahead with its schedule, a few hundred BMAC members peacefully courted arrest.

Dangerous

To counter its rival's programme during the next four months, the BMAC would hold meetings in the districts to explain its stand. But its announcement to resist the VHP yatras are fraught with dangerous consequences. It urged the Government to stop the yatras which would be taken out in different parts of Uttar Pradesh to mobilise opinion over the proposed construction of the Ram temple. Perhaps the BMAC's idea is to force the administration to promulgate prohibitory orders in view of the likely confrontation and violence.

A new dimension to the imbroglio is to be added by a few Hindu organisations under the aegis of Swami Swarupanand, Sankaracharya of Dwarakapeeth. A Sri Ram Janmabhumi Punaruddhar Samiti set up by him and a few other saints, with the twin objectives of neutralising the VHP's sway among the Hindus with a more strident stance and to embarrass the party in power, would soon create a new irritant. In league with a number of other organisations floated recently, a declaration is to be made that the foundation stone for the Ram temple would be laid afresh inside the disputed shrine.

The issues of Krishna Janmabhumi in Mathura and Vishwanath temple in Varansi are also being raked up. Already, Swami Harinarayanand, convenor of the Bharat Sadhu Samaj, has expressed dismay over the postponement of the VHP's temple construction programme.

Panel Formed To Review Environment Policy

46001278 Madras *THE HINDU*
in English 20 Feb 90 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, 19 Feb—The Centre has set up a high-level committee to review the environmental policy, especially with a view to protecting Tribal interests.

The committee will be chaired by Mr Mahesh Prasad, Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Forests, and will also have as members the Cabinet Secretary, the Planning Commission Secretary and the Secretaries to the Ministry of Welfare and the Department of Rural Development. The Inspector-General of Forests in the Ministry of Environment and Forests and the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes will also be members.

Environment Ministry sources said the committee's aim was to coordinate development projects and to ensure that Tribal interests were not overlooked.

The committee's report is expected by mid-March, it would be submitted to Mrs Maneka Gandhi, the Minister for Environment and Forests, and Mr Ram Vilas Paswan, Minister for Welfare.

The committee, which was set up recently, has elicited the views of Secretaries, Ministries of Forests and Tribal Development of six States—Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat and Maharashtra. Among the issues discussed was the question of traditional rights of tribals and the concessions to be given to them.

The committee has been asked to examine and suggest ways to improve the conditions of Tribals and to review and suggest changes in the existing measures for increased participation of Tribals in forestry programmes.

A spokesman said the committee would take due account of the Duleep Matthai Committee which is expected to submit its report soon. The Matthai Committee was set up in April last year, to go into forest conservation vis-a-vis development.

New Nonpolitical Trade Union Front Launched

46001301 New Delhi *PATRIOT* in English 8 Feb 90 p 3

[Text] A new apolitical trade union, the National Front of Trade Unions (NFTU) was launched on Wednesday with the active support of about 25 non-political workers' unions from all over the country.

In a press conference, in the Capital, B. K. Prasad, chairman of the Front said that NFTU shall not allow the working class to be exploited by politicians any more. The NFTU will also concentrate on social and economic upliftment of the working class and mobilise them to fight for their political rights which have been continuously eroding during the last decade, he said.

The objective of NFTU is to suggest ways for the implementation of various programmes and schemes of the government and in due course pressurise it to implement the same, Mr Prasad said.

Answering the question on whether the NFTU will extend its total support to the National Front Government, Mr Prasad said, "we are not guided by any political party. If the present government will not fulfil its promises to the workers made before the elections, we will raise our voice against it.

The front's manifesto has a 19-point programme in which right to work, abolition of ESMA [Essential Services Maintenance Act], national wage policy and right to shelter are included.

It was also announced that NFTU will organise a three-day All-India National Conference in Capital on March 17 to chart out its further course of action.

New Find Shows Cauvery May Be Oil-rich Area

46001300 Madras *THE HINDU*
in English 9 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] Madras, Feb. 8—The Oil and Natural Gas Commission [ONGC] has found more oil in the Nannilam and Narimanam structures in Thanjavur district in the Cauvery onland basin, further reinforcing the prospects of the Cauvery basin as an oil-rich area. The hydrocarbon strikes were made yesterday.

Sources told *THE HINDU* that from the second well at Nannilam, drilled recently, oil was flowing at the rate of 67 tonnes a day viz. about 500 barrels while another well at Narimanam structure was yielding about 74 tonnes of oil (555 barrels) a day. "The oil in both the places is sweet (devoid of hydrogen sulphide). It is very light. It is high quality oil," sources said.

"From the general standards in the area, this is considered to be highly promising. The implication is that these two wells have further improved the prospects of the Thanjavur area of the Cauvery basin," they said. The wells would be put on early production system by the ONGC. The early production system is an innovative measure to bring a hydrocarbon strike into production, without waiting for the delineation of the field and the development of the complete infrastructural facilities. This leads to quick earning of revenue.

The two wells will be connected to the group gathering station of oil at Narimanam.

The last hydrocarbon strike in the basin was made at Adiyakamangalam in Thanjavur district on August 31, 1989. The well released 600 barrels of oil a day and one lakh cubic metres of gas a day.

The production of oil from the onland Cauvery Basin is more than 5,000 barrels a day now and it will increase to more than 6,000 barrels when the latest oil finds are brought under the early production system.

The ONGC is already making arrangements to transport this crude oil by rail tankers from Nagapattinam to Madras Refineries Limited, Manali, for re-processing, which will result in cutting down of costs in transportation. The rail transportation of crude may begin in some weeks. Right now, crude from Thanjavur and Bhuvanagiri in South Arcot is being brought to Madras Refineries by road tankers.

Commentator Discusses Indian Ties With Iran

46001302 Madras THE HINDU
in English 6 Feb 90 p 9

[Article by K.K. Katyal]

[Text] New Delhi, 5 Feb—The Indian Government has not done or said anything to suggest it has written off Iran, thus implying continuity in the mutual efforts to strengthen relations both in the economic and political fields. The official comments on the Iranian Government's action in "postponing" a scheduled meeting of the Joint Commission in Tehran, (that would have taken the External Affairs Minister, Mr I.K. Gujral, there) have been in a noticeably low key.

Iran did not want the Joint Commission meeting because, 'in the present climate' it did not expect concrete economic results. This was generally regarded as its show of unhappiness over developments in Jammu and Kashmir and hence a demonstration of solidarity with Pakistan. Officials here preferred to downplay the episode, obviously in the belief that there was nothing definitive about Tehran's attitude. The very paucity of official comments was significant.

This was part of the concerted diplomatic drive to put across the factual position on Jammu and Kashmir to the Muslim world—as also to others—and to counter the misperceptions, spread by Pakistan, through an appeal to religious sentiments. It was this mission that took Mr Muchkand Dubey, Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry, to West Asia today—for the second time in a week. He, according to reports reaching here, had 'fruitful talks' in Kuwait and is due to spend the next two days in Iraq—to see the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Mr Tarik Aziz, in Baghdad on Wednesday. The Foreign Secretary, Mr S.K. Singh's trips to Moscow and Washington, too, had the same purpose and were considered useful and productive.

Pakistan concentrated on the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) for support of the Muslim countries on its line on Kashmir. The OIC secretariat released a statement, at its instance, denouncing and condemning the 'blind repression' against the population of Kashmir. Though New Delhi could not derive solace from the contents of the statement, the fact that it was issued by the 'Secretariat' and not by the Secretary-General, as was done earlier on the Babri Masjid issue, did not go unnoticed here. The not-so-cleverly-worded statement on the Babri Masjid sought to convey the impression that it had been approved by the member-countries.

Some of them, however, told India that they were not aware of it and had not been told by the Secretary-General in advance.

That Pakistan did not find it easy to carry conviction with the Muslim world was evident from a despatch in a Lahore daily NATION. On the basis of interviews with over 20 Islamabad-based diplomats, it came to the conclusion that "Pakistan's friends from the European world, particularly the powerful donors, were cautious and somewhat suspicious and most of the Arab and Muslim diplomats were confused." A European diplomat was quoted as saying that "since 1971, Pakistan should have realised that it cannot fight and sustain a war with India.["] The burden, to him, was on Pakistan to establish that it was not escalating tension in the sub-continent.

Arab representatives, according to the daily, gave longish explanations for their silence on Kashmir. Pakistan's policies during the Suez crisis and its military alliances, they said, enabled India to convince the Arabs of its support. Another diplomat held Pakistan responsible for the cool Arab response—because Islamabad in the last 15 years had not projected the Kashmir issue in the world fora and pursued a one-point programme—to seek support for the Afghan Mujahidins.

IRAN

Government Sets Technological Subsidy Program for Inventors

90010191A Tehran ETTELA'AT
in Persian 18 Feb 90 pp 1, 9

[Text] Economic Service: With the establishment of the Financial Support Fund for researchers, innovators, inventors, and discoverers, the country has arrived into the age of support for domestic technology.

This Fund is to support the research and scientific activities of the best minds in the country to build prototypes of inventions and product units for experimentation and to make the final products available to industrial entities for mass production.

The minister of heavy industries and the governor of the central bank who were present at the opening ceremonies for the establishment of the Fund yesterday afternoon, at the center for banking education, called this the cornerstone of the support structure for domestic technology.

Mr. Nejad-Hoseynian, the minister of heavy industries, at the opening ceremonies for the establishment of the Fund, mentioned that the growth of technology and industry in the country depends on scientific research.

Referring to the fact that technologically advanced countries wield power in the world today, the minister of heavy industries called the four factors of machine, information, management, and skill as tools of industrial growth. Pointing to the fact that the technological level

in our country is not balanced with respect to the above four factors, he said that we are not doing so bad in our country when it comes to the machinery, but our work in the field of information is limited to catalogues and brochures, and as for organization and management, we are at a very low level. He added that the best we can do is to repair foreign machinery as far as our level of skill is concerned and weakness in these three technological areas is the main cause of our industrial weakness.

The minister of heavy industries said: the present situation demands that we engage in research and training if we want to solve this problem.

He added: Until we build up the manpower, we cannot walk in the path of reconstruction in our country. Referring to such models of industrial progress as Japan, he mentioned that they started out with training their manpower and consequently passed through the stages of progress.

At this point, Mr. Nejad-Hoseynian, the minister of heavy industries, referring to the proposal to the government for the formation of the center for technological development, said that similar to the formation of Support Fund for the development of scientific research in our country, the formation of this center has special importance.

He also mentioned in his remarks that because of the priority attached to the industrial sector in the five-year plan, we should try to solve our industrial problems, and this depends on technological growth which itself is conditional upon research and innovation.

Dr. 'Adeli, the governor of the central bank, mentioned in his remarks that industrial growth in the country depends on innovative and constructive thinking and added: our economic deficiency is in the production sector and to overcome the problem of lack of development, we must increase our production in the country.

Referring to the imported technology into the country, Dr. 'Adeli said: with regard to the transfer of technology into the country, the type of technology and its appropriateness must be clear and if we import a technology, we must know and attempt to develop that technology.

He considers the establishment of the Financial Support Fund for researchers, innovators, inventors, and discoverers a movement in the direction of the same policy and mentioned that the five-year plan attaches special importance to training and to the application of innovations.

He said this Fund is to provide the financial resources in the direction of the policy of helping researchers in the country, as well as the flourishing and utilization of innovative ideas and, for this reason, bureaucratic red tape should be avoided in the function of this Fund.

Dr. 'Adeli asked that the banking system in the country try to support this Fund.

Our reporter's story indicates that preparations for the establishment of this Fund had been made two years ago, and after two years of continuous work by a committee, its establishment was announced yesterday. The goal of this Fund has been announced to be the financial support for researchers, innovators, inventors, and discoverers so that self-sufficiency, economic independence of the nation, and freedom from economic dependence can be achieved.

This Fund has been committed to the task of covering all the expenses for projects involving research, innovation, invention, and discovery. It also provides financial assistance to the individuals and entities so that the operational expenses for the production of prototypes and experimental units and acquiring permits are covered and such projects could reach the stage of mass production.

According to Mr. Shahram Khamushi, chairman of the board of directors and general manager of the Fund, inventors and innovators who desire to apply for financial help from the Fund should send the completed application through the Iranian organization for scientific and industrial research or directly to the Fund.

He said: the proposed projects must meet the legitimate and essential needs of the society, and their goal must be to help break dependence and achieve self-sufficiency and self-reliance and, as much as possible, they should have practical applications.

Among the other requirements for the proposed projects, he mentioned, are: compatibility with the conditions of the country, utilization of domestic raw materials and machinery, coordination with the industrial plans of the country, economic saving, and improvement of traditional technologies.

Private Sector Role in Reconstruction Detailed

Rafsanjani on Private Sector Involvement

90010181A Tehran RESALAT in Persian 21 Jan 90 p 2

[Excerpts] Tehran—IRNA: In a summit of nationwide governor-generals held yesterday—Saturday—Hojat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Hashemi-Rafsanjani, president of the republic, stressed: The people's participation in public affairs is one of our policies, and the government shall not be able to handle all issues without the people's help. The president, who was attending the governor-generals' summit at the Ministry of Interior, expressed his satisfaction at having participated in the summit and hoped that it would bring forth favorable results for the country and for the revolution. [passage omitted]

Emphasizing the significance of the role of production for the Islamic Republic of Iran, in another section of his talk, Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani pointed out: We have continued to stress the issue from the very outset, and I do resolutely declare that without considerable production we may not be able to solve the country's problems,

and the root of many constraints being in production, we should take production seriously in our executive operations.

With reference to making full use of national production capabilities, the president added: We should not allow these capabilities to remain idle and you should endeavor to make full use of all production capabilities in the provinces in the sectors of agriculture, animal husbandry, fishery, industries, handicrafts, and in every field of production. Of course, this shall resolve the current situation to some extent—our main goal being fundamental works to guarantee future production and national self-sufficiency.

Stating that attending to the deprived areas signifies the justice sought by our revolution in another part of his address, the president said: Efforts should be made for implementing projected plans in poor areas where people suffer due to a lack of public amenities.

The president added: A most significant goal of the five-year plan is to attain self-sufficiency in providing resources, training manpower, and making adequate use of field specialties and technologies.

With reference to the recommendations of his late eminence Imam Khomeyni (may his memory be blessed) and his eminence Ayatollah Khamene'i, the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution, concerning the people's involvement in public affairs, Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani said: The people's participation in public affairs is one of our policies, and the government shall not be able to handle every problem without the people's support. Therefore relegating nonstrategic affairs that are not sanctioned by the Constitution is one of our planned policies. The activation of the stock market was a pre-ambles along the same lines. [passage omitted]

In reference to the problem of administrative red tape, the president said in yet another part of his speech: The elimination of bureaucracy requires both legal modifications as well as the reformation of individuals, and God willing we shall commence our work in this regard shortly, and we shall strive to change the public view towards administrative organs.

At the end of his talk, the president added: The Islamic Republic of Iran is in need of national unity, and you governor-generals should try to assume a fatherly approach towards all layers of society. You should consider yourselves above political factionalism and splintering, and don't you ever interpose factionalism in discharging your duties, in your appointments, and in your making of decisions. [passage omitted]

People's Participation in Economic Development

90010181B Tehran RESALAT
in Persian 21 Jan 90 p 11

[Text] Tehran—IRNA: Foreign resources and credits will be used for projects such as gas, construction of dams, petrochemicals, water, power plants, and the

imports of raw material for the purpose of producing goods and exporting them, over the five-year plan.

The foreign currency income has been projected to be about \$120 billion, 70 percent of which shall generate from oil revenues.

Mas'ud Rowghani-Zanjani, the vice president of the republic and head of the Plan and Budget Organization, said in an interview with the AYENEH weekly Magazine revealing the above: The government shall curtail the extent of its economic involvements and activities and shall relegate these to the people over the five-year plan.

He believes that in the past consumer protection policies actually turned into the protection of consumption per se, and the five-year plan shall pursue the strategy of protecting production—it being within such a context that the interests of the consumer too shall be secured.

According to Zanjani, during the plan foreign currency shall be used optimally along the general goals of the national economy, and the producer shall be given priority of access to foreign currency to increase output. The head of the Plan and Budget Organization added: During the five-year plan \$2,469 billion shall be invested in the industrial sector, approximate \$900 billion of which shall be launched by the private sector.

He stated the foreign currency volume of investment in the industrial sector during the plan to be \$22 billion and said: \$2,866 billion will be invested in the agriculture sector over the period of the plan.

He declared the foreign currency volume to be expended in this regard to be \$7,100,000,000.

Zanjani added: Foreign resources and credits will be used in this plan for projects such as gas, construction of dams, petrochemicals, water, power plants as well as the imports of raw material for the purpose of producing goods and exporting them, during the five-year plan.

He declared the amount of resources to be used to be 15 percent of the total amount of the national foreign currency reserves.

With reference to augmenting the people's involvement in the national economy Zanjani said: We are not inclined towards special societal groups in this arena, and all may enter into it.

He considered stock market activities in this regard to be very crucial and said: Enhancing the operations of the stock market over the period of the five-year plan for the purpose of facilitating the offer and demand market for capital while decreasing the volume of cash flow has been stressed, and the stock market is one of the benchmarks of revising the national economy.

He stressed: Over the period of the plan and based on specific mechanisms, public servants, blue collar workers, and other groups—whom the vice president described as vulnerable—would be protected.

The head of the Plan and Budget Organization believes that during the plan the unemployment rate shall have a stable trend and shall not rise.

According to him based on projections performed, conditional upon implementing programs envisaged in the plan and the absence of budget deficit, the rate of inflation shall drop over the plan period.

In another section of the talk, Zanjani said: During the five-year plan the government's physical presence in the national economy shall be reduced, relationships shall be revised, and efforts shall be made to draw people closer.

He stressed that during the plan we may be able to make maximum use of potential resources extant both within and without national borders, and in the interim, the government should assume the position of supervisor, should judge, and should act resolutely when making decisions.

Transfer of Mines To Private Sector

90OI0181C Tehran RESALAT
in Persian 21 Jan 90 p 11

[Text] Economic Section—The operations of Iran's Mining Services and Development Company, the necessity of mining and the production of minerals, transferring mines to the private sector, techniques of extracting construction and facading ores, the need for paying attention to investing in the mining sector, the lack of incentives for exploratory operations, and the wage situation of mining workers were issues discussed over special talks between RESALAT and the managing director and member of the board of directors of Iran's Mining Services and Development Company, an experienced mining specialist.

Engineer Javad Ashkan-Nezhad, managing director and a member of the board of directors of Iran's Mining Services and Development Company said: the Mining Services and Development Company was established by the end of 63 [21 March 1984-20 March 1985] on the basis of the Mines' Code. It supervises about 130 mining units, 70 of which are active. The company maintains 12 branches throughout the various parts of the country and has in its direct employ some 12,000 workers. The mines run by the company are active or in part inoperable during the various seasons of the year as per market requirements and demands.

He added: Presently silica, the basic material for glass-works and crystal manufacturing, is mined up to the level of sorting and preliminary sluicing in mines covered by the company, and it therefore comes in various qualities. Whereas if we manage to establish factories which eliminate impurities to a large extent, the finished cost of excavation shall drop while all extracted ores shall be made useful. Presently a considerable percentage of the products are held at mine sites due to certain impurities—which obstruct operations and increase excavation costs and finished prices.

Engineer Ashkan-Nezhad said: In Europe during the second half of the 18th century, miners were allowed to produce as much as they could manage and afford. When they reached an acceptable level of growth, they began to set laws and regulations. Unfortunately in our country, before any steps were taken towards development, we were confronted with voluminous law books, namely "Principle Agreement," Ecology, etc.

He pointed out: In my opinion, if mining operations are tentatively declared free within one of our poor provinces and every applicant is allowed to indulge in mining operations and to establish mineral industries with minimum criteria and without wasting any time, the experience may form the basis of many new decisions.

The managing director of Iran's Mining Services Development Company stressed: In regard to mining techniques, particularly those of construction materials in large part carried out by Iran's Mining Services Development Company, recruiting relevant specialists for operations is a must. Proper mining requires equipment, power, capital, and expertise. Presently exploring construction ores with the use of the cutting wire technique has begun in one mining unit—though the operations speed in this instance is not comparable to the time when operations were carried out with the use of fireworks. But because of the decorative uses of such ores and due to rising prices, one may be optimistic towards this method—most particularly when considering that the explosion technique causes the destruction of up to 230 percent of the minerals.

Engineer Ashkan-Nezhad reminded: During the past year mining units operated by Iran's Mining Services Development Company produced five million tons of minerals including $\frac{1}{4}$ million tons of facading ores, three million tons of construction materials, 75,000 tons of industrial minerals (silica, feldspar, and fluorine), and 100,000 tons of metallics (iron ore and antimony).

He added: The issues currently propounded regarding the transfer of mines to the private sector should be seriously pursued within an implementational framework—but the government should retain adequate leverage required for actual control. Government approved budgets usually fail to meet the mineral operations (exploration and excavation) of the remote regions of the country. Unfortunately our experiences in the field of mining decorative stones show that the techniques used by the private sector have not been parallel with specialized opinion, and on the other hand general mining departments lack the needed executive capability—due to being restricted to the use of budget line items—to be in full control of mining techniques. Therefore these departments should be made active through generating local incomes.

He pointed out: The presence of the private sector is necessary to control the public sector, and the presence of the public sector is vital for controlling the private

sector in the arena of economic competition. Unfortunately our problem has always been that at one time the overall mineral resources have been ceded to the private sector, while at another time the larger portion of these resources have been available to the government only. For this same reason, a comparative study of the capabilities of the two sectors has never been possible, and confronting the issue has always typically been marked with a lot of ruckus and commotion. Since the government should never forsake its responsibilities towards society, it should bring certain companies under its coverage to control production, marketing, and pricing.

At the end of the talks, he added: Until we have attained automatic controlling methods in presenting managerial techniques at the societal level—which requires many preparatory steps—a total handover of the country's fate to the private sector will not be advisable.

An experienced mining specialist talking to our economic reporter said: In transferring mines to the private sector two points should be taken into consideration: First, priority should be given to those who are religiously, morally, and financially more competent than others. Second, expenditures previously made on mines out of public funds should be received from applicants.

He reminded: If we wish mines to be developed, we should pay attention to the discovery of mines. Since actual exploration is costly and its future uncertain to some extent, the government should directly commit itself to the mammoth task. Or, as was done in the past, the government should give free reign to the private sector and should even help that sector in its mining endeavors. Experience shows that if this course is taken, explorations shall become practical. For example, if an explorer succeeds in discovering mineral resources sums of money should be received from him, but if he fails to discover anything, he should not be held liable for any payments. The government should be equipped with exploratory resources and capabilities and should earmark considerable sums for explorations every year in the national budget. Also, the government should establish competent organizations for the task of exploration; the Geological Organization is not up to standard for this important task.

He stressed: If the mines investment schedule is compared to that of other sectors, it will be found that investments in the mining sector have been extremely low. Industries upon which agreements in principle have been made, are provided with electricity, whereas 90 percent of the mines lack electrical power, and nowhere in the plans is there any indication of any type of coordination in this regard with the Ministry of Energy. Likewise, in major road construction plans, mines are not given any meaningful consideration.

The specialist reminded: In order for the private sector to enter into exploratory operations, the road should be smoothed for it. Of course, directions should be specified and made clear. For instance, private sector

applicants who have reconnoitered minerals in target areas should be able to receive exploring permits very easily, and the government should provide them with incentives through technical and manpower assistance, so that they may invest their assets along these lines—and even after explorations—they should be given priority in working the mines and excavating them.

He added: We have done very little work in the field of mining and the production of minerals in the country. Both the private and the public sector are involved in mining endeavored to use full standard products and upon a drop in mineral quality, they abandoned the mines. Whereas in the advanced countries of the world when mineral resources are reconnoitered, full and short standard substances are excavated jointly. Unfortunately, in our country—due to an abundance in blessings, and perhaps due to a lack of technical knowledge, mining has not been like that. Exploratory operations and mining should be seen together.

He added: One of the provisions made in the mining code is the establishment of the Exploration Organization. This still remains to be done.

He reminded: Because of various reasons, mines require more attention than industries since industries are established where there is an abundance of capabilities and a consumer society, and the site in question is known at the very outset. Contrarily, a miner should look for his desired mine in nature. In industries basic materials are specified, whereas in mining the percentage, depth, and dimensions of mines should be considered. In many instances programmers have deemed mining and industries to be the same thing, and for this reason no progress can be detected in mining. As supplying cities and villages with electricity is in consideration, likewise supplying mines with electricity should be in consideration. Also since many mining projects are not limited to a specific year, they should not be confined to a fiscal year.

The experienced mining specialist said: In advanced countries, mining personnel are in the topmost wage bracket. In those countries the form, depth, and configuration of mines determine the salary rates of workers and their fringe benefits. The wages of a worker who toils at a depth of 350 meters is different from the wages of a worker who works at a depth of 100 meters.

Potato Shortages, Black Market Activities Reported

90010208A Tehran RESAL 11
in Persian 26 Feb 90 p 11

[Text] Tehran, IRNA: Following the aggravated potato black market situation in some parts of the country, the second phase of a fair supply and distribution plan for this product, aimed at confiscating the hoarded potatoes and decisively prosecuting the hoarders and violating advance-purchasers, was put into effect.

The creation of a black market for potatoes has come about at a time when during the last few months a few thousand tons of this product have been distributed in various parts of Tehran under the supervision of the government's consumer protection authorities, however it is some time now that this product cannot be had at the official rate in Tehran.

Right now potatoes are presented for sale at various satellite markets of Tehran Municipality at 145 rials per kilo, but as a result of the long lines of purchasers usually a large number of the citizens, despite all their efforts, cannot get their hands on this product.

A few consumers who were questioned by IRNA's reporter at Qezel Qaleh marketplace [of Tehran Municipality], stated: Taking into consideration the waste of time and the taxi fares, they would prefer from now on to buy their potatoes from the black market. Furthermore, the majority of the people who had succeeded in purchasing potatoes at the official rate at the said market stated that they had waited in line about two to three hours for the purchase of a few kilos of potatoes. All the respondents cited the shortages, the existence of the black market, and the interference of the middlemen in the matter of supply and distribution of potatoes to be a result of the nonexistence of a proper plan and a lack of fundamental projects for the cultivation and harvest of this product.

In this regard, Haj Akbar Baba'i, head of the union of the fruit and vegetable sellers markets of Tehran, stated: Unfortunately, so far there has not been a correct and fundamental plan for the cultivation of potatoes. For instance, one year our farmers plant an overabundance of potatoes where the crop would not seem beneficial to gather, and another year as a result of fear of over-cultivation and loss, they do not show any interest for planting this product, thus we face a shortage, exorbitant prices, and a prevailing black market as we see today.

With regard to the current year's shortage and the expensive prices of potatoes, the head of the fruit and vegetable sellers markets of Tehran said: Last year potato farmers purchased the planting shoots or sprigs of potato for 30 to 35 toman a kilo, and since the price was somewhat high many of the potato farmers desisted from doing so, thus this year we are facing a shortage and a black market for this product.

While stating the fact that they had warned the responsible authorities that without a correct and fundamental plan in 1368 [21 Mar 1989-20 Mar 1990] we will face a shortage of potatoes, he stated: Right now, we would like to point out to the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Governor's Office, the Government's Headquarters for Consumer Protection, and other responsible officials that if they do not put into execution a fundamental project for the cultivation of potatoes, the same problem of shortage and exorbitant price could be envisaged for the next year as well.

He went on to suggest: Since there is one-and-a-half months left for the harvest of the new potato crops, we should import a quantity of potatoes from abroad, in order to break the black market's hold. He further added: Thereafter, we'll see that the hoarded potatoes in the warehouses find their way into the marketplace. In addition, the potato farmers will be able to purchase their supply of sprig plants at lower costs and we won't be witnessing another shortage and a black market next year.

Mir 'Ali Negarandeh, assistant director of the Government's Headquarters for Consumer Protection, noted that the aggravated potato black market is a result of a rush of the middlemen on the production centers of this product and its unlawful transfer to other parts of the country. He further indicated that within the last two months, despite the prohibitive measures for the transfer of potatoes from the production centers, unfortunately some of the responsible officials have not paid sufficient attention to this important matter and thus have allowed the transfer of potatoes to take place to other parts of the country uninhibitedly.

He also added: Thus some self-seeking middlemen have taken advantage of the opportunity by purchasing potatoes at exorbitant prices from the production centers, and by transferring the same to other parts of the country, they have created a black market for this product in Tehran.

Negarandeh went on to say: Following some talks with the Ministry of Interior, that ministry, through a circular, has asked the highway police [gendarmerie department] to prevent the unlawful transfer of potatoes from the production centers. As of the beginning of last week, after this circular was put into effect, further control and supervision on this important matter have been initiated: And as a result, the price of potatoes at the production centers has decreased to a certain degree.

Likewise, a number of teams from the Government's Headquarters for Consumer Protection have been dispatched to various parts of the country in order to put the second phase of this program into effect. The aforementioned team members have begun their extensive activities with regard to the detection of the hoarders and confiscation of the hoarded potatoes according to the fourth article of State Law of Consumer Protection.

Based on this report, yesterday morning one of the responsible officials of the public relations office of the Government's Headquarters for Consumer Protection in a radio program announced: With regard to the shortage of potatoes at some of the production centers, certain measures are underway to import more potatoes, therefore there is no need for concern, and God willing in the near future the black market's hold on this product will break.

PAKISTAN

U.S. Accusation on Refugee Aid Refuted

90010198B Karachi JANG in Urdu 18 Feb 90 p 3

[Editorial: "U.S. State Department's Ugly Accusation"]

[Text] According to the British Broadcasting Corporation, in explaining the reason for stopping the \$30 million food aid to Afghan refugees, a U.S. State Department spokesman charged that a Pakistani department had used the food to fill its own warehouses. The spokesman made some other statements as well, all to the effect that the U.S. aid sent for Afghan refugees is reportedly misappropriated in Pakistan. It is necessary here to pay attention, not to the accusations as such, but to the choice of time and atmosphere in which these charges were made public. The whole world knows that after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, America's greatest desire is to prevent the establishment of a government of true Muslims in Afghanistan. To achieve this aim, an understanding was reached at the summit with the Soviet Union, the real and sole objective of which was to arm the Najib regime with modern weapons against the Mujahidin. It is as clear as day that there was conspiracy afoot because at a time when, according to Soviet sources, daily 50 planes loaded with weapons were being sent [to Najib], the Americans totally stopped the supply of arms to the Mujahidin added to which, instead of handing over the arms to the Mujahidin alliance, the idea was advanced of sending the arms to commanders fighting within Afghanistan. Now, a willingness to recognize the Najib regime has been expressed as well. If, at this juncture, the U.S. State Department accuses Pakistani departments of so-called misappropriating aid sent for Afghan refugees, the objective becomes quite clear. It is not so difficult to see the reason behind these accusations because for several years communists have been levelling such charges against Pakistan. If there had been any truth to them, the United States would have said so a long time ago. The facts bear witness that at no time in the last 10 years did the United States make such an accusation. To start doing so now proves just one thing: that the United States and Russia are united in their efforts to damage the struggle and the cause of the Mujahidin, and to this end, they are trying to create a misunderstanding between the Mujahidin and the Pakistani departments. In view of the situation, the Afghan Mujahidin should reflect on this matter alone: that they will have to carry on their struggle without any outside support and with faith only in God. Neither Russia nor the United States want Muslims to rise and attain power, but God promises success to those who fight for the truth. We believe that this serious and decisive moment is a test of the mujahidin leaders' faith and spirit of jihad. As true Muslims, at this fateful time they should put their trust in God and, with the power of their faith, destroy the web of conspiracy spread by outside powers.

Military Said Pursuing Strong Public Relations

90010198C Karachi JANG in Urdu 17 Feb 90 p 3

[Column by Abdul Qadir Hasan: "Visits With the Army" under byline, "Nonpolitical Affairs"]

[Text] It appears that Brigadier Riazullah, head of the ISPR [Inter-Services Public Relations], is bent upon getting us journalists into uniform. This is the public relations department of the military and in the past, like the army, it stayed out of public sight. Not even we journalists, let alone the public, ever heard anything about it. Our colleagues who worked at the news desk were slightly acquainted with this department since, occasionally, a picture or a bit of news would come their way about a certain brigadier becoming a general or a certain general retiring. The name of the department would accompany the news or the photograph. Some of the heads of this army department enjoyed strong public relations on a personal basis. Whereas Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Maulana Chiragh Hasan Hasrat, and Z. A. Salahri were all at one time members or heads of this department, it gained celebrity mainly because of two Siddiquis and in particular our late, kind friend Siddiq Salek. He was the head of this department as well as press secretary to the late president; hence his name came up frequently. His writings were another important reason for his celebrity. It was during his term of office that the department, which was housed in Rawalpindi's old barracks, was renovated. The department director's office was redecorated in such a style that on seeing it, I exclaimed: "Mr. Salk, this room looks like a set from [the movie] Moghule Azam." He looked somewhat abashed. I found out later that his opponents criticized the renovation of the office; but since these were army internal affairs, we never came to know about it.

At any rate, as I was saying, individuals connected with the department were well known, but the department itself remained obscure. Now, Brigadier Riazullah has become the head of the department and he says that a year and a half ago, he had not even set eyes on a journalist, but departmentally he was now so close to journalists that he has become the target not only in the news but in columns as well. The new policy he has laid down for ISPR, if continued, will make him a continuous target for the press.

The military has now decided that the public and the military should be brought closer to each other, hence a seminar on defense was held last year in Rawalpindi and another one a few days ago in Lahore. Journalists from around the country and writers on defense matters were invited to the seminar and they read papers on formerly forbidden defense subjects and argued unreservedly even aggressively over them. I am a nonmilitary individual myself. At one time, the sole employment open to the inhabitants of my village was in the military and they were very proud of that fact. When any of them attained the rank of lieutenant or captain, the mother would not find any girl good enough to marry her son while the father would wear white cotton clothes, tie a muslin

turban, and make frequent visits to the post office in anticipation of a letter from the captain, his son. In spite of these ties with the man in the army, it always remained an unfamiliar entity to me. It was only when the military started imposing martial law that one began to see generals in the flesh. Otherwise, the situation was such that once when I went to visit a relative in Lahore who was in the army, the rickshaw driver dropped me off near the Lahore barracks and told me that he would not enter the military area. People were afraid of the army. In my village, when military vehicles passed through we would hide in our houses out of fear.

This fear of the army was dispelled during the martial law periods, when the military forced themselves into the ranks of civilians and people had to deal with the military night and day. These meetings removed the fear of the uniform, but another fear has taken its place which still exists and to dispel which the chief of the army, General Aslam Beg, repeats night and day. "We will not impose martial law." I have reasons for believing him when he says that he will not impose martial law. Otherwise, my first regular encounter with the army occurred in a course on wartime journalism. The tragedy of East Pakistan had already taken place and one of our teachers from the land army was General Surup Khan, who was then a full colonel and is now a retired lieutenant general. Whenever we journalists raised the subject of martial law, he would say in a tired and disgusted voice, "It is all over and done with; please let us not talk about it."

What then followed was the longest martial law ever imposed on the country. Anyway, these are old topics. Now, the brigadier head of ISPR is bent upon taking us even into the army's bedroom and is tearing down all barriers of separation. After all, why should there be any barriers between the military and the public in a free country? What would be the justification for it? Here we are going hungry to keep an army to defend us. Is it right that we should be afraid even to mention its name? Except in matters which should be kept secret in the national interest, the army should keep its doors open to the public and welcome them, for therein lies the honor of the army. One could cite any number of reasons to prove the validity of this attitude, but I will keep quiet and only request Brigadier Riazullah to continue what he is doing and to go further still.

Commentary Supports Pakistan-Iran Defense Cooperation

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[Editorial: "Islamic Countries Cooperate on Defense"]

[Text] According to knowledgeable sources, Pakistan and Iran will cooperate on matters relating to defense. The details of this agreement will be worked out between high level officials of the two countries. At present, a five-member military delegation from Pakistan led by chief of the army staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, is visiting Iran, and it is strongly hoped that General Beg's visit will greatly help defense cooperation between the two countries. Pakistan and Iran are bound both by strong ties of religion and culture. Both countries have common borders and already have naval and air relations. The geographical nearness of the two countries has far-reaching economic and defense advantages. After the Islamic revolution, the decrease in Iran's dependence on the great powers and other advanced countries has increased the need for closer cooperation with Islamic neighbors such as Pakistan. In this connection, an important fact to be noted is that on such regional matters as the Afghan issue, Pakistan and Iran have views which are quite close. Iran is an important country, which has in this modern period established an Islamic social system, and Pakistan is trying to establish an Islamic society as well. This common interest brings the interests and the objectives of the two countries closer together. Iran has always taken a courageous stand on problems facing the Islamic world. As a protest against the new wave of Indian tyranny in Kashmir, the government of Iran cancelled the visit of the Indian foreign minister to Tehran, and set an example of wide ranging Islamic unity worthy of emulation by other Islamic countries. In matters of defense, Iran has always been a sympathetic supporter. Cooperation in matters of defense can dispel, to a certain extent, the discriminatory treatment of Iran by the West, while the support of a territorially vast country like Iran can prove extremely advantageous to Pakistan. An important benefit to be gained from a wide economic and defense cooperation between Pakistan and Iran is that this cooperation can form the basis for extending it to the Gulf states and other Muslim countries of the region. Thus, wider cooperation and unity among Muslim countries can be facilitated. Earlier, defense cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey was extended. In our view, in order to counter the ambitions of India and other such Islam-hating countries in the region, it is vital to cooperate in defense matters with Iran and the other Muslim countries of the area. The leaders of Islamic countries should cooperate in promoting this aim in order to create an effective barrier against the dangers facing the common interests of Islamic countries in the region.

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